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INTRODUCTION 
The following dissertation has as its purpose an inquiry into 
the concrete significance of the "turn" in Heidegger's work. The 1928 
lecture course entitled Metaphysische Anfangsgrtinde der Logik im Aus-
gang von Leibniz yields essential clues to the solution of the problem 
of the turn, for Heidegger introduces, in this text, a distinction 
between ontology and metontology [Metontologie] which provides a basis 
for understanding the transition from the early to the middle period in 
his work. 
The usual formulation of the turn as a "turn from Dasein to 
Being" is inadequate either as a representation of the progression of 
Heidegger's work or as a characterization of the sense of the turn 
itself. According to this perspective on Heidegger's work, usually 
called the "developmental" view, in the initial phase Heidegger focused 
upon transcendence as foundational of thought and world; in the later 
phase, he shifts to a "Being-centered problematic"l. David Krell2 
speaks of a "developmentalist bog"3 with reference to the image of the 
turn as an advance from phenomenology to "the other thinking"; presum-
ably this formulation is meant to characterize Richardson's position in 
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The worst version of the 
developmentalist view, according to Krell, is that of Bollnow and 
L6with; for them, in the later Heidegger "a mystical and mystifying 
contemplation of pure Being replaces existential analysis"4. 
Krell correctly insists, against every parody of the turn, that 
1 
2 
Heidegger continues in his later period to emphasize the "antic 
fundament"5 that supports the thinking of Being. Surely one can ask, 
however, whether some view of Heidegger's "development" isn't possible 
which neither runs roughshod over the central concerns of each phase of 
Heidegger's work, nor which neglects the textual evidence that essen-
tial changes occur in Heidegger's approach. Krell, in his own discus-
sion, fails to account for or even recognize the change of approach 
manifest in Heidegger's middle- and late-period texts. In opposition 
to the developmentalist view, he says only that "'Heidegger-II' intro-
duces humanity (der Mensch) into his texts far more liberally than does 
the 'Heidegger-I' who analyzes Da-Sein"6. Apparently content with 
merely disputing the claim that Heidegger turns from man to Being in 
his later work, Krell fails to recognize that it is precisely the prob-
lem of the "antic fundament" which leads to the crisis in Heidegger's 
work to which the turn is a response. 
Even while suggesting that the changes in Heidegger's thought 
arise from an increasing concern with the problematic of finitude, 
Krell takes a rationalistic view of the effect of this issue on Hei-
degger's thought. For he holds that, because Heidegger is aware quite 
early ("in 1924 or 1925"7) that the project of ontology is threatened 
by the concept of the finitude of time, "the difficulty is whether the 
word Kehre in the developmentalist sense can mean anything at all any 
more"8. Krell seems actually to suggest that if a determinate set of 
problems can be found which Heidegger addresses in his work, then there 
is no need to attempt to characterize and account for the manifest 
changes in his work. Thus in his essay "Heidegger's Ostensible Turn-
3 
ing," we find the following remarks: 
By now the disadvantage of all such developmentalist 
approaches--whatever semblance of order they provide--ought to 
have become apparent. Whether we subdivide Heidegger into two or 
three or even more parts, the problem remains that the moment we 
begin to think about any element of any part that element itself 
turns back and forth to all the remaining elements of Heidegger's 
thought .... Each element of Heidegger's thought turns, showing 
itself in sundry perspectives. These turnings seem to have had 
no first beginning in Heidegger's career; they certainly have no 
final end once we ourselves begin to turn with them.9 
That the elements of Heidegger's thought remain, in a certain sense, a 
constant set, and that Heidegger explores these in different ways at 
different times, "turning" back and forth among them, is undoubtedly 
true but of rather minimal significance by itself. What philosopher 
doesn't reexamine the "elements" of his thought over and over again? 
Krell's remarks here trivialize the issue. They offer no clue concern-
ing a question which demands a response in this context: Given that 
there are changes in Heidegger's thought--i.e., reformulations, mani-
fest in the texts themselves, of the issues of central concern in 
Heidegger's problematic--how can they be characterized and accounted 
for? It is not at all necessary to suppose, as Krell so strangely 
does, that the problem of the turn can be formulated only in terms of a 
change of focus from man to Being (or vice versa) and that it can be 
answered by saying that Heidegger's attention moves from one element to 
another at different times. The notion of a "turn" has already entered 
into the tradition of Heidegger scholarship; the usage of this word is 
legitimate, as long as it is understood that we cannot presume that we 
already know in what the turn consists, in any concrete sense. Perhaps 
the characterization of neither the ''developmentalists" nor those who, 
like Krell, simply oppose them, is correct. The root of the problem, 
we maintain, lies in the polemical, and quite "unphenomenological" 
choice offered us: to defend the identity of the "matter itself" 
throughout Heidegger's career, and thus to be charged with having to 
find evidence that his "thought" never changes: or to take Heidegger's 
work as though a series of position-papers were being offered, so that 
his "philosophy" changes depending upon whether its focus is transcen-
dence, truth, or time. The question of the turn is, however, first of 
I!!! a textual issue: Through what changes of focus, transpositions, or 
reformulations are we conducted as we proceed along the vectors encoun-
tered in, and even constitutive of, Heidegger's texts? And the ques-
tion of unity would then no longer ask about the "unchanging content" 
of Heidegger's work, but about what fundamental inquiry, pursued with 
ever-deepening insistence, is responsible for precisely those changes. 
What would it mean to deny that essential changes occur in the 
course of Heidegger's work? Presumably it would mean that Heidegger 
could, if he liked, have written Qn the Essence of Truth in 1926, or 
The End of Philosophy in 1930. Let us suppose, then, that he could, in 
some literal sense, have written down these words at the beginning of 
his career. Would that fact help us to understand any of these texts? 
If we are to suppose that it means anything to call Heidegger's work a 
"path" of thought, then the sequential character of his work is to some 
degree constitutive of its meaning, and must therefore be taken into 
account in any interpretive inquiry. Heidegger himself says, in the 
Letter to Richardson, that "the reversal is in play within the matter 
itself"lO. One of the functions of The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic is to show how the turn arises as a consequence of the fulfill-
4 
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ment of the ontological project. MFL is a transitional text, in which 
Heidegger deliberately gathers up the work of his "early" period into 
an interpretation which prepares for the coming "turn." 
Before proceeding to our own reading of this and other relevant 
texts, let us look briefly at what Richardson, with his presumably 
"developmentalist" view, has to say, in fact, about the "reversal" in 
Heidegger's thought. The turn from the phenomenological approach to 
"There-being"ll results, according to Richardson, from Heidegger's 
recognition of the primacy of Being in the disclosive process; the 
latter is now conceived as essentially historical: 
Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it 
is Being that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending 
itself unto its There. We may speak of this self-sending as 
proceeding from Being and call it a "self-emitting," or, if we 
may be permitted a neologism to designate a completely new 
concept, a "mittence" (Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it, 
too, as terminating in There and therefore call it a "com-
mitting" or "com-mitment" (Schicksal) of There to its privil-
eged destiny as the shepherd of Being.12 
Richardson understands the thinking of Being not only as fundamentally 
"historical" (in the sense of the Seinsgeschichte) but also as address-
ing the concealment or withdrawal intrinsic to "Being": "To think 
Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its posi-
tivity but in its negativity."13 Indeed, the turn is demanded precise-
ly by the original experience of the "negativity" of Being, and is the 
result of carrying the analysis through to its end: 
What is more, this transformation is not an arbitrary thing, 
determined by extrinsic circumstances. Much less is it an escape 
into a new problematic necessitated by the dereliction of the 
old. Rather, the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II 
is born out of a necessity imposed by the original experience of 
Being as finite (negative). For the shift of focus from There-
being to Being (which, as far as we can see, characterizes the 
decisive difference between the two periods) was demanded by the 
exigencies of the hermeneutic analysis itself, as soon as it 
became clear that the primacy in the Being-process belongs to 
Being itself. And when was this? Precisely when the author 
began to meditate the negativity of truth as such. This we take 
to be the genuine sense of the "reversal" in WW, for it was then 
that he began to appreciate the full import of what it means for 
concealment somehow to precede non-concealment in the coming-to-
pass of a-letheia.14 
What is missing in Richardson's account is an indication of what 
specific "exigencies" demanded the "shift of focus"; a precise charac-
terization of how the experience of Being as finite requires the trans-
formation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II; and a concrete understand-
ing, in the light of Heidegger's texts, of what it means to turn from 
"There-being to Being." Richardson's recognition that there is a 
"shift of focus" from transcendence to the problem of "mittence," and 
that a more radical experience of "negativity" plays a role in initiat-
ing this shift is undoubtedly correct. Yet Richardson offers, in fact, 
little more than a topical outline of themes relevant to the question 
of the turn. When we examine the texts more closely, we will find that 
the formula "from Dasein to Being" is not of much help as a character-
ization of the turn, the so far unexplored "logic" of which we are 
seeking in the present undertaking. 
Although Heidegger's later texts are increasingly concerned with 
the language appropriate to thinking the "withdrawal" of Being, the 
question for any interpretation of the meaning of the turn is how 
Heidegger's increasing concern with "negativity"--a questionable term, 
in any case, with reference to Heidegger's thought of "withdrawal"--
emerges in Heidegger's work and how it is developed in the sequence of 
his texts. 
We shall attempt to retrace a part of the movement of Heidegger's 
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thought, as it manifests itself on the basis of the view that Heidegger 
himself offers of his early work in the (recently translated) Metaphys-
ical Foundations of Logic. There we find that Heidegger defines die 
Kehre on the basis of a concept of metaphysics to which he assimilates 
his own early work. Thus it is, for the Heidegger of The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, at the culminating moment of the development of 
the first part of metaphysics--ontology--that the turn, as the self-
overturning of ontology, occurs and gives rise to the second part of 
metaphysics, which Heidegger calls "metontology" (Metontologie). Here 
is how Heidegger characterizes the moment of this change, or metabole: 
What must be kept in mind, particularly with regard to funda-
mental ontology, is that it is precisely the radicality and 
universality of this central problematic, and it alone, which 
brings us to realize that these problems are indeed central; but 
for that very reason they are in their import and essentiality 
never the sole problems. In other words, fundamental ontology 
does not exhaust the notion of metaphysics. 
Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already 
there, fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward 
a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible 
only when Being is understood in its whole problematic. The 
intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of 
origin can be clarified by reference to the primal phenomenon of 
human existence: the being "man" understands Being15; under-
standing of Being effects a distinction between Being and beings; 
Being is there only when Dasein understands Being. In other 
words, the possibility that Being is there in the understanding 
presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn 
presupposes the factual extantness of nature. Right within the 
horizon of the problem of Being, when posed radically, it appears 
that all this is visible and can become understood as Being, only 
if a possible totality of beings is already there. 
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for 
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This 
new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and 
is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its metabole. I 
designate this set of questions metontology [Metontologie]. (MFL 
156-57 /199 )16 
The locus of the turn from Heidegger's early to his middle17 period is 
specified here, not as anything like a turn from Dasein to Being, but 
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as a shift from the problematic of ontology to that of "being as a 
whole." 
Our task is to show how the turn arises, as an issue, in relation 
to Heidegger's inquiry into the twofold structure of metaphysics. The 
turn is the locus of what we shall call the "dynamic" relation between 
the two parts of metaphysics, ontology and metontology. Heidegger 
assimilates his own work to the concept of metaphysics operative in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; thus the turn must be interpreted 
from the twofold structure of metaphysics. Heidegger's first account 
of ontology and "theology" simply establishes the relation between them 
in a thematic, external way, and refers to Aristotle's two definitions 
of metaphysics. What is at stake here is the possibility of a "repeti-
tion" of metaphysics. But Heidegger's aim in repeating metaphysics, 
following the "reduction" of philosophy to metaphysics (the Destruk-
tion), is to recover the source of philosophy as such. Metaphysics, in 
MFL, means philosophy in its source--its essence, that grounding 
"activity" which gives rise to philosophy. Thus, in its repetition, 
metaphysics becomes the "metaphysics of Dasein." The turn arises out 
of the encounter with the source; it is with the fulfillment of ontolo-
gy that the necessity of its "overturning" appears. 
In the Appendix to MFL, Heidegger speaks of a metabole. The 
relation between the two parts of metaphysics becomes a "dynamic" one 
as ontology is overturned (umkehrt) into metontology. Thus it is our 
task to trace, first in MFL and then in certain of Heidegger's other 
works, the development of the relation between the two parts of meta-
physics. The turn in Heidegger's work can be understood in terms of 
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this development: The turn from Heidegger I to Heidegger II takes 
place with the completion of the metabole of ontology into metontology. 
The following summary of the five chapters of the dissertation is 
intended to serve as an extended statement of its thesis: 
The first chapter, essentially an exposition of Heidegger's own 
Introduction to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic explains the 
meaning of "metaphysics" for the early Heidegger, and shows how Heideg-
ger conceives of his own project as aiming toward a retrieval of the 
twofold structure of metaphysics. Ontology, the "first part" of meta-
physics, concerns the interpretation of the Being of beings, "being as 
such"; theology (metontology) concerns the relation of man, as Dasein, 
to "being as a whole." 
In Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics ontology is incorpora-
ted, as one element, or one pole, into the larger twofold structure. 
Thus ontology is displaced from its central role in Heidegger's 
thought. This displacement (or overturning), however, is effected not 
by adding a newly discovered element to the framework of Heidegger's 
thought, but by following the internal "logic" of the development of 
ontology. The new investigation "resides in the essence of ontology 
itself" (MFL 157), and arises with the very fulfillment of the onto-
logical project. But in Heidegger's Introduction, the relation between 
the two parts of metaphysics is first presented in "static" terms as 
the relation between Aristotelean "ontology" and "theology." 
Heidegger makes it clear in his Introduction that he means to 
undertake a repetition (Wiederholung) of this relation. It is through 
repetition that the relation between the two parts of metaphysics is to 
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become "dynamic," i.e., that the metabole is to be effected. 
Thus, the second chapter shows how Heidegger begins to expand 
upon the twofold relation within metaphysics in the course of his 
Destruktion of Leibniz's monadology. In the Destruktion Heidegger 
dismantles Leibniz's logic down to its ground in ontology; at the same 
time, he shows how Leibnizian ontology, characterizing the Being of 
beings as drive, leads immediately to the problem of the individuation 
of drive, i.e., to the problem of the concretely exisiting monad. In 
his discussion of the monadology, Heidegger emphasizes the transforma-
tion, in Leibniz's thought, of the traditional metaphysical concepts of 
"possibility" and "actuality." The problem of metaphysics becomes that 
of the relation between what Heidegger calls "possibility" and "possi-
ble actuality," i.e., between the Being of the monad as drive and the 
individuation of drive in a unique apperception of the "world." Rei 
degger shows the internal relation between these two parts of metaphys-
ics. As drive, the monad represents (perceptio) a multiplicity to 
itself in a unifying act (appetitio) which grasps its own relation to 
the multiplicity in the very act of unification (apperception). Here 
the relation is immediate or internal, as it were--the theory of drive 
as possibility, properly understood, calls for the theory of appercep-
tion, which is concerned with the individuation of the monad in rela-
tion to a potential multiplicity. 
The twofold relation--between the general characterization of 
Being in terms of the "drive" of the monad, and the individuation of 
drive in the particular monad, is reduplicated in Heidegger's "re-
trieval" of Being and Time in UO of MFL. Thus the third chapter takes 
10 
up Heidegger's formulation of the problem of metaphysics as that of the 
relation between what he calls the neutrality of Dasein and concretely 
existing Dasein. Heidegger calls the twofold the "meta-physics of 
oasein"(139)--metaphysics is now the metaphysics of Dasein. If ontol-
logy "repeats" the Leibnizian problem of drive, then metontology re-
peats that of individuation, or the concretization of ontology. 
The neutrality of Dasein signifies the dimension of fundamental 
ontology, which Heidegger interprets, in ,10, in terms of possibility, 
essence, and origin. The concept of neutrality occupies the place of 
the traditional metaphysical concept of essence. Neutral Dasein, like 
the Platonic form which is separated from its instances by the chor-
ismos, is "separated" in relation to the concrete facticity of that 
humanity, i.e., existing Dasein, which it makes possible. "The pecul-
iar neutrality of the term "Dasein" is essential, because the inter-
pretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual 
[faktische] concretion" (136/171-72). 
What is at issue in fundamental-ontological inquiry is the 
"source" of the Being of factically existing Dasein, the transcen-
dental-horizonal structure which makes its understanding of Being 
possible. But precisely because the neutrality of Dasein means its 
possibility, and does not "exist" as neutral (137), the origin cannot, 
in the end, be thought in separation from concretely existing Dasein. 
Thus metaphysical neutrality is "not an empty abstraction from the 
ontic, a neither-nor"; it is rather the "authentic concreteness of the 
origin, the not-yet of factical dispersion" (137). Here the same 
internal transition takes place that Heidegger discerns in Leibniz's 
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monadology, where the theory of drive demands an immediate transition 
to the problem of the individuation of the monad. The monad is always 
individuated, and in its individuation constitutively "reflects" a 
world. Similarly, as the "potency of the origin," Dasein is itself 
already "dispersed" (zerstreut), in every case, into a manifold, in 
relation to which it has the potentiality of existing "concretely," 
i.e., effecting a concrete disclosure of that manifold (as a world). 
Thus, in the recapitalation of ontology in tlO, something like a 
transition to "metontology," i.e., to the problem of being as a whole, 
occurs. However, the significance of this transition--wherein lies the 
whole problem of the turn--is not addressed here. Yet the problem of 
history (in a sense not yet encountered in the treatment of histor-
icity in Being and Time, since historicity is a function of neutral 
Dasein) looms on the horizon. The problem can only become an issue in 
its own right when the principle that "neutral Dasein never exists" is 
thought through to the end: For the situatedness of every project, 
including that of fundamental ontology, raises the question of whether 
it makes sense to think of transhistorical Dasein as foundational of 
history. In this sense, the Q!:_Oblem of history is that of the "origin" 
of a multiplicity of historical disclosures of the "meaning of Being," 
when all disclosure is essentially historical. This is the problem of 
the Seinsgeschichte: how to think origin without addressing a source 
"transcendent" to history, i.e., to the series of unconcealments of 
Being. Heidegger's middle period is characterized by the attempt to 
think the problem of origin in a resolutely "anti-metaphysical" way, if 
by metaphysics we mean the attempt to ground history in something 
12 
superior to or other than history. Even the residue of ontic thinking 
that remains in the grounding of Being in Dasein--where Dasein is the 
metaphysically privileged "being"--is rejected in the inquiries of the 
middle period. 
Heidegger has tried to show, first in his Destruktion of Leibniz 
and then in his retrieval of Being and Time, how something like a 
transition to the problematic of concretely existing Dasein is implicit 
in the fulfillment of the ontological project. Section 10 indicates, 
furthermore, that it is necessary to think the neutrality of Dasein 
before the issues connected with the factuality of its concrete exis-
tence can be addressed. The overturning of ontology is not possible 
apart from the full development of ontology. In ontology, the language 
of metaphysical questioning is articulated for the first time. Thus it 
would be impossible for metaphysics to "begin" with a survey (say) of 
the characteristics of a multiplicity of concretely existing "Daseins" 
--because one would not know where to look: The very concept of Dasein 
is ontological in character. The significance of the concreteness of 
factically existing Dasein can only become evident as the result of 
ontological inquiry. It begins to become evident that ontology has as 
its aim its own overturning, and is at the same time an essential 
prerequisite for that overturning. 
Chapter IV shows the internal connection between ontology and its 
overturning into metontology. The inner significance of ontology lies 
in its Umschlag into metontology. The transition from ontology to met-
ontology takes place in both a formal and a radical sense; the latter 
is the Umschlag proper. 
13 
We have seen, in connection with Heidegger's interpretation of 
Leibniz's ontology, that there is an internal relationship between 
ontology--in Leibniz's case the ontology of drive--and the theory of 
the individuation of the monad, i.e., the doctrine of apperception. We 
have also been able to find in ,10 of MFL evidence of a necessary tran-
sition between the ontology of neutral Dasein and the inquiry into "the 
authentic concreteness of the origin, the not-yet of factical disper-
sion" (MFL 137). These transitions remain "formal," in the sense that 
the "overturning" is in each case is required by the nature of the 
ontology, but does not yet effect an undermining of the ontological 
project as such. In Chapters IV and V, we find that the completion of 
the ontological project in the fullest sense requires the transition to 
a new method of inquiry; the fulfillment of the project exposes the 
limitations of a transcendental-horizonal investigation. Heidegger's 
inquiry into the origin of metaphysics is shifted onto a new ground. 
It is no longer an ontology, a transcendental-horizonal inquiry into 
the source of the meaning of Being, i.e., into the nature of Dasein as 
the ground of metaphysics, but a metontology: an inquiry into how 
metaphysics arises from the midst of "being as a whole." This shift is 
the key to the meaning of the "turn" from "Heidegger I" to "Heidegger 
I I." 
Chapter IV shows how the transition takes place, both formally or 
logically--the fulfillment of ontology in the "Temporal science" 
requires a return to the concrete significance of temporalization, or 
the "individuation" of Dasein--and radically, for the finitude of time 
also casts doubt upon the concept of Dasein as fundament, as ground of 
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the possibility of metaphysics in general. To use the language of 110, 
neutral Dasein never "exists"; Dasein is always individuated or "con-
crete," so that the very concept of a Dasein which, as such, serves the 
metaphysically privileged position of ground is called into question. 
Heidegger is fully aware of the issue in Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic: 
[P]rojection of the basic ontological constitution of Dasein must 
arise by constructing one of the most extreme possibilities of 
Dasein 1 s authentic and total capability of Being. The projection 
is directed towards Dasein, as a whole, and towards the basic 
determinations of its wholeness, even though Dasein in each case 
is only as existent. To put it another way, attaining the meta-
physical neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only pos-
sible on the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement of the 
one who himself projects. (MFL 139-40) 
Ontology is itself a "metontological" project. Ontology, like any 
other metaphysical project, reveals "the essential finitude of Dasein's 
existence ... through and in the service of each possible totality" 
(140). Thus ontology is a finite project, in service to a "totality" 
of beings. It does not stand outside a concrete (historical) config-
uration of beings, but itself belongs to a "time and place," mani 
festing its own "perspective," its own manner of "apperceiving" beings. 
The ontological project required the construction of a model of Dasein 
--an "extreme construction"--standing outside of time and "place," and 
providing the ground for every possible interpretation of the meaning 
of Being. (Thus, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger locates 
the origin of the interpretation of Being as "production" in the pro-
ductive modes of Dasein 1 s comportment.) But the fulfillment of the 
ontological project shows that such an ahistorical concept of Dasein is 
doomed to failure. Not only does neutral Dasein never "exist," the 
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finitude of time makes nonsense of the very concept of the ontological 
neutrality of the ground, and thus undermines the possibility of some-
thing like a transcendental-horizonal inquiry into the foundations of 
metaphysics. The attempt to grasp Dasein as a whole shows, in the end, 
that Dasein cannot be "grasped" as a whole, making its self-transpar-
ency the prelude to a "science of Being." The turn represents the 
radical re-origination of the project of "founding" metaphysics, 
undertaken now as an inquiry into the very possibility of anything like 
a questioning about the origin of metaphysics. For there can be no 
origin--neither metaphysical, nor historically manifest--outside the 
"whole of beings," no privileged standpoint from which to ask about the 
foundation of metaphysics. Because there can be no such privileged 
standpoint, Heidegger in the middle period rejects the possibility of 
the type of inquiry which would locate the ground in relation to any 
specific Seinsverstandnis. Thus in the middle period Heidegger under-
takes a radical inquiry into the "problem of origin." How can an 
origin be thought which is not itself entangled in metaphysical 
representations of origin? Differently put--how can we think "Being 
itself"? Thus this enterprise continues, in more radical fashion, 
Heidegger's attempt to distinguish Being from beings, to refuse to 
Being any name that derives from beings or even being as a whole. The 
radicalization of the "question of Being" means that the source of the 
history of metaphysics can no longer be conceived to be Dasein, the 
concrete site of a specific understanding of Being (metaphysics), nor 
can it be conceived on the model of an abstract or neutral meta-being 
outside the sequence of the concrete, historical disclosures of the 
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meaning of Being. To question "Being" for its own sake, then, means to 
undertake the continuing radicalization of the question of Origin. 
That questioning begins--or, rather, is re-initiated, on the 
basis of the failure of ontology and its overturning--in essays written 
at the end of the early period. In particular, it is in On the Essence 
of Truth that Heidegger begins the inquiry into the origination of 
metaphysics in the midst of the whole of beings. Thus On the Essence 
of Truth is a "metontological" treatise, and it opens up the question-
ing that continues through the middle period of Heidegger's work. 
The radicalization of fundamental ontology, with its discovery of 
the finitude of time, results in the turning back of ontology into the 
"metaphysical ontic" from which it arises and "in which it implicitly 
always remains" (MFL 158). The metontological problematic concerns the 
happening of metaphysics--or, in On The Essence of Truth, of the dis-
closure of beings--in the midst of being as a whole. The turn means 
the re-origination of the question of the origin of metaphysics on the 
basis of the metontological problematic, following the overturning of 
the transcendental-horizonal inquiry. 
"Finitude," now, is no longer a property of Dasein but of being 
as a whole. Heidegger no longer says that "transcendence" is grounded 
in "finitude," but that unconcealment occurs in relation to the con-
cealment of being as a whole. The regression from truth as correspon-
dence to the "essence" of truth as freedom shows how the "question of 
the essence of man" (BW 127) remains central to the problem of disclo-
sure. Nonetheless, the regression locates the ground of disclosure, 
not in the finitude of Dasein, but in the concealment of being as a 
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whole. Furthermore, the essence of freedom lies in "letting beings 
be," and this letting-be is possible only on the basis of an attunement 
to being as a whole. Heidegger writes here of Verhalten or comport-
ment, the relation of man to beings in their disclosure. Comportment 
is openness to beings. But comportment is already "attuned and in this 
attunement is drawn up into being as a whole" (131), a being as a whole 
which remains, as a whole, concealed. The relation between comportment 
and atttunement replaces the interrelationship in Being and Time 
between understanding and mood. Atttunement takes place from out of 
"being as a whole" itself, so that "finitude" is no longer a function 
of man, not even as Dasein, but of being (das Seiende) itself. The 
primordial concealment of being as a whole is "untruth" (Unwesen), and 
therefore untruth is the essence of truth. 
Man can be open to beings, and thus be "insistent" in his bearing 
(Verhaltnis) toward beings--i.e., fall into a concern with beings 
alone--precisely because the concealment of being as a whole conceals 
itself in that concealing. As such self-concealing, it is the 
"mystery." "Mystery" names the whole of man's relatedness to being, 
and is that relationship which gives rise to ~istory as errance. There 
is a "turning to and fro" (Zu- und Wegwendung) which is proper to 
Dasein, and which is a function of the "need" (Not) to which Dasein is 
bound. "History" is constituted by this turning to and fro, toward 
what is "readily available" (135) and away from the mystery; indeed, 
Dasein itself is nothing other than this "turning into need." And the 
Turn--in Heidegger's "technical" sense, and for this "metontological" 
text--is nothing other than this turning into need, which "constitutes" 
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Dasein (history, disclosure). The Turn is a turning into errancy as 
such, Le., into that "finitude" which is no longer the finitude of 
man. Thus the Turn signifies a movement opposite to that which seems 
to be indicated with the rubric "science of Being." And to inquire 
into "Being as such" is to inquire into "oblivion as such." 
It is not the inquiry into oblivion as such that is undertaken in 
on the Essence of Truth, however, but the inquiry into the concealment 
of being as a whole. The inquiry into oblivion, or withdrawal, as such 
(Heidegger "III"), cannot be undertaken directly because the withdrawal 
of Being is not an "objective" phenomenon which can be examined in 
distinction from the event of withdrawal, i.e., the concealment of 
being as a whole which occurs with every event of disclosure. To make 
aletheia, the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, into an 
object of inquiry would be to turn it into a metaphysical origin of the 
various epochs in the history of Being. To question the origin is not 
to leave the field of historical disclosure, i.e., being as a whole, 
but it is rather to question that process which occurs in the event of 
the unconcealment of being as such and as a whole. It is by question-
ing this event, which is in every case "concrete" in its occurrence, 
that the problem of origin is addressed. Thus the questioning of origin 
never leaves the field of the totality of beings, never departs being 
into a meta-physical realm. What happens in that questioning is not 
something that we can follow here, except to say that it becomes the 
questioning of the "event" as such (Ereignis), that its aim is to 
develop the language appropriate to the thinking of aletheia, and that 
it is intertwined with the question of the transformed relationship of 
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•an to language. The phrase "truth of essence" is merely a heuristic 
phrase in relation to this potential development of the questioning of 
the essence of truth which, in the original material of On the Essence 
of Truth, can merely accomplish the regression to the problematic of 
the concealment of being as a whole. It is in relation to the over-
turning of ontology into metontology that it can be understood how the 
central issue of the middle period becomes the Seinsgeschichte. For 
the latter problem is simply that of the character of the "event" in 
its concreteness as the series of the disclosures of being as such as a 
whole. This primary concreteness is now the starting-point for the 
inquiry into the possibility of such disclosure. 
In spite of this reversal, it is clear that Heidegger continues 
to inquire into the "source of the possibility" of disclosure (of 
thought; of metaphysics; of philosophy as such; of world). It is in 
the character of this inquiry as a "questioning of origin" that the 
continuity and unity of Heidegger's thought consists, since this 
questioning, pursued to its consequences in the most radical fashion, 
motivates the changes in Heidegger's work. 
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NOTES 
1. William J. Richardson, From Phenomenology to Thought. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 207. 
2. Krell is the first to write in English of the Metontologie, in his 
Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's 
Think!!!g_of 1l11ing, ch. 2, "Fundamental Ontology, Meta-Ontology, Frontal 
ontology." Krell recognizes the connection between "meta-ontology" and 
finitude, but seems to find in this theme only the evidence of Heideg-
ger's recognition of the futility or simple failure of his early tran-
scendental-horizonal project. But metontology is the fulfillment of 
ontology (cf. Heidegger's interpretation of metabole in his lecture on 
Aristotle's Physics B,l). Krell places finitude and ontology in a re-
lationship of opposition, in spite of his own recognition that "Heideg-
ger's choice of that word [Umschlag] now aims to exhibit something of 
the unfolding or maturation of his own question." (p. 39) There is a 
considerable difference between "unfolding" and "maturation," since one 
means fulfillment in an overturning, and the other only a "better judg-
ment" with reference to the problem. 
3. Krell, p. 95. 
4. Krell, p. 98. 
5. Krell, p. 98. 
6. Krell, p. 99. 
7. Krell, p. 100. 
8. Krell, p. 99. 
9. Krell, p. 105. 
10. Richardson, p. xviii. 
11. Richardson characterizes the early, "phenomenological'' approach as 
follows: 
In the present case, the phenomenon with which we are 
concerned is There-being itself. The task is to let-be-seen the 
Being of There-being .... To permit the There-being, then, to 
reveal of its own accord what it is and how it is (as ontological 
comprehension, existence, finite transcendence), Heidegger will 
submit it to a phenomenological analysis and thus lay the Being 
of There-being out (Auslegung) in full view. (Richardson, p. 47) 
It is in "There-being" that Being is disclosed, so that the "thinking 
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of Being" can take place, at this stage of Heidegger's thought, only 
through the analysis of Dasein. 
12. Richardson, p. 20. 
13. Richardson, p. 21. 
14. Richardson, p. 624. 
15. I have consistently modified all translations, where Sein has been 
translated "being," to read "Being." There are several reasons for 
insisting upon translating Sein with the capital "B." In the first 
instance, Sein is a different word from das Seiende, and many passages 
read more efficiently with the aid of the capitalization; witness a 
passage like this from Michael Heim's translation of The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic: 
Human Dasein is a being with a kind of being to which it belongs 
essentialy to understand something like being. (p. 16) 
More importantly, the real question is why "Being" should not be 
capitalized in the Heideggerian text, when it is the term of central 
importance in his thought. Presumably Being has been de-capitalized 
precisely because it is of such central importance; thus, many inter-
preters have wanted to resist the reification of the concept of Being, 
or its elevation into a mystical goal of thought. Being is turned into 
be-ing, since presumably Sein only means the "being-process," something 
verbal and not an "object" at all. But does this (quite correct) 
observation about the verbal character of Being resolve anything at 
all? Precisely what is mysterious about Being is the fact that it is 
no being, that it is "nothing." Even the attempt to think Being as an 
"event" runs aground, again and again, on the representational pull of 
the language inherited from our metaphysical tradition. The very 
thinking of Ereignis is to a certain degree a response to the attempt 
to say in what "be-ing," Being as event, consists. Thus the presumed 
demystification of Being only has the effect of covering over the 
profound and genuine difficulties inherent in the attempt to think 
Being. Being is a mystery; its numinosity for thought is at least 
suggested by the capitalization. 
Furthermore, it is not even quite correct to emphasize, always, 
the verbal aspect of Sein. The constant questioning of Being means 
that Being is, for Heidegger's thought, an unknown which is always 
addressed, which itself originates the questioning, whose multifold 
meanings enter into play in the questioning, but which we do not yet 
know how to name. Being is, in an odd way, a cipher which arrives from 
the tradition but which is not properly addressed therein. Heidegger's 
thought undertakes a transformation of this very concept, mediating the 
metamorphosis of Being into Ereignis. The decapitalization of Being 
suggests that we know what Being is; that we do not is, however, 
precisely the starting-point and ground of Heidegger's inquiry. 
Finally, Heim translates das Seiende im Ganzen as "beings as a 
whole," but it is often useful to translate it as "being as a whole," 
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since the emphasis here is precisely upon the totality of the ontic 
realm as such, not upon the "collection" of beings which make it up. 
16 . 1 shall refer to Heidegger's texts by pagination, within quotation 
aarks, and always with the understanding that the page numbers refer to 
the last text explicitly designated within quotation marks. Because I 
usually quote the text in English, I shall give the English page 
reference first; an "m" following the reference means that I have 
aodified the translation, however slightly (except that I shall not 
note the modification in changing "being" (Sein) to "Being," or, in the 
case of Hofstadter's translation of the Grundprobleme, "the Dasein" to 
"Dasein"); the German textual reference follows a slash, but is 
included only if I have modified the translation or have referred to 
the German text within the quotation. 
17. For heuristic purposes, I accept Poggeler's three-stage account of 
Heidegger's work, as reported by Krell (Krell, p 104): 
Poggeler's first stage comprises Heidegger's Marburg years 
and the first several years of the second Freiburg period, 
roughly 1923 to 1930 .... The second stage comprises the 1930s 
and 1940s, when the question of the meaning of Being develops in 
the direction of the truth of Being. . The 
third tier of Heidegger's career rises in the years 1950 to 1964, 
when Heidegger "modifies" the question of the truth of Being by 
asking about the site or locale of Being, the topos of the topic. 
We need not accept precisely this characterization of the three stages, 
but I shall work within the framework of this periodization. I am 
attempting, in this essay, to show how Heidegger enters the second 
period, and at the same time to show how to characterize the work of 
that period. My claim is that the turn should be understood through 
the occurrence announced in the quoted text from MFL, the overturning 
of ontology into metontology. In that case, however, we might suspect 
that the third period would be marked by something like a re-turn--to a 
transformed ontology, i.e., to the problem of language. But this 
question of the entry into Heidegger's later period is not an issue 
which I shall address here. Rather, I wish to show through a 
"practical" criticism how the problem of the turn is first of all a 
textual issue, since the first question to be asked is what changes do 
exhibit themselves in the development of Heidegger's work. The essay 
"On the Essence of Truth" constitutes a demonstra- tion of the 
direction Heidegger's questioning takes once the principal issue 
becomes the metontological one of the origin of "truth" in the midst of 
being as a whole. 
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Chapter I 
Heidegger's Early Concept of Metaphysics 
In the texts of the Marburg period, Heidegger writes of founding 
metaphysics and searches for the "ground of its possibility"; later, 
his interest in the foundational problem seems to disappear, since in 
the texts of the middle period he is clearly concerned with something 
like an "overcoming" of metaphysics. What accounts for this apparent 
change is that, while in the early texts "metaphysics" is used in a 
positive sense, in the texts of the later period metaphysics has come 
to mean the thinking that belongs to the epoch of the oblivion of 
Being. For the Heidegger of the early period, "metaphysics" names the 
essence of philosophy. Metaphysics is the goal of the Destruktion, 
with its regression to the "source-ground" of philosophy, and is the 
source of the possibility of philosophical thinking as such. 
In fact, the problem of metaphysics holds the key to an inter-
pretation of Heidegger's early philosophical project--and with this key 
the door opens to an understanding of the continuity of his work, as it 
proceeds by way of the turn to the later concern with the "overcoming 
of metaphysics." It is by focusing upon the development of the concept 
of "metaphysics" in the early work that we gain an entryway to the path 
that leads from the early to the middle period, and thus that we are 
able to achieve a characterization of the concrete significance of the 
"turn" itself. 
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Presumably we could determine the meaning of Heidegger's early 
concept of metaphysics, simply enough, through a reading of What is 
Meta.Q~~ics£_ But Heidegger raises the question of "what" metaphysics 
is in the context of his own already developed concept of metaphysics, 
which receives its clearest formulation in the text of the lectures of 
the summer session of 1929, published as The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic. In this work, Heidegger attempts to place the fundamental-
ontological project of Being and Time within a certain context and he 
does so through the development of a radical conc~f metaphysics. 
Heidegger's succinct definition of the subject-matter of meta-
physics is to be found at the end of the Introduction: "The subject-
matter of metaphysics is what lies 'beyond' beings ... It deals with 
a) Being as such, b) beings as a whole" (MFL 25). But this straight-
forward statement follows Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle's un-
derstanding of philosophy, and in fact represents a synopsis of the 
results of that discussion. Is this, then, Heidegger's definition or 
Aristotle's according to Heidegger? The question as thus formulated 
cannot suggest the complex relationship of Heidegger's thought to the 
tradition. Heidegger neither simply takes over the conceptions of the 
tradition nor does he merely replace them with his own. His inquiry in 
its relation to the tradition is guided by the notion of Wiederholung, 
which I shall translate, in this essay, as "repetition. "1 
The "method" at work in this text is meant to culminate in a 
repetition of the traditional concept of metaphysics. Heidegger 
prefaces his undertaking with methodological remarks which reflect the 
"circular" structure appropriate to the hermeneutic understanding of 
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oasein: 
Philosophy can be characterized only from and in historical 
recollection [g_eschichtliche Erinnerung]. But this recollection 
is only what it is, is only living, in the moment of self-under-
standing [im augenblicklichen Sichselbstverstehen], and that 
means in one's own free, productive grasp of the task harbored in 
philosophy. The ways of historical recollection and reflection 
on the present [augenblickliche Besinnung] are not two ways, but 
are both essential elements of every way toward the idea of 
philosophy. (8/9-10) 
The elements of geschichtliche Erinnerung and augenblickliche 
Besinnung together signify the structure of historicity as presented in 
Being and Time (!74). Recollection based in historicity (Geschicht-
lichkeit) is not a mere reproduction of opinions or doctrines held in 
the past. For at its heart lies the Augenblick, the "moment of vis-
ion," whereby the past is explicitly taken over on the basis of an 
envisioning of a possibility latent in it but perhaps hitherto undis-
closed. In augenblickliche Besinnung the future (Zukunft) is opened up 
on the basis of a possibility belonging to what has-been (das Gewesen). 
Thus the recollection, Erinnerung, of the "past" is the explicit 
"handing down to itself" which Dasein can undertake on the basis of its 
moment of vision. Handing down explicitly, however, is repetition: 
"Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrtickliche tiberlieferung" (SZ 386). Thus, 
in the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, we find a 
repetition, in Heidegger's sense, of what the tradition intends by 
metaphysics. It is our task to trace the path of the Heideggerian 
transformation of the concept of metaphysics under the aegis of the 
WiederholuQg. 
In order to undertake the repetiton of the tradition--of the 
understanding of metaphysics elicited from Aristotle's Metaphysics--a 
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further methodological strategy is required, in order to effect a 
clearing of the way for the necessary repetition. What is required is 
a "disavowal (Widerruf) of that which in the 'today' is working itself 
out as the 'past'" (BT 438/386). Repetition can take place only if a 
refusal or disavowal first occurs; in relation to the idea of philoso-
phy this means that a destruction is called for. This is the "way to 
the idea of philosophy" to be followed in The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic. From the standpoint of MFL, the destruction belongs to 
geschichtliche Erinnerung, and constitutes the task of the First Major 
Part of the text of the lecture series. The Destruktion will address, 
specifically, the work of Leibniz. But the stage is set for this 
destruction by Heidegger's reference, already a "retrieval," to Aris-
totle's concept of metaphysics; in this way the relevance of the 
destruction to the tradition as a whole is indicated. For Aristotle's 
concept of metaphysics "oversees" the tradition as a whole, and it is 
in reference to this concept that the Wiederholung is to be undertaken 
and achieved. 
Concerning the destruction, Heidegger says in Basic Problems that 
it consists in a "critical dismantling (Abbau] of the traditional con-
cepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, down to the sources 
from which they were drawn" (BP 22-23m/31). It is, he adds, carried 
out ''im historischen Rtickgang auf die Tradition," in a historical 
regression to the tradition (23m/31). In the destruction, a regression 
to the sources or origin of the tradition is undertaken. But at the 
same time, what is sought in such regression is the possibility of a 
repetition. Heidegger's "method," then, can be characterized in 
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general as a "regression to the origin," and equivalently as a "re-
gression leading to a repetition." The destruction or repetition is 
never undertaken for its own sake, to end in an original disclosure 
covered over by the tradition; the movement toward the origin can only 
be completed in a repetition. Why this should be so has to do with the 
character of the "origin" (primordial time), and is a question we shall 
discuss briefly below, and then examine more closely in Chapter IV. In 
any case, Heidegger's formulation in MFL makes it clear that the "mo-
•ent of vision" (Augenblick) lies at the heart of the task of retrieval 
("historical recollection") in relation to the tradition, and the 
Augenblick guides the Wiederholung, as we know from Being and Time (cf. 
BT !74). 
I have suggested that what we shall see in Metaph~sical Founda-
tions of Logic is, in view of Heidegger's methodological clues, a 
"regression to the origin" (here, of course, of "logic"), a regression 
that has the character of a Destruktion, and an origin whose character 
we have yet to examine. What is the character of that "origin" which 
supports and even requires a "repetition"? 
Of course, Heidegger has already shown us the character of the 
origin in Basic Problems of Phenomenology. There the regression to 
the origin takes place through the threefold methodology implicit in 
phenomenology, namely, reduction, construction, and destruction. De-
struction undertakes a historical regression to, or "upon" (auf) the 
tradition, and thus to the sources from which it arises. Reduction 
means the leading back (Rtickftihrung) of phenomenological vision "from 
the apprehension of a being ... to the understanding of the Being of 
28 
this being" (BP 21/29). Phenomenological construction is the pro-
jection of the "antecedently given being upon its Being and the 
structures of its being" (22), a projection which occurs precisely 
through the "reductive recursion from beings" (22). The projection, 
in other words, is not added to the reductive recursion or regression 
but is disclosed in it. In the end, construction finds in time the 
"origin of possibility itself" (BP 325); origin of possibility means, 
as we shall see, the origin of "metaphysics." Construction is an 
epagoge2, a leading-towards the origin of Seinsverstandnis, and is, 
as such, the culmination of the process of regression. But if the 
phenomenological methodology culminates in the disclosure of Temp-
oral i tat as the origin of Seinsverstandnis, how can we justify the 
claim that the Heideggerian regression necessarily ends in a 
repetition? 
Because of the emphasis upon the "scientific" character of 
ontological inquiry in BP, it may be difficult to see at first how the 
core of method is in fact repetition. That it is so is clear in MFL; 
it becomes even more explicitly so in Kant and the Problem of Meta-
physics. But in BP it appears, on the surface, that the phenomeno-
logical method fulfills its function in the demonstration that Temp-
oralitat is the horizon of all interpretation of Being, and, therefore, 
in this explicit carrying out of the ontological difference. And of 
course this is correct, so long as we restrict our inquiry to the 
announced goal of Basic Problems. Nonetheless Heidegger clearly 
suggests there that his inquiries are meant not only to "grasp" the 
meaning of Being but to open up the possibility of a repetition: 
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in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting 
nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient 
philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by 
their own selves. (BP 316) 
The reductive recursion or regression implicit in phenomena-
logical method leads to primordial time. What does it mean, however, 
that time is the "origin of possibility," that time has, in some sense, 
a "possibility-character"? "Possibility" bears an intrinsic reference 
to the future, within the structure of primordial time; but repetition 
itself means the apprehension of a possibility that comes toward one 
from the future, on the basis of what "has-been" and in the "moment of 
vision." Primordial time, as the origin of possibility, means the 
"occurrence" of a repetition; primordial time occurs as repetition. 
The origin itself exhibits the character of repetition. Thus the path 
to the science of Being--to Temporal science, ends, in fact, in repe-
titian, even though this is not made explicit within the limitations of 
the project undertaken in Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
If time means repetition, then the recovery of "possibility" sig-
nified by this characterization of time already means something like an 
overturning (Umschl~) of the scientific result of the inquiry, that is 
to say, the result signified by the very concept of ontology. Ontology 
grasps primordial time as the source of all Seinsverstandnis. But time 
itself--and the argument concerning this claim must be reserved for the 
appropriate place in our discussion (cf. ch. IV)--signifies, because it 
exhibits the character of repetition, the possibility of a movement 
beyond itself, the possibility of the origination of something new. 
The science of Being, even if it is the end of the ontological inquiry, 
is for Heidegger the beginning of the possibility of a renewal of 
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philosophy· 
What "originates" in the origin is always unique. Temporalization 
never occurs in abstracto, but only as the temporalization "of" con-
cretely existing Dasein; neutral Dasein is never what "exists" (cf. MFL 
110.4; p. 137). The issue here is nothing other than that of the 
overturning or Umschlag of ontology into metontology, an issue to be 
examined in detail in chapter IV. The overturning is an immediate 
consequence of the ontological inquiry itself, since, because it 
elicits the origin of possibility lying at the heart of philosophy, 
ontology has no other significance than to make (concrete) philosophy 
possible. And this means that Heidegger's foundational "science" 
requires no application and has no "result"--since its sole function is 
to make philosophy possible! 
It might be objected that even if Heidegger is, in the early 
period, concerned with something like a "new beginning" in philosophy, 
that nonetheless this new beginning lies in the foundational character 
of his own thought, i.e., in the science of Being considered as the 
content of a new "first philosophy." Thus an image of Heideggerian 
ontology arises whereby "end"3 means a stopping-place, or a line to be 
crossed4, beyond which philosophy would take its clues from that true 
insight into its nature proffered in the Heideggerian ontology. 
It is difficult to criticize this image tellingly. But its oddly 
unHeideggerian figuring of the character of time overlooks the features 
of repetition and possibility which belong to primordial time and which 
th!tJ!!.elves constitute its "foundational" character. Time is the 
"origin of possibility," the "condition of the possibility of all 
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projecting" (BP 307). It is thus the dimension of the preservation of 
"possibility as possibility" which constitutes the goal, in Being and 
Time, of the inquiry into the meaning of death and the attempt to grasp 
nasein "as a whole." In other words, the inquiry into the "end" of 
oasein eventuates in the irruption of possibility, in an insight into 
that origin or essence which is the source of the possibility of dis-
closure as such. Similarly the end of philosophy is something other 
than the cessation of the tradition; it is the moment of a glimpse into 
its source and thus into the possibility of its renewal and even 
transformation. 
The dimension of possibility is not the same as that of sequen-
tial, chronological time. The task of the "science of Being" is to 
elicit this primal dimension of time, from which arises all projection 
of the meaning of Being. Ontology intends to enable philosophy, to 
make it possible, and to let it remain "possible," solely on the basis 
of the disclosure of the source of such possibility. In short, what 
lies beyond ontology is not a "Heideggerian" philosophy based upon the 
true science of Being, but concrete philosophy--"enabled" by the 
apprehension of what lets it arise and "come to presence." If future 
philosophy is transformed because of the accomplishment of the onto-
logical gathering of philosophy into its end--time as the origin, in 
repetition, of possibility--it is not because future philosophy builds 
upon a supposed fundamentum inconcussum, but because philosophy can now 
look to the disclosure in ontology of· the possibility of philosophy as 
such. Ontology is the eidos of philosophy itself. 
What precisely is the "way to the [eidos or] idea of philosophy" 
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undertaken in MFL? And, further: What happens to "philosophy" in this 
text as Heidegger works out the repetition of the twofold structure of 
metaphysics? The destruction undertakes a regression, specifically on 
the basis of the "traditional concept of logic" ( U). Henceforth, 
Heidegger will again and again return to traditional logic as a 
starting-point, and undertake a movement back therefrom into the 
ground of the received concepts belonging to the discipline. Here he 
surveys, in a way that becomes characteristic, the traditional field of 
the discipline. Logic itself "asks about the properties in general of 
logos, of statement, of that determining where the essence of thinking 
as such resides" (MFL 2). Logic consists of two branches, material and 
formal logic. Material logic is investigation of the thinking approp-
riate to different domains of objects; its concern, in effect, is 
regional onto~. Formal logic is knowledge of formal thinking, i.e., 
thinking without respect to specific type of content, "neutral with 
respect to content" (4). Heidegger characterizes this "general logic" 
as the logic which treats "that which makes thinking, as such, intrin-
sically possible" (4), thus already suggesting the fulfillment of the 
idea of logic in something like a fundamental ontology. 
Logic is supposed to be a propaedeutic to philosophy, but aca-
demic logic provides no such genuine introduction; the question is "how 
should a philosophical logic be set in motion? Where can we get even 
an idea of such a logic?" The answer lies in the appropriate 
regressus: 
We shall try to loosen up the traditional logic in such a way 
that problems in it become clear, and from the content of these 
very problems we shall allow ourselves to be led back into the 
presuppositions of this logic. In this way we shall gain 
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immediate access to philosophy itself (6). 
What is at stake, then, in releasing tradiitonal logic from "petri-
faction" (Versteinerung) (6/7) is not so much acquiring a new logic as 
gaining "an 'intro-duction' which leads into philosophy itself" (7). 
The regression intended to ''loosen up" traditional logic exhibits 
the following pattern: A series of terms, representing certain funda-
mental themes, is elicited from the domain of tradiitonal logic. Hence 
logic as a discipline is reduced to fundamental problems such as 
"truth, ground, lawfulness, freedom, concept, Being" (21). None of 
these terms is reducible to the other--" ... none of these basic 
phenomena is more primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial" 
(56). The problem becomes, then, the "inner constitution of this 
equiprimordiality" (56); that is to say, the problem is to open up 
these themes, as philosophical issues, in such a way that their in-
terrelatedness and mutual irreducibility becomes clear. Finally, the 
"ground" is sought which makes this equiprimordiality possible (56). 
Heidegger adds that "these grounds and foundations are attained by 
metaphysics; thus our title: 'The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic'" 
(56). We shall see this pattern confirmed in Heidegger's Destruktion 
of Leibniz's logic (cf. ch. II). 
The regressus leads to metaphysics--metaphysics is philosophy 
dismantled. If destruction returns philosophy to its sources, then 
these sources lie in metaphysics. And it is in metaphysics that the 
"grounds and foundations" of logic--and thus of the sciences--are 
attained. Thus the foundational issue is the central issue of meta-
physics. Metaphysics is the heir, in MFL, to the fundamental ontology 
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of Being and Time and to the ontology of Basic Problems of Phenomen-
~; metaphysics takes up the mantle of ontology. In fact, through 
the development of his concept of metaphysics Heidegger incorporates 
his earlier work into a more incisive formulation of his own project in 
relation to philosophy and the philosophical tradition (cf. the Ap-
pendix to MFL, "The Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology"). It 
is for this reason that Metaphysical Foundations of Logic can provide 
the basis for an interpretation of the full significance of the early 
project. 
With regard to the foundational issue, we soon find that the 
inquiry into the foundations of logic serves a quite different function 
from that of supplying the grounds for the advancement of "logic" as an 
academic discipline. In fact, the disclosure of the foundations will 
bring into question the relationship of logic and the sciences to the 
"foundation." Heidegger will "undermine the foundations," but there is 
no guarantee that the foundational enterprise will be able, by begin-
ning "again from the first foundations," to establish something "firm 
and lasting in the sciences" (Descartes, Meditation I)5. If the foun-
dations of logic are "hidden" (verborgen) (21/27), there is what we 
might call a caesura or gap between logic and its foundations. In 
exhibiting what the hidden foundations already are, as he does in 
ontology, Heidegger suggests implicitly that the sciences are in some 
sense delusively founded (just as is "everyday'' existence). For the 
sciences, traditional philosophy and everyday existence are "founded" 
upon the forgottenness of Being, i.e. upon the implicit interpretation 
of Being as presence--upon, as it were, the concealment and distortion 
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of the foundations. The very disclosure of the foundations of logic in 
8 regression to them may disallow any route ~~ck to the concepts tra-
ditionally constitutive of logic. This potential "shaking of the 
foundations" is implicit even in the fundamental ontology of Being 
~nd Time, as soon as we recognize what it means to exhibit the fact of 
the founding of traditional forms of inquiry in the forgottenness of 
Being. There is no guarantee that recovery of the "meaning of Being" 
would leave us with the traditional fields of inquiry intact. 
Examination of Heidegger's texts shows that in fact he is 
peculiarly indifferent to any concrete question of the conceptual 
reorganization of any particular science; he seems interested neither 
in an attack upon the conceptual structure of any given science nor in 
a reformation of the fundamental concepts of any "regional ontology." 
He is, however, concerned with the relationship of existing Dasein to 
scientific inquiry (cf. MFL 21). From the standpoint of the founda-
tional problem as such, what is at stake in laying the foundations is 
not a "science" which would provide the basic store of concepts for all 
other sciences; the issue rather is the ~ossibility of foundational 
action in general, i.e. of Krounding as such. Metaphysics is the in-
quiry into "that which makes thinking, as such, intrinsically possible" 
(4)--it is the inquiry into the intrinsic possibility (source or ori-
gin) of thought as the original "grounding" activity, without respect 
to the character of any particular region of inquiry. Because the 
science of logic seems to be the arbiter in the realm of thought, it is 
logic that is dismantled in order to discern a more fundamental signif-
icance to "thinking" than that provided by the traditional discipline. 
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The dismantling of logic yields the clue to the character of thinking 
as the fundamental grounding activity. 
To suppose that fundamental regional concepts could be spun out 
of an inquiry into "thinking" as such represents a basic confusion of 
"types"--the caesura or chorismos here is that between thinking in 
general and its "object" in any particular case, between noesis and 
noema. We must, therefore, reject the assumption that Heidegger's 
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investigations will reflect the traditional conception of the relation 
of the foundational inquiry to those disciplines to be "founded." This 
is clearest precisely where Heidegger's language concerning the rela-
tionship of the foundational investigation to the positive sciences 
echoes Kant's: 
Whether we learn to think, in the real sense, by way of 
logic depends on whether we arrive at an understanding of think-
ing in its intrinsic possibility, that is, with regard to law-
fulness, truth, ground, concept, Being, and freedom. When we 
acquire this understanding for ourselves, even if only in a few 
outlines, then we will have warrant to clarify the particular 
positive science we are working in from out of its intrinsic 
limits, and only then do we take possession of a science, as a 
free possession. And science, thus appropriated [zugeeignete], 
and only such a science, is in each case the genuine school for 
thinking. ( 21/27) 
Here we find the same interrelationship between the limits and the 
possibilit~ of a science that is exhibited in Kant's treatment of the 
understanding. But Heidegger says nothing about "establishing" the 
science of logic. There is rather a contrast implicit in this para-
graph between the thinking that subjects itself to the canons of a 
scientific discipline, and that which is aware of the nature of the 
foundatinal activity which underlies the possibility of the con-
struction of the sciences in general. Only such awareness lets science 
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become a "free possession," and allows the discipline to become a 
"genuine school for thinking." What is this foundational activity? 
It is nothing other than the projection of the ontological difference. 
The following discussion from The Essence of Reasons clarifies the 
contrast in question: 
The basic concepts of modern science do not include "authentic" 
ontological concepts of the Being of the being it treats, nor can 
the latter be obtained simply through a "suitable" extension of 
the former. Original ontological concepts must instead be 
obtained prior to any scientific definition of "basic concepts," 
so that only by proceeding from them WILL WE BE IN A POSITION TO 
EVALUATE the manner in which the basic concepts of the sciences 
apply to Being as graspable in purely ontological concepts. The 
manner in which ontological concepts apply to Being will always 
be limited to and circumscribed by a definite point of view. The 
"fact" of the sciences, i.e., the factical constituent of the 
understanding of Being that is necessarily included in them as in 
every way of behaving toward being, is neither a tribunal for 
founding the a priori nor the source of our knowledge of the ~ 
priori but merely a possible clue to the primordial constitution 
of the Being of, for example, history or nature. It is a clue 
which must itself be constantly subjected to the sort of criti-
cism that has already gotten its bearings in the fundamental 
problematic of all inquiry about the Being of being. (ER 25--
emphasis mine) 
The limitation (as well as the possibility) of scientific thinking lies 
in the limited point of view from which the specific science projects 
its understanding of the Being of beings, e.g., one derived from the 
pre-ontological experience of history or nature. That science depends 
upon such projection can only become clear to ontology. Science is 
"founded" in ontology solely in the sense that the grounding activity 
already operative in every science is made explicit for the first time 
in ontology's "explicitly carrying out the ontological difference," 
i.e., in its clarifying the nature of the grounding activity as such. 
It is through ontology's making this "structure" explicit that science 
becomes a "free possession"; here one can speak of something like a 
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liberation from what Husserl called the "naivete of the scientific 
attitude." 
The true concern of the ontological inquiry, as indicated by the 
phrase I have emphasized in the passage from ER, is to ~ the under-
standing of the Being of beings from contamination by concepts derived 
from the projection at work in the positive sciences. Heidegger is not 
concerned to "proceed" from ontology to science, but to prevent philo-
sophy's proceeding from science to ontology--except by way of a dis-
mantling of the science. 
The route to learning to think is undertaken through the dismant-
ling of logic, and leads to a determination of the activity constitu-
tive of thinking--"grounding"--that makes this activity possible. What 
is at issue is thus not the methodology, fundamental concepts and 
articulated content of logic as a particular science, but the recovery 
of the intrinsic possibility of thinking as such. Through a return to 
the basic problems brought to light through the dismantling of logic, 
what is achieved is "a concrete entrance into philosophy itself"--not a 
new logic or a reaffirmation of the essentials of traditional logic. 
Fundamental ontology demonstrates the intrinsic possibility of 
thinking as such. But what is "thinking," or, equivalently, what is 
philosophy in its essence? If the "sources" (Quellen) of philosophy 
lie in metaphysics, what is the nature of metaphysics, such that 
philosophy can arise from it? 
The determination of the idea of philosophy "from historicity," 
the repetition of metaphysics, requires the destruction for its ful 
fillment, but at the same time guides the destruction by providing a 
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preconception of the nature of that idea, namely that the "essence" of 
philosophy lies in metaphysics. Through the dismantling of traditional 
concepts, philosophy returns to its own source, metaphysics. As dis-
•antled philosophy, the latter is the "primordial" form of philosophy 
covered over in the development of the philosophical tradition. But if 
ancient philosophy is the "gigantic beginning [that] contains within 
itself a wealth of truly undeveloped and in part completely hidden 
possibilities" (9), this does not mean that the idea of philosophy is 
adequately developed by the ancients; it means, on the contrary, that 
the possibilities of philosophy that emerge with the beginning remain 
latent. The return to the sources of philosophy in historical recol-
lection cannot directly yield the sought-for idea of philosophy, so 
that even in this early text, Heidegger aims for something other than a 
simple recovery of Greek thought in its original form. Nonetheless, it 
is only ancient philosophy which corresponds to the "Qresent necessi-
!}! [augenblickliche Notwendigkeit] of bringing problems back to 
simplicity" (9). 
Aristotle in particular is chosen because "he represents the peak 
of the development of genuine ancient philosophy" (10). But even 
Aristotle does not bring the conception of philosophy to full clarity; 
Heidegger's appeal to Aristotle is already informed by the "present 
vision" which guides his inquiry, and it is on its basis that he is 
able to elicit the twofold structure of metaphysics. 
Aristotle characterizes philosophy as the investigation of the 
":» J; 1< 
ov .lov --beings with regard to Being, i.e. solely with regard to what 
makes a being the being it is: Being" (10). Knowledge of Being is 
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knowledge of the "first," of the arche. Philosophy, c,tiv\oGo¢t«. is the 
• 
'. f 
striving ( ¢1,{05 ) for understanding ( ao<j.t.d....) "of what precede~ 
everything else, what is earlier, prior to everything else, that is, 
prior to individual beings" (13); what philosophy strives to understand 
is thus Being, for Being "is what is first understood before anything 
like a being can arise anywhere and in any way" (13). 
'°! I 7• i ,, As striving for knowledge, /\O(fOS, of the ov .l ov , philosophy is 
ontology ( 13) . 
But there is another aspect to the Aristotelean characterization 
of philosophy. Philosophy, for Aristotle, is ~~0Ao¥1K1· Here, too, 
philosophy is science "of the highest, of the first" (11). In this 
case, however, the first is the realm of being as a whole. "Eh:oAna-€:1'v 
is a contemplation of the 1<rf ttµ.05" ( 11), 1. e. of 
the heavens [die Himmel]: the encompassing and overpowering, that 
under and upon which we are thrown, that which dazzles and takes 
us by surprise, the overwhelming [das Ubermachtige]. (11) 
Philosophy is thus not only ontology, it is also theology. 
Here in the Introduction, Heidegger does not explain further 
the relation between philosophy as ontology and philosophy as theology. 
Nonetheless his succinct statement of the subject-matter of metaphysics 
does indicate the direction to be taken by Heidegger's investigation; 
he himself suggests the structural relationship between his own task 
and the twofold characterization of philosophy elicited from Aris-
totle's Metaphysics. Ontology, as knowledge of Being, is referred to 
the problem of the understanding of Being; theology, as "knowledge of 
the overwhelming," concerns itself with that which holds man "in 
thrall" (12). Therefore "this twofold character corresponds to the 
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twofold in Being and Time of existence and thrownness" (11). Heidegger 
thus intimates the possibility of interpreting Being and Time from the 
standpoint of the concept of "metaphysics," for "the concept 'meta-
physics' encompasses the unity of 'ontology' and 'theology' in the 
sense already characterized" (25). In fact, to offer such an inter-
pretation concerning the significance of the project of Being and Time 
is one of the purposes of MFL (cf. !10 and Appendix). 
Metaphysics, then, has two parts, ontology and theology; ontology 
"deals with ... Being as such," and theology with "being as a 
whole." This distinction within the structure of metaphysics defines 
the structural articulation of Heidegger's own work. Heidegger 
establishes and interprets his own "problematic" in terms of the 
relationship between these two parts of metaphysics; indeed, he now 
understands his own project as the recovery and repetition of the 
metaphysical project which lies concealed at the heart of the 
philosophical tradition. Regression to the source of the tradition, 
metaphysics, is completed in a repetition of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics takes up the mantle of fundamental ontology; it 
"absorbs" the whole of Heidegger's early project, particularly as 
articulated in Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
Much of MFL is devoted, as we shall see, to the assimilation of the 
earlier work to metaphysics, and to the reformulation of its goals in 
terms of the clearer apprehension of the metaphysical project. 
Heidegger writes in the Appendix that 
By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of 
ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits 
the intrinsic possibility of the Being question as the basic 
problem of metaphysics--the interpretation of Dasein as 
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temporality; 2) an explication of the basic problems contained in 
the question of Being--the temporal exposition of the problem of 
Being; ... (154) 
But we have already learned that there is another part to 
metaphysics, "theology," an inquiry which we find, according to the 
Appendix, arising out of the full development of ontology itself: 
3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic, 
its task and limits--the overturning [Umschlag]. (154/196) 
Heidegger thus introduces a "dynamic" relationship (metabole) between 
the two parts of metaphysics. Ontology is "overturned" into theology, 
and it is nothing other than "the radicalization of ontology [which] 
brings about the above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its 
very self" (157). 
Heidegger gives to his retrieval of the Aristotelean "theology" 
the name metontology (Metontologie). Its theme is the problem of man 
thrown into the midst of the "overwhelming," i.e., of being as a whole, 
a problem which arises out of the "intrinsic necessity" for fundamental 
ontology to "turn back to its point of origin" [zurtickschl~gt, von wo 
sie ausgegangen war] (156/199), i.e., to turn back to the "metaphysical 
ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (158). The full develop-
111ent of the concept of existence requires an inquiry into the condi-
tions determining the factical situatedness of Dasein and thus the 
possibilities open to his "projection." Ontology itself is possible 
only with the factical existence of Dasein: 
. Being is there [es gibt Sein] only when man understands 
Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is there in 
the understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, 
and this in turn presupposes the factical extantness of nature. 
Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when posed 
radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become 
understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings is 
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already there [schon da 1st]. 
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for 
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This 
new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and 
is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its metabole. I 
designate this set of questions metont~. (156-57/199) 
Heidegger's formulation of the motivation and circumstances of the 
overturning is precise, and requires closer examination than we can 
give it in these remarks on the Introduction; this passage will be 
taken up again in chapter IV. For present purposes it is adequate to 
observe the "concreteness" of the formulation. The announced theme of 
11etontological inquiry is that of a "possible totality of beings" 
[mogliche Totali tat von Seiendem], of "being as a whole" [das Seiende 
im Ganzen]. It is in relation to such a whole of beings that ontology 
"arises." Facticity is brought into relation to the concrete situ-
atedness of Dasein, the specific situation or configuration of being 
from out of which Dasein emerges in its existence. If ontology is 
generated by thematizing Dasein's "death," metontology concerns the 
site of its "birth." 
Thrownness and existence are inseparable moments in the consti-
tution of Dasein, and Heidegger has treated them as intertwined, in 
Being and Time, in a manner we cannot take up here. Nonetheless, Hei-
degger's investigation in Being and Time is oriented from the beginning 
toward the question of the meaning of Being ("Being as such," the first 
half of metaphysics) and thus toward the horizon of projection. "The-
ology," the relationship of man to das Seiende im Ganzen, is not ex-
plicitly elevated in BT to the status of a problem in its own right. 
We have already seen that Heidegger identifies the twofold in 
Being and Time with "the twofold ... of existence and thrownness" (MFL 
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1) Dasein is thrown projection; existence (transcendence) takes over 1 . 
its thrownness as its Gewesenheit or "having-beenness" in the light of 
its zuk~nft, that possibility which comes toward it in the taking over 
of its authentic "past". The problem here is to show how Dasein ori-
ginates in a specific "situation," i.e. finds itself in a given world, 
already disclosed in a particular manner ("everydayness") in its own 
transcendence. In Being and Time, the analysis says nothing of the 
situation into which Dasein is thrown as such; the Situation is con-
sidered only from the formal standpoint of the analysis of Dasein's 
transcendence. As thrown, Dasein is for the most part lost in the 
world of its concern: 
"Dasein gets dragged along in thrownness; that is to say, as 
something which has been thrown into the world, it loses itself 
in the 'world' in its factical submission to that with which it 
is to concern itself" (BT 400). 
But Dasein can come back to itself in anticipatory resoluteness: "The 
authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the 
same time a coming-back to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown 
into its individualization" (BT 388). Thrownness is understood from 
the standpoint of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Either it 
forgets itself in the 'world' into which it is thrown, or, alterna-
tively, it takes over its thrownness to become that which it already 
authentically is. But this means that it takes over its 'world' as 
its own, for the sake of resolute disclosure of the situation in which 
it finds itself. Thus the "twofold" of SZ, thrownness and existence, 
are considered together from the standpoint of the problem of transcen-
dence, and thus from the standpoint of the development of a fundamental 
ontology. But it turns out that it is possible, and indeed necessary, 
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to conceive of "transcendence'' from the standpoint of the "situation" 
into which it is thrown, and, surpassing which, it discloses in 
transcendence. 
The situation, considered in itself, is nothing other than the 
"whole of beings" (das Seiende im Ganzen) "into which" Dasein is 
thrown. The overturning of fundamental ontology is an overturning into 
the problematic of the realm of "being as a whole" into relation to 
which is thrown, and in relation to which Dasein's transcendence 
happens (geschiehtl. The metontology takes up the issue of the 
happening of the transcendence of Dasein in relation to the prevailing 
order into which Dasein is thrown: the "overwhelming," das tiber-
machtige. Thus "thrownness" can be said to appear twice in the 
developing problematic of metaphysics: first as subordinated to 
transcendence, and then in such a way that the problem of transcen-
is taken up on the basis of its relation to the whole into which Dasein 
is thrown. The overturning of ontology means that the event of tran-
scendence must be rethought from the standpoint of the original 
relatedness of transcendence, as an event, to the "whole" of beings. 
The problem of the metontology is that of how Dasein "happens," 
how it effects an irruption, or rather is as an irruption, into an 
already extant whole of beings, into an already prevailing 'world'. 
We can now understand the change of perspective which has 
occurred in a text like What is Metaphysics?. This text--and the same 
remains true for virtually all other texts of the "middle period" (the 
new approach defines the "middle period")--begins with the factical 
situatedness of Dasein, its finding itself thrown into the midst of 
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being as a whole. Thus in What is Metaphysics? "the question of the 
nothing proves to be such that it embraces the whole of metaphysics" 
(BW 110). The nothing is encountered, however, in the fundamental mood 
of anxiety, which "not only reveals beings as a whole in various 
ways, ... this revealing ... is also the basic occurrence of our 
oa-sein" (102). What is at stake in the "nihilating" of the nothing, 
in WM, is the occurrence of the transcendence of Dasein, in which 
nothing less transpires than the irruption by one being called 
"man" into the whole of beings, indeed in such a way that in and 
through this irruption beings break open and show what they are 
and how they are. (97) 
Heidegger says furthermore in WM that: "Metaphysics is the basic 
occurrence of Dasein. It is Dasein itself" (112). Heidegger gathers 
the fundamental ontological inquiry undertaken in his early work into 
the question of metaphysics, i.e., that of the irruption of Dasein into 
the midst of being as a whole. "'Metaphysics' is the fundamental event 
[Grundgeschehen] which comes to pass with the irruption into being of 
the concrete existence of man" (KPM 251/218). In the lectures and 
texts following the publication of Being and Time, "metaphysics" means 
the twofold metaphysics of Dasein: the problem of the possibility of 
something like an understanding of Being (fundamental ontology, the 
investigation of transcendence, or the ground of the possibility of 
metaphysics), and the problem of the relation of transcendence itself 
to that "whole of beings" in relation to which transcendence "occurs." 
If we conceive of Heidegger's work as beginning with an inquiry 
into the "hermeneutics of facticity," then we can say that in the 
metontology Heidegger returns to his starting-point, bringing the 
hermeneutic enterprise full circle. But this return within the scope 
47 
of the hermeneutic circle does not end in a reiteration of the initial 
formulation of the problematic of facticity, but to a re-initiation of 
Heidegger's project on the basis of his retrieval of "metaphysics." 
Thus the metontology does not simply recapitulate the relationship 
between the existentiell and the existential, but represents a sharp-
ening of the problem of the ontic "origin" of Dasein's transcendence. 
rt is now necessary to account for the origin of transcendence on the 
basis of Dasein's originary situatedness in the midst of being as a 
whole. The dispersal of Dasein implicit in this conception--since the 
problem of "being as a whole" implies the problem of the concrete 
individuation of the event of transcendence, with reference to a 
particular "configuration" of being--opens up the problem of tran-
scendence to that of hi~tory. Metontology leads, as we shall see, to 
the problematic of the Seinsgeschichte. 
Dasein projects an understanding of Being, not in the void of a 
worldless transcendental subjectivity, but as itself a being already 
thrown into the midst of a totality of beings. The problematic of the 
metontology is that of the ontic whole wherein Dasein finds itself 
situated in the very act of disclosive projection. The metontology 
overturns the ontological standpoint because it shows that temporal-
ization itself "occurs" in the midst of beings. But this means that 
temporalization cannot provide the most radical "answer" to the ques-
tion of the meaning of Being; it means that Dasein cannot be the 
ultimate source or origin, as fundamental ontology requires it to be, 
of metaphysics as interpretation of Being. Dasein, the site of the 
meaning of Being, is itself situated in the midst of beings. One of 
48 
the motivations of the so-called "turn" lies in the fact that with 
the metontology, a more radical questioning of the origin becomes 
necessary. 
The problem of the origin is that of the way the question of 
Being arises with the existence of man; it is the problem of the 
relation of the "basic question of philosophy and the question of man" 
('IV). The problem of that upsurgance of the question of Being which 
can occur in human existence is sometimes formulated as the problem of 
freedom, as in MFL and On the Essence of Truth. But the investigation 
of this problem must also take account of the "finitization" (Verend-
lichung) of human being, an issue emphasized in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics and the Introduction to Metaphysics. 
The question of Being, Heidegger says, 
is not arbitrary and not applied to man externally, but is more 
or less stirring in man insofar as he exists at all as human, and 
because human Dasein takes this question over, as it were, along 
with human existence, this question has, as a burgeoning problem, 
its own necessities. This is why the latter manifest themselves 
already in the first steps of philosophy (MFL 15). 
These "necessities" manifest themselves in the fact that, throughout 
the tradition, from Parmenides for whom the "clarification of Being 
takes place by way of a reflection on 'thinking, ' noein," (15) to 
Hegel's defining of substance from the subject, "human Dasein moves to 
the center" (15). Here the "field becomes visible . . upon which the 
K!g_antomachia peri tou ontos takes place, the battle of the giants over 
Being" (15). 
Thus man is already the site of the polemos, the conflict which 
"breaks out from human Dasein as such" (16), that polemos which is the 
focus of Heidegger's interpretation, with reference to Heraclitus, 
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parmenides, and Sophocles, of the relation of Being and thinking in the 
!,ntroduction to Metaphysics. In the later text Heidegger says that 
According to Heraclitus what man is is first manifested. 
in QQ_lemos, in the separation of gods and men, in the 
irruption of Being itself. For philosophy what man is is not 
written somewhere in heaven. We must rather say: 
3. The question of what man is must always be taken in its 
essential bond with the question of how it stands with Being. 
The question of man is not an anthropological question but a 
historically meta-physical question. (IM 140) 
Heidegger writes also of "the conflict between the overwhelming 
presence of being as a whole and man's violent being-there" (162). 
Where is this conflict enkindled? The "gigantomachia," the 
battle of the giants, is a battle of Titans, of the gods of the earth. 
The battle "breaks out from Dasein as such," and Dasein is a being 
among beings, in the midst of the totality of beings. What is 
essential, from the standpoint of the problem, resolutely entertained 
as a problem, is that there is "nothing" beyond beings. The ques-
tioning of the relationship of man to the question of Being is 
resolutely a-theistic. There "is" nothing but being, das Seie~~ 
Ganzen; the problems of freedom and finitude are possible as problems 
only insofar as it is recognized that the inquiry into the origin of 
metaphysics excludes consideration of an origin "beyond" being. Man 
himself is the field of the conflict; the problem of the "beginning" is 
placed back here into its metaphysical antic, from which it arises and 
"in which it implicitly always remains" (MFL 158). 
The problem of finitude is that of how transcendence arises on 
the basis of finitude (KPM, Section IV), and this problem can be 
formulated with philosophical precision only if every concept of an 
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ttother" to the totality of beings is rigorously excluded. In this 
sense, Heidegger's questioning is already resolutely anti-"meta-
physical." The transcendence of man is founded in his holding himself 
out into the Nothing; in his finitude, he transcends or "passes beyond" 
beings to no being, to nothing ontic. That World is "nothing," that in 
the event of transcendence, the "nothing nothings," must be understood 
rigorously, to mean that what occurs in transcendence is solely an 
affair of the realm of beings. The battle takes place on an earthly 
battlefield. 
One of the questions concerning the nature of the "turn" is 
whether the latter signifies a relaxing of the rigorously a-theistic 
character of the early questioning, so that "Being"--which is now 
questioned "by itself"--has something of the character of a tran-
scendent "source" for the happening of truth. An investigation of this 
question (and whether this question is even correctly posed) we shall 
defer for the present. 
The present section (IV) of the Introduction to MFL has the 
character of a sketch; the problems which Heidegger surveys here are 
taken up again and again with increasing rigor, so that here we have 
only something like an "outline," through which the elements of the 
problem are placed into relationship with one another. Thus when 
Heidegger says that "the basic question of philosophy, the question of 
Being, is in itself, correctly understood, the question of man" (16), 
and yet that "the important thing is to raise the question of man in 
view of the problem of Being" (16), we catch only a glimpse of the 
difficulty of the set of inquiries which the problem of the inter-
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relationship of man and Being initiates. As late as 1956, in his 
Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger says concerning 
that text that the relation between man and Being is "unsuitably 
conceived"--
a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since Being 
and Time and has since been expressed in a variety of versions. 
(PLT 87) 
Before leaving this section, let us take note of the interplay in 
Heidegger's lecture here of the metaphysical themes of ontology and 
metontology. Heidegger reminds us that "human Dasein is a being with a 
kind of Being to which it belongs essentially to understand something 
like Being. We call this the transcendence of Dasein, primal tran-
scendence" (MFL 16), and he refers here to the second part of the 
lecture course--showing, incidentally, that the question of grounding 
in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic belongs primarily to the "onto-
logical" theme, not the metontological. 
But the question of Being is also the question of man, so that 
ontology is also at once intertwined with the metontological theme: 
That the basic ontological question of philosophy has 
somehow to do with beings as a whole, as well as thereby with 
human existence and in such a way that the existence of the one 
philosophizing is in each case decided, this i~ expressed in 
Aristotle by the fact that "first philosophy" is, at the same 
time, theologike. (17) 
The two are intertwined in that philosophizing (in which the question 
of Being is addressed) is only significant in relation to the decision 
thereby made with regard to the existence of the one philosophizing. 
"Philosophy, in its innermost ground, is the most radical, universal, 
and rigorous conceptual knowledge" (17)--i.e., it is ontology. 
Nonetheless, "the proofstone of philosophical truth consists solely in 
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the loyalty the philosophizing individual has to himself" (17). Here 
the "existential" and the ''existentiell" are inseparable. We shall see 
that the unity of metaphysics, i.e., the unity of ontology and met-
ontology, is thematized by Heidegger under the rubric of freedom (18). 
The latter problem, however. comes into its own only with the "over-
turning" of ontology into metontology, because the problem of freedom 
is precisely that of the ''happening" of truth in the midst of being as 
a whole. 
Indeed, we shall be able to observe in Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic the initial steps of Heidegger's transition to the "middle 
period," with its focus upon the problem of truth as opposed to that of 
time. Both the turn-over into the metontology and the reorganization, 
to be observed in this text, of the problems of fundamental ontology 
around the issue of "ground" are aspects of this change. Of course, 
MFL with its inquiry into logic as the "metaphysics of truth" can be 
understood to supply the missing fourth chapter of Part Two of ~asic 
Problems of Phenomenology--just as the latter is supposed to belong to 
the missing Third Division of Part One of Being and Time--namely, the 
chapter on the truth-character of Being. Thus MFL represents a con-
tinuation of the early ontological project, even while it undertakes 
the work of reorganization and transition. 
The concept of metontology prepares the way for the reformulation 
of Heidegger's inquiry into the "question of the meaning of Being" on 
the basis of truth, aletheia, as opposed to the ontological formulation 
of the question in terms of the horizon of temporality. Meanwhile the 
principal task of the present text is the restatement of the problems 
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of fundamental ontology on the basis of the issue of grounding. What 
is at stake in fundamental ontology is, in the end, the nature of the 
"grounding event," the "happening" of the transcendence of Dasein. 
Heidegger will show how "world" comes to pass with this event--what is 
grounded is "world." Focusing upon the problem of ground clarifies the 
founding nature of the event; this clarification suggests that what is 
actually at stake in fundamental ontology is not a search for a dogmat-
ic version of the "true" meaning of Being, but an attempt to elucidate 
the character of the world-instituting event, the origin of world. Nor 
is what is accomplished in fundamental ontology merely an exhibition of 
the basis of the positive sciences; more fundamentally, it is a dis-
closure of the source or "possibility" of the coming-to-pass of a 
world. 
Thus Heidegger's regression upon logic engages the dimension of 
"thinking," not in order to establish a reformation, however funda-
mental, of the science of logic, but in order to establish the poss-
ibility of the "act" of grounding that takes place in thinking. 
"Thinking" here is understood as the event of transcendence and has, 
in the end, nothing to do with subjective processes of ratiocination. 
Thus in seeking the "grounds which make thinking possible," what is 
sought are "the bases [Griinde] for understanding, existence, the 
understanding of Being, Dasein, and primal transcendence" (19). The 
question is, "How are ground and Dasein related to one another?" (20). 
That Heidegger is reorganizing the problems of fundamental 
ontology around those of ground shows why he chooses Leibniz as an 
"appropriate place" (geeignete Stelle) (22) for the "critical dis-
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mantling of logic down to its hidden foundations" (21). If the prob-
lem of ground is that of primal transcendence (metaphysics), then the 
dismantling of the philosophical tradition itself is accomplished in 
the dismantling of logic; and the central principle of logic is that 
of Leibniz's principle of ground. In other words, the Destruktion of 
Leibniz's "doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems" 
(27) addresses the central issue in the dismantling of the tradition as 
a whole: what is the source of the possibility of "thinking" as such? 
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NOTES 
1 . one may object to this translation, since it does not convey the 
sense of "drawing up again" that is implicit in Wiederholung, and since 
repetition often signifies mere reiteration in English. In fact, I 
have sometimes used "retrieval" or even "recovery" as the translation 
of Wiederholu~. Nonetheless, thee are reasons to use repetition as 
the central, if not the only, rendering of this term. The strongest 
argument in favor of "repetition" is that, even in English, it retains 
the connection with the tradition which Wiederholung intends, in that 
(for example) we are familiar with repetition in Plato (S~mposium); we 
can speak of repetition in Kierkegaard, but not retrieval, and we think 
of Augustine as having a doctrine of repetition (the soul's return to 
God in self-knowledge). Thus we can say that in Heidegger's work the 
concept of repetition comes to suggest the whole of the process of re-
trieval, appropriation and transformation which together constitute the 
Heideggerian "methodology." But "retrieval" seems to imply bringing 
back (Wiederbringen) that which once was present, the restoration of a 
former state--and this is not at all what Heidegger intends by Wieder-
holung. Furthermore, we should like to be able, in certain contexts, 
to speak of a repetition where it seems odd to speak of retrieval; for 
example, with reference to the repetition of the First Major Part of 
MFL in the Second Major Part. 
2. As Rodolphe Gasche points out in his recently published work, 
The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
p. 115. Gasche, too, finds in Heidegger's method something like a 
"retrogression to the origin," although he develops this insight in 
the context of a comparison with Husserl's methodlogy in Experience 
and Judgment (pp. 109 ff.). 
3. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of ontology to the 
problem of the "end" of philosophy and thus to the overcoming of the 
oblivion of Being, see John Sallis, "End(s)," in Delimitations (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press), pp. 128-38. 
4. For a critique of the image of the line, cf. The Question of Bei~. 
tr. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven: College and Univer-
sity Press, 1958), pp. 33-43. 
5. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on Flrst Phil-
osophy, tr. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1980), p. 57. 
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Chapter II 
Leibniz's Doctrine of Judgment and its Destruktion 
The destructive analysis of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment is set 
into the context of the question of the relation of thinking to beings, 
of thinking to Being, and of thinking itself as a way of Being (MFL 
27). The path undertaken here, meant to be "a concrete path of re-
flection on what makes thinking possible as such" (27), first asks 
whether Being or thinking is "most proximate" (27); for the modern 
tradition, it is thinking that is "nearest." Yet the question remains 
whether, for Leibniz, thinking (logic) is prior to or dependent upon 
metaphysics (ontology). The issue of whether logic or metaphysics 
guides the construction of Leibniz's system was already a current one 
in the Leibniz scholarship of Heidegger's day. Couturat's La Logique 
de Leibniz (1901) and Russell's A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy 
of Leibniz (1900), especially, are mentioned; both of these works ar-
gued for the precedence of logic over metaphysics in Leibniz's thought. 
In any case, it is the am~iguity of this relationship within the Leib-
nizian text that guides the direction of Heidegger's inquiry. The 
specific route taken by the Destruktion is the one required in order to 
resolve this ambiguity. 
tl. Characterization of the the general structure of judgment 
Thus the discussion is oriented by contemporary scholarly at-
tempts to determine whether logic or ontology dominates in the con-
struction of Leibniz's thought. Heidegger's analysis begins with the 
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theory of judgment (logic, "thinking") and will remain alert to the 
presence of ontological elements within this theory. 
The theory of judgment is for Leibniz a theory of inclusion. In 
every true statement, "the subject must contain the predicate in it-
self, whether explicitly or implicitly" (32). But what does "sub-
ject" mean here? Apparently substance itself is understood "from the 
viewpoint of the logical subject," although "the converse is also quite 
possible" (33). Many passages in Leibniz assimilate the ontic subject 
to the logical, i.e., "substance" to "subject." But this assimilation 
takes place in each case via the concept of truth. The essence of 
truth consists, according to Leibniz, in the relation of being-in. But 
Inclusion is as such an inclusion in logos, a logical inclusion; 
and as intending the being itself, it is an ontic inclusion. The 
peculiarity is that both of these in a certain way coincide. 
(35) 
Thus the situation with regard to the priority of being or logos cannot 
be clarified until we have "forged ahead to the final metaphysical 
foundations of this theory of judgment" (35). 
The first task is the more precise characterization of inclusion 
or the inesse. 
!2. Judgment and the idea of truth. The basic forms of truth 
Because "being true is the being true of propositions" (37), the 
question is how the concept of judgment is to be connected with that of 
the essence of truth in Leibniz. Heidegger shows that, for Leibniz, 
the essence of truth lies in identity. Truth means the truth of judg-
ments, so that the problem of truth centers on the connection of the 
predicate with the subject. This connection, as we have seen, is of 
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the nature of inclusion, or being-in, t~. For Leibniz, however, 
the type of statement exemplary of the nature of being true is "the 
simplest and most primordial true statements, ... the primary 
•truths'" (38), such as "A is A." Statements like these have the 
character of identities, "propositions in which something is explicit-
ly asserted as itself in its sameness to itself and with regard to that 
sameness" (38). Furthermore, for Leibniz, all true statements are 
reducible, through definition or analysis, to such primary identities; 
therefore "all true statements are finally reducible to identities" 
(39). Thus the essence of truth "resides in identity" (39). 
Heidegger now wishes to show that this definition and the prob-
lems connected with it land us immediately in "the ontological problem-
atic, the question about Being as such" (39). In the first instance, 
identity, which for Leibniz constitutes the essence of truth, is tra-
ditionally one of the principal features of Being (a "transcendental"). 
Heidegger will show, furthermore, that Leibniz's division of truth into 
original and derivative truths "has its metaphysical, ontological back-
ground" (41). Thus he proceeds to resolve the ambiguity between logic 
and ontology by exhibiting the metaphysical substructure that is con-
cealed in Leibniz's theory of judgment. 
In the division into two types of truths, original truths are 
those primary propositions for which no proof is posssible, since "they 
are in themselves immediately evident" (41). These are the class of 
explicit identities, identities as such. Derived truths are further 
classified into two types of truths, necessary and contingent. Neces-
sary truths are "virtual" identities, i.e., they can be reduced to 
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explicit identities; conversely, they can be deduced by us from identi-
ties. contingent truths Hare also identities in essence, but their 
analysis, their proof, never comes to an end--for finite understanding" 
(41). For God, however, contingent truths can be analyzed into identi-
ties, and therefore can be deduced from these. Implicit in the whole 
of this scheme is the a priori character of all knowledge. 
Heidegger proceeds to show the metaphysical basis of this concept 
of knowledge, for which even truths of fact are grounded in eternal 
truths--not, to be sure, in logical identities, but in the "very con-
cept of the subject" (monad) (43). Thus contingent truths, too, would 
be truths of identity. What is the metaphysical basis of this tendency 
to assimilate truths of fact to truths of identity? 
In the first instance, Leibniz, as a "rationalist," conceives 
Being, including the Being of facts, from the standpoint of the ratio 
(43). More importantly, the Scholastic tradition exerts a principal 
influence here. The Scholastic doctrine of God is "the key to Leib-
niz's logic" (43). 
At this point an indication of a key element in Heidegger's 
destructive strategy is in order. Having begun with the problematic 
situation (aporia), the ambiguity encountered in attempting to de-
termine which of logic or ontology is more fundamental in Leibniz 1 s 
thought, and focusing on the manifestly "logical" theory of the 
doctrine of judgment, Heidegger shows, in effect, that the issue is 
undecidable on the basis of the express formulations of the Leibnizian 
text alone. Heidegger then demonstrates the presence in Leibniz's 
thought of metaphysical (Scholastic) doctrines guiding his theory of 
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judgment. The priority of logic or ontology with reference to Leib-
niz's theory cannot be determined as long as the inquiry remains at the 
level of the overt, "logical" discourse that constitutes the "given" of 
Leibniz's text. Heidegger's Destruktion wishes to exhibit the sources 
of the Leibnizian philosophical discourse. This engagement with the 
sources of the tradition will serve, in the end (as we have already 
seen in Ch. I), the function of that repetition which seeks a renewal 
of philosophical thinking from its source. Thus Destruktion is not 
"endless" in principle, but has a determinate goal--one which, to be 
sure, cannot be achieved forthwith but requires, for Heidegger, the 
constant "repetition" of precisely this task of retrieval of the 
source. 
Hence the Destruktion, as a "regression to the origin," makes 
use of concrete and, indeed, scholarly procedures as Heidegger locates 
the sources of Leibniz's theory of judgment in Scholastic metaphysics. 
There is, in this analysis, something like a topology at work, to 
borrow an expression from Heidegger's later phase.l Heidegger dis-
cerns in Leibniz's text--to take one example--the topos of truth and 
the relation of the latter to identity. The themes belonging to this 
topos are preserved even while they undergo a certain process of trans-
formation in Heidegger's own work, so that the language of aletheia and 
of the Same remains related to that of traditional metaphysics. I can-
not trace the full process of transformation at which Heidegger's 
"overcoming" of metaphysics aims here; but we can observe the begin-
nings, at least, of the process of transformation in Heidegger's act 
of revealing the "place" of the Leibnizian text in relation to the 
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tradition. 
Heidegger traces the source of the Leibnizian ideal of cognition, 
according to which all truths can be reduced to "original" truths, 
f.e .• truths of identity, to the Scholastic notion of the scientia Dei, 
the knowledge that belongs to God. Thus he shows how Leibniz's concept 
of truth originates in the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger's ex-
plication of this concept is based for the most part upon Aquinas's 
article De scientia Dei (Quaestio XIV in Part I of Summa Theologica). 
There are two types of divine knowledge, scientia necessaria 
~alis, naturally necessary knowledge, and scientia libera, free 
knowledge. The division is based upon a relationship within divine 
knowedge to "possibility." God has a knowledge of pure possibilities 
as such--the essences of things--regardless of whether these possi-
bilities are actualized or not (44). Scientia necessaria naturalis is 
the knowledge that belongs to the nature of God; namely, "it belongs to 
God's essence simply to think the totality of what is possible" (44). 
This is, in effect, "thought thinking itself," noesis noeseos: 
In the knowledge of his thinking, God knows what is thought in 
this absolute thinking, i.e., the totality of reality, the 
omnitudo realitas, pure possibilities. (44) 
Apart from the concept of pure possibility, the notion of the 
"possible" also means "that which in actuality is not yet but will be 
.. all that which is not only in general possible, but also deter-
mined" (44). God has perfect precognition of what will thus become 
actual: 
God has, moreover, a precognition of everything actual, a Y!J!!.Q., 
a scientia libet!!, because whatever does become actual remains 
ultimately a matter of his willing it. (44) 
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This visio "is a grasping in the manner of a ~raesens intuitus .... a 
look which must be taken to range over the whole, as present before God 
who has everything existing presently before him" (45). The fact that 
God knows everything, past, present and future, "equally present in his 
presentness [Gegenwartigkeit]" (46), bears upon the nature of truth as 
identity. In finite knowing, knowledge proceeds by composition and 
division, in the proposition; but "what for us is a separate and 
successive attribution of predicates is for God an original unity, a 
sameness, identity" (47). (Thus the logical concept of identity is 
grounded in a metaphysical concept of the co-presence of all beings 
before the divine intuitus.) 
For God, then, in the visio of scientia libera, contingent truths 
already have the character of identities. This assimilation of truths 
of fact to truths of reason is, for Leibniz, the ideal for human cog-
nition. "He defines the idea and essence of human knowledge, i.e., of 
truth and of the statement, from the idea of the scientia Dei" (47-8). 
Following this explication of the metaphysical background to 
Leibniz's concept of truth, Heidegger now shows how the idea of truth 
as identity is further related to the principles of knowledge (suf-
ficient reason, non-contradiction). 
,3. The idea of truth and the principles of knowledge 
In this section, Heidegger notes once again an ambiguity in 
Leibniz's thought, in this case one that obtains among the principles 
of knowledge in their relationship to one another. According to the 
conventional understanding of Leibniz, the two basic principles of 
knowledge are correlated with the two types of truth: truths of 
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reasoning with the law of non-contradiction, and truths of fact with 
the principle of sufficient reason (52). Nonetheless, this 
straightforward correlation does not represent the true complexity of 
the situation. 
~tates originariae require no grounding, since they are self-
evident: "they are themselves grounds" (53). But both necessary 
truths, i.e., truths of reason in general, and contingent truths do 
require grounding. 
They fall under the principium rationis, or better, under the 
principium reddendae rationis, the principle of demonstrating 
grounds, i.e., the resolutio (the principle of the need for 
proof ) . ( 53) 
This seems to be the crux of the matter. Although Leibniz does not 
fully clarify the issue, even necessary truths, subject to the 
priniciple of non-contradiction, are also subject to the principium 
reddendae rationis. The reason for this is that necessary proposi-
tions, subject to the principle of non-contradiction can be reduced to 
identities. But reducibility is a kind of demonstrability, so in some 
sense the principle of grounds "is more primordial than the principle 
of non-contradiction" (53). Furthermore, Heidegger understands 
Leibniz to say that the principle of sufficient reason follows from the 
definition of truth as identity, meaning that without the principle of 
sufficient reason there could be no proof, i.e .. reduction to identi-
ties, and thus there could be no truth (55). It already begins to 
appear that the principle of sufficient reason is the basic principle 
of knowledge. 
But Heidegger wishes first of all to show the irreducible 
interconnectedness obtaining among the principles and terms of 
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knowledge: 
This summary of the principles of knowledge shows their 
connection with identity as the essence of truth. Identity is, 
however, the basic feature of the Being of all beings .... A 
connection emerges between reason, or ground, and truth and 
Being, with reference to identity. (55) 
The question is how these terms fit together. What it is important to 
notice is that no decision is possible with regard to the equiprimor-
diality of a single term: "(N]one of these basic phenomena is more 
primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial" (56). Thus 
Heidegger turns the ambiguity to be found in Leibniz's work regarding 
the primacy of one term or principle over another, into an equiprimor-
aiality obtaining among the basic terms. 
This result, however, is not meant as a solution but provides a 
way of further sharpening the central problem, which now becomes: "l) 
the inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground 
which makes it possible" (56). Just as one step is taken toward 
resolving the ambiguity of the relationship between logic and meta-
physics in Leibniz's thought by showing the dependence of Leibniz's 
logical inquiries upon the Scholastic metaphysical tradition--a method 
of going ''outside" the ambiguous structure to show its hidden basis in 
the tradition--so here another kind of step is taken toward overcoming 
a fundamental ambiguity in Leibniz's logical theory. The equiprimor-
diality of the basic logical terms is grounded in something other than 
logic, namely metaphysics: 
The fundamental meaning of the principle of reason first becomes 
clear ... when one realizes that the main principles of 
Leibnizian metaphysics are based on it and that Leibniz even 
deduces his metaphysical principles from it. (55-6) 
The principle of sufficient reason is not primarily logical, but 
65 
11etaphysical, since it concerns the grounding of "reason" itself. This 
transition to a metaphysical ground belongs, as we shall see, to the 
grounding of thought in general in the transcendence of Dasein; thus 
Heidegger says here that "the question concerns the nature of the 
integrity (non-decomposability) of this equiprimordial dimension of the 
transcendental" ( 56) . 
As I have already indicated above, Heidegger's geschichtliche 
Erinnerung exhibits a pattern that suggests something like a 
-
"topology," since Heidegger is seeking to locate logic within its 
proper dimension. (Cf. note 1, above.) Thus Heidegger insists upon 
the non-decomposability of the equiprimordial dimension of these 
elements, i.e., the logical terms, since the dimension of their equi-
primordiality, transcendence, is not another element with an indepen-
dent subsistence, a "one" beyond the "many"; it is nothing other than 
the "dimension" constitutive of their equiprimordiality.2 
Heidegger's discussion here concerns, then, "how the main phenom-
ena of what is discussed in logic refer back to metaphysics" (56-7). 
But his demonstration of this relationship aims toward something other 
than a foundation for the rebuilding of logic; for "the dismantling of 
logic is itself part of the grounding of metaphysics" (57). This 
requires nothing less than an Auseinandersetzung "with the whole of the 
previous tradition" (57), and the site of this "confrontation" is, for 
the present inquiry, Leibniz's doctrine of judgment. 
14. The idea of knowledge as such 
In the present section Heidegger demonstrates in greater detail 
the dependency of the Leibnizian ideal of knowledge upon the ideal of 
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the ~~i~qti~_Dei. The mode of knowledge of the latter, int~itt.!§ 
eraesens, which has the character of ~~Q!C!_si~~esentialtter 
~ciE!_ns, "bringing everything before itself in its presentness" 
(58), is deduced, in effect, from the sim~licitas of God. The 
~implicitas Dei is itself the "guiding ideal of what, in the genuine 
sense, is" (69), and therefore exhibits the grounding of Leibniz's idea 
of knowledge in an ontology, i.e., in an interpretation of Being. 
Heidegger presents an elegant and clear analysis of Leibniz's 
treatise on the essential characteristics of knowledge, ~~~itati~ de 
cognitione, Veritate et Ldeis (1684). Here I shall review only the 
principal elements of that analysis in order to bring out the relevant 
topoi. 
Leibniz writes (Gerhardt IV, 422): 
Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either 
confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or 
adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive. The most 
perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. 
(59) 
Heidegger summarizes these relations in a diagram: 
knowledge 
obscur.---~ 




blind --- :::c:: 
(most perfect) 
Obscure notions are those which do not allow for the clear 
differentiation of things different in themselves, i.e .• which do not 
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allow for the recognition of a thing as of one kind rather than an-
other; clear notions are those which do allow of such demarcation. 
Even if one has a clear notio, however, one may not be able to "enum-
erate one by one the marks which are sufficient to distinguish this 
clearly known thing from others"; in this case, even though one's 
knowledge is clara it is nonetheless confusa. What is at stake here is 
the capacity to define a thing through its distinguishing character-
istics, as opposed to the capacity to distinguish things at the level 
of sensory experience. A clear knowledge is distincta when we do 
indeed have "sufficient marks and characteristics to distinguish the 
thing from other similar things" (60-1). Here it is possible to have a 
"nominal" definition of the thing. A nominal definition "does not mean 
a simple verbal definition," but "a knowledge with content, though not 
the really primary knowledge" (61)--a knowledge sufficient to enumerate 
the "marks" of the thing named. Thus a 
cognitio distincta is one in which the object named as such is 
not only clearly distinguished from another, but in which also 
the marks of its difference are expressly enumerable. (61) 
Even though such marks are enumerable, the marks taken by them-
selves may be confused; in this case knowledge is inadequate, ~Q&.nitio 
inadaeguata. Knowledge is adequate when analysis is carried out to the 
end and "confusion is no longer possible" (62). 
What is important here is that adequate knowledge represents an 
ideal of knowledge, since it may be impossible for a human being to 
carry out such an analysis to the end. Furthermore, "the mathematical 
ideal of knowledge appears again in connection with this idea of 
knowledge" (62). 
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Cognitio adaequata is possible for us only in an indirect way: 
"Instead of maintaining ourselves in the total intuition of things, we 
use signs" (62). This "blind" knowledge is the way that human beings 
appropriate adequate, i.e., fully analyzed knowledge. It is contrasted 
with "seeing," intuitive knowledge, which is "not a still higher degree 
of analysis, but a mode of appropriating the highest state of analysis, 
i.e., of its result, of cogntio adaequata" (64). It means to look into 
"the distinct totality simultaneously; to bring to complete presence" 
(64). This manner of possessing knowledge 
implies the orientation to the ideal described earlier as God's 
way of knowing, the knowledge of the simplest being, ens simplic-
issimum. Intuitus is therefore: 1) direct grasp, 2) grasp of 
what is not further analyzable in its wholeness. (64) 
Adequate knowledge is thus distinguished from distinct knowledge, not 
merely by greater clarity, but by what is in effect a different type of 
knowledge. For here "all marks are present in clarity, and among them 
'natures' as well, essential determinations, i.e., what makes the thing 
itself possible" (64). Heidegger adds that "with Leibniz the distinc-
tion between essentia and existentia is again fluid" (64). With the 
concept of adequate knowledge, the ideal of knowledge moves into the 
realm of essentia, i.e., that of possibilitas, "the inherent possibil-
ity of the thing." 
Heidegger is engaged, even in this seemingly straightforward 
analysis, in something like a repetition of the relation of essentia 
and existentia, which, relying upon the Leibnizian precedent, will 
result in a clarification of the relationships to be established 
between ontology and metontology. If ontology is fundamentally con-
cerned, as we have already seen in our introductory remarks, with 
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essence or ~ossibility, then we can expect the metontology to consti 
tute the Heideggerian transmutation of existentia or "actuality." 
Possibility for Leibniz signifies compatibility among its marks: 
Adequate knowledge as knowledge of essence is a priori knowledge 
of what makes the known itself possible, for it is the clear 
grasp of thorough compatibility, compatibilitas. (65) 
Real definition, definitiones reales, is associated with adequate 
knowledge, since it is in real definitions that "the thing is estab-
lished as possible" (65). 
Heidegger notes here by way of parenthesis that the Kantian tran-
scendental inquiry constitues a radicalization of Leibniz's doctrine 
of possibilitas, to which belongs realitas. Thus the problem of the 
"objective reality of the categories" is that of their realitas, not 
empirical determinations of appearances but the way that categories 
determine objects from their "transcendental reality, a finite, 
horizonal-ecstatic reality" (65). Kant "grounds ontological knowledge 
in the transcendental imagination. Intuitus gains a constitutive 
character" ( 67). 
The problem now is to connect the earlier interpretation of truth 
as identity to its definition in relation to the idea of knowledge, 
i.e., as adequate intuitive perceptum esse, "being adequately perceived 
intuitively" (68). A close examination of what is meant by adequate 
knowledge enables us to see its connection with identity: 
In adequate knowledge that which is known is the totum of 
the reguisita, i.e., that which, as a whole, constitutes the 
reality of a thing. This thing known is the true, the verum; the 
totality of the requisita is the possibilitas, that which makes 
possible the thingness of the thing. This content of the res is 
compatible with itself, for only by being compatible can it make 
possible. Incompatibility as conflict breaks apart, as it were, 
the essence of a thing; it falls apart and "can" not "be." What 
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is known in adequate knowledge is the coherent connection of the 
thing's mutually compatible determinations. In fact, the thing, 
if adequately known, is known precisely with regard to the com-
patibility of its realities. Adequate knowledge is the total 
grasp of the harmony of multiplicity" (68). 
However, "identity," in relation to the judgment, means that what is 
grasped in the connectio realis characterizing true judgment not only 
does not come into conflict with itself, "but all is in itself unified 
and, as determination, relates to one and the same, to what the thing 
is, to the identical in its identity" (68). 
Thus Heidegger not only shows the relationship of adequate 
knowledge to identity but arrives at an enriched concept of identity: 
Identity is not the negative concept of the absence of all 
differentiation. It is, conversely, the idea of the uni-sonous 
unity of what is different" (68). 
If truth as "the same" (69) and truth as adequate knowledge are 
thus linked, then it also becomes clear how the characteristics of 
truth are derived from the "sirnplicitas Dei as guiding ideal of what, 
in the genuine sense, is" (69), and thus how logic is dependent upon 
ontology or metaphysics. The next step is clarify further Leibniz's 
interpretation of Being, and at the same time to "find a connection 
between the interpretation of Being and the theory of judgment" (69), 
i.e., to show how Leibniz's logic rests upon the interpretation of 
Being implicit in Leibniz's work. 
We have already seen that Heidegger's Erinnerung exhibits 
something of the character of a "topology," not only in its attempt to 
locate the metaphysical site of the Leibnizian doctrine of judgment, 
but also in its manner of delineating the various topoi constitutive of 
Leibniz's metaphysics. These topoi--which are constitutive not only of 
71 
Leibniz's metaphysics, but of metaphysics in general--include identity, 
presence, possibility, the contrast of essence and existence, and 
infinite vs. finite knowledge. What is Heidegger's aim in delineating 
these fundamental themes? 
on the one hand, Heidegger is engaged, as we have seen, in a 
"regression" to the foundations of logic in metaphysics. The regres-
sion demonstrates how interrelationships among fundamental terms can 
onlY be resolved by placing them in a metaphysical context; thus 
Heidegger will show that for Leibniz the "site," the concept of the 
Being of beings at work in his monadology, is named in the concept of 
drive (cf. !5). 
At the same time, the exposition of the metaphysical site of 
Leibniz's fundamental logical concepts--the geschichtliche Erinnerung, 
in Leibniz's case--makes it possible to undertake the repetition 
envisioned in the augenblickliche Besinnung. Heidegger exhibits, in 
his analysis of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment and its metaphysical 
basis, the resources which he appropriates and, in the context of the 
present text, transforms in order to constitute his own concept of 
"metaphysics." Thus "drive" becomes "transcendence." (Heidegger 
remarks incidentally how Kant's notion of the transcendental imag-
ination belongs to a radicalization of the Leibnizian problematic, and 
thereby suggests that it mediates Leibniz's concept of drive and his 
own concept of transcendence.) We see, then, that the Destruktion of 
Leibniz's logic unfolds into a repetition. And it is not only the 
fundamental notion, drive as the interpretation of Being, which is 
repeated; but also all the topoi of the metaphysical "dimension"--we 
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see this exemplified in the way that Heidegger already calls identity 
"the same" here (p. 69). Heidegger's revaluation of metaphysics, even 
while attempting to effect the most fundamental transformation of meta-
physics, remains in the "same" topos as metaphysics. Thus Leibniz's 
unifying, monadological drive becomes the event of transcendence; pos-
sibility becomes the central theme of Heidegger's theory of transcen-
dence and temporalization; and the "uni-sonous unity of what is dif-
ferent" (68) suggests the harmony that characterizes world. 
Destruktion as a method is meant from the first to open up the 
possibility of a positive appropriation and transformation of meta-
physics. Something like this "method" remains operative throughout all 
periods of Heidegger's work, even when Heidegger no longer wishes to 
retain the name "metaphysics" for the source of the tradition. The 
strategy of regression to the origin, exposition of the nature of the 
origin or "site" of metaphysics, and, with this "insight into that 
which is," the envisioning of a possible transformation of thought, 
remains characteristic of Heidegger's work from beginning to end. This 
fact suggests that the unity of his work should be conceived in terms 
of this "strategic" continuity, rather than (say) on the basis of a 
determinate philosophical position maintained from beginning to end. 
Of course, it may also turn out that his "position" can only be 
conceived on the basis of this "strategy," i.e., that the content and 
movement of Heidegger's thought are intimately intertwined. 
We should note here, too, that because "Being" enters into this 
Process of transformation in Heidegger's work, it is not adequate to 
focus upon the theme of the "question of the meaning of Being" as the 
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sole key to his project. That question, it is true, serves as the 
~hicle of his work, as it carries his project through to that trans-
formation which his thought seeks to work upon the tradition. But for 
this very reason it is necessary to see that what motivates the ques-
tion of Being is just this goal of repetition (overcoming) and trans-
formation. Heidegger's questioning of the meaning of Being "destroys" 
"Being" itself. 
!5. The essential determination of the Being of genuine beings 
This long section, the crux of Heidegger's analysis, is divided 
into three subsections. In subsection a), "The monad as drive," 
Heidegger at last elicits the truly fundamental metaphysical features 
of Leibniz's monadology; in b), "Intermediate reflections to find the 
guiding clue for the interpretation of Being," he compares Leibniz's 
determination of the nature of substance, on the basis of the ego's 
awareness of itself, with his own concept of Dasein's transcendence and 
its constitution through the understanding of Being; and in subsection 
c), "The structure of drive," he shows how the individuation of the 
monad, its uniqueness, follows from its metaphysical character as 
drive. 
By means of this long analysis of the Leibnizian monadology, 
Heidegger in effect outlines his own metaphysical program: subsection 
a) concerns the elements of ontology and subsection c) constitutes a 
treatise on Leibnizian "metontology." Thus Heidegger presents a 
Preparatory exposition of his own "metaphysics of Dasein." The Second 
Major Part of MFL is a repetition of the First, so that Heidegger's 
inquiry into grounding and the metaphysics of truth is offered as a 
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repetition of the Leibnizian monadology, just as in KPM his "laying of 
the foundations of metaphysics" in fundamental ontology is presented as 
a repetition of Kant's own laying of the foundations in the Critique of 
pure Reason. We see then the concreteness of the process whereby the 
metaphysical essence is distilled, as it were, from the work of a 
thinker, and how Heidegger's own analyses are indeed engaged in the 
alchemy of transformation with respect to each text. What Heidegger 
seeks is the metaphysical essence of the metaphysical tradition, an 
essence (!~) which his own work is meant to "liberate" from the 
obfuscations of the tradition. The "possibility" addressed in the 
Destruktion is that of the letting-arise of world (truth). be thought 
again as the letting-arise of thought and world. 
Heidegger has been engaged in showing the metaphysical roots of 
Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and thus that his logic is grounded in 
an ontology. In t4 he has demonstrated that a metaphysical content 
(the ideal of the simplicitas Dei) underlies the concept of truth as 
identity, and that this concept can be reconciled with the interpre-
tation of truth as intuitus. Heidegger now turns to the interpretation 
of Leibniz's ontology proper, the monadology, and asks 
Is there a connection, and what sort of connection, between the 
interpretation of Being as identity and the interpretation of 
Being as monad? Does discovery of this connection give us 
insight into what we seek: the metaphysical foundations of 
Leibniz's logic--and with it a paradigmatic insight into the 
deep roots logic has in metaphysics? (72) 
The choice of "monad" as the name for substance lies, indeed, in its 
signifying "the simple, unity, the one" (72). But Heidegger immedi-
ately offers an alternative definition--"it means also: the individual, 
the solitary" (72); and this alternative definition already suggests 
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the themes that differentiate metontology from ontology. 
In his polemic with Descartes, Leibniz shows how the principle of 
unity cannot lie in extensio with its passive or purely negative geo-
11etrical points, but "the principle of unity is thus to be sought in 
what is itself positively unifying and thereby active" (75). But the 
unifying elements sought are not "pieces" of "matter," "but they are 
the primordial indivisible principle of formation, the forma, the 
eidos" (77). Monads, in short, are not antic but are of an ontological 
character. 
Heidegger's analysis in subsection a) concerns the interrelation-
ship between the "principle of formation," i.e., drive rn.rang), and the 
problem of unity. "The nature of 1 force 1 must be understood by way of 
the problem of unity as it is inherent in substantiality" (77). Force 
interpreted as "drive" is the concept of an activity which is, in its 
essence, an activity of unification. 
Before introducing the concept of drive, however, Heidegger 
enlarges upon the Scholastic background to Leibniz's principle of vis 
primitiva. What is important for our purposes in the exposition is the 
way Heidegger emphasizes the role of possibility in the development of 
Leibniz's concept of force, "possibility in the sense of that which 
constitutes the essence of a thing, enabling the thing in its essential 
constitution aside from whether or not this possibility is ever 
actualized" (80). The Scholastic roots of the concept of possibility 
(or "power") are seen in the division of eotentia physica into activa 
and passiva. This division corresponds to a twofold division of actus 
into actio and forma, second act or "power to accomplish" and first act 
- --
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or "inclination towards, aptitude." Potentia passiva corresponds to 
"first act," actus as forma, whereas potentia activa corresponds to 
"second act," actus as actio. There is a metaphysical hierarchy in 
evidence here, for second act, the power to accomplish or actio, is 
possible only if something is already actual. 
Power, on the contrary, as power to become something, to allow 
something to happen with itself, is distinct from actuality, for 
in this case something which becomes actual is particularly 
dependent on the disposition of that which allows something to 
happen to itself. The aptitude is distinct from that which is 
and can come to be on the basis of the aptitude. The aptitude 
itself requires no actualization. (81) 
Heidegger adds that "these are important distinctions for general 
ontology, and they have long been inadequately interpreted and 
assimilated" (81). 
Leibniz's concept of vis activa (which Heidegger translates as 
Orang, drive) is not potentia activa, the capacity to act, but is 
"midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself" (Gerhardt IV, 
469), "a capability, but not a capability at rest" (82). Drive is a 
capacity for action which is continuously productive (83). In the 
concept of drive, Leibniz transforms the Scholastic notions of ~ctio 
and for'!! by reversing their relationship (subordinating the former to 
the latter), and combining them into the structure of the metaphysical 
entity, the monad. The character of drive defines the Being of the 
monad, and thus constitutes an interpretation of the Being of beings, 
an ontology. 
But Heidegger adds that "we must now anticipate. For, as 
universal, this interpretation of genuine being must also explain the 
possibility of beings as a whole" (83). What is "anticipated" here is 
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the problem of the dual structure of metaphysics, how what is "one" in 
the monad's metaphysical character as drive gives rise to the problem 
of its radical individuation, i.e. its unique relation to being as a 
whole. The question for Leibniz is, 
On the basis of this self-unifying monad [on the basis of the 
ontological character of the monad], how does the entirety of the 
universe constitute itself in its interconnectedness [the 
problem, in its Leibnizian version, of "being as a whole"]? (85) 
Heidegger interprets drive as the conferral of unity. The nature of 
this unifying activity is examined in subsection c), "The structure of 
drive." 
One half of this subsection is given over to the further 
clarification of the structure of drive in its ontological character. 
The other half concerns what lies beyond ontology for Leibniz's 
metaphysics: his "meta-ontology." Specifically, the subsection can be 
divided into four parts with the following themes: 1) drive as the 
original organizing function, and the relation of perceptio and ~ 
titio; 2) transition (the question of individuation); 3) apperception 
as the key to the problem of individuation; and 4) review and transi-
tion to the (undelivered) ~6. 
In what we are calling part 1 of !5(c), Heidegger develops the 
ontological significance of the monad, in effect demonstrating that the 
monad is characterized by a kind of representing transcendence, namely, 
by an appetitio or "tendency toward transition" which expresses itself 
in eerceptio. 
The "central problem" is that of how "the drive of substance con-
fer[s] unity, how must the drive itself be defined?" (89). 
Now, although the monad itself is simple, if it is to be 
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conceived as conferring unity, then "there must already be something 
l!!!nifold which it unifies," so that "what unifies and that whose es-
sence it is to unify must essentially have a relation to the manifold" 
(89). 
If what unifies is drive, then the manifold itself has the char-
acter of drive, and indeed it is drive itself that constantly is 
pressed on [Ge-drangte], since it possesses the character of movement 
as such. "There is thus in drive itself a self-surpassing; there is 
change, alteration, movement" (90). 
The problem here is the relation of unity, of the one, to the 
manifold. "Unity should not be the subsequent assembling of a 
collection, but the original organizing unification" (90). 
This means that the constitutive principle of unification must 
then be prior to that which is subject to possible unification. 
What unifies must anticipate by reaching beforehand toward 
something from which every manifold has already received its 
unity. The simply unifying must be originally a reaching out 
and, as reaching out, must be gripping in advance in such a way 
that the entire manifold is already made manifold in the 
encircling reach. (90) 
Leibniz calls this reaching out and gripping in advance ~erceptio, 
"apprehension," which Heidegger characterizes as vor-stellend, repre-
sentational.3 Heidegger goes so far as to speak of the ek-static char-
acter of representating drive (91); that is to say, representation is 
not a mental faculty but the way in which the manifold is pre-unified 
"in the simple" (91). 
The "striving" that belongs to the structure of drive Leibniz 
clarifies further with the concept of appetitio. This concept signi-
fies the self-surpassing that belongs to drive. "This means that 
multiplicity arises in the driving thing itself" (92); the multiplicity 
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is a multiplicity of manifold succession, i.e., time. This drive to 
overcome any momentary stage or "trend toward transition is what Leib-
niz means by appetitus" (92). 
The self-surpassing (a precursor of "transcendence") that char-
acterizes drive is a way of anticipating every "possible multiplicity," 
and at the same time of being able to "deal with every multiplicity in 
its possibility" (91). 
That is, drive must have already surpassed and overcome multipli 
city. Drive must therefore bear multiplicity in itself and allow 
it to be born in the driving. That is its "world" character. It 
is important to see the essential source of multiplicity in drive 
as such. (91) 
Heidegger will later take up the theme sketched out here, tran-
scendental dissemination, in tlO of MFL. Heidegger treats this ancient 
philosophical problem of the one and the many, furthermore, under the 
aegis of "world," as we see in this passage. In the Leibnizian con-
text, the "one" is addressed in the function of drive, at once unifying 
and self-surpassing. In other words, the "one" here has the character 
of an event. Multiplicity itself can only arise and come to be as a 
manifold with the unifying event which anticipates a possible multi-
plicity and provides it with its "possibility." The one, however, is 
not something over and above the multiplicity--it is the originally 
unifying event itself (always a "concrete" event), the event that 
allows "multiplicity to be born" and that bears multiplicity "in 
itself." (Because it is neither an ontic nor even a "meta-physical" 
One, world, as exhibiting the character of event, is "nothing" (cf. MFL 
210). ) 
It is clear that there is not "a" drive apart from this or that 
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drive that organizes and unifies a possible multiplicity. The onto-
logical significance of drive lies in its possibility-character. But 
drive, which lets a multiplicity arise in its possibility, always 
refers to the "individuality" of this particular multiplicity. This 
•eans, hwoever, that it must lie in the nature of drive, in the onto-
logy of drive, to individuate itself in this fashion. Heidegger 
writes, in the transitional "part 2" of t5(c): 
As what unifies, drive is the nature of a being. At the 
same time, every monad has its propre constitution originale . 
. . What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular 
monad? How is this individuation itself constituted? ... 
Obviously individuation must also take place, as it were, 
in that which basically constitutes the essence of the monad, in 
the drive. Where can and must the ground of the peculiar 
uniqueness of the monad reside? What essential character in the 
structure of drive makes a particular individuation possible? To 
what extent is the primordially unifying self-individuating in 
its unifying? (94) 
These questions lead to the "overturning" (Umschlag), in the Leibnizian 
context, of ontology into the problematic of radical individuation 
(meta-ontology). In our examination of the Umschlag of Heidegger's 
ontology into the metontology, we shall see how the metontology is the 
immediate result of the full development of the ontology; the turn-over 
into the metontology is not mediated by anything else, nor does it 
signify a mere "failure" of the ontology, but arises, just as Heidegger 
says, with "the development of the self-understanding of this prob-
lematic" (154). And for Leibniz the radical individuation of the monad 
arises immediately from its ontological character: "Inasmuch as it 
unifies--and that is its essence--the monad individuates itself" (96). 
Our part 3 of subsection c), then, constitutes the Leibnizian 
"metontology." The central issue here is the way the finitude of the 
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(created) monad is expressed in the monadology. In the Leibnizian 
context, "finitude means restrictedness [Eingeschranktheit]" (94). 
Restrictedness is founded in the basic ontological feature of the 
monad, its unifying drive, because in "representational unifying there 
is a l!Q.Ssession of unity in advance to which drive looks, as repre-
senting and tending toward transition" (94-5). This "point" to which 
drive looks, the "view-point," is already "constitutive for drive" and 
indeed "regulates in advance the entire drive itself" (95). Thus "per-
ceptio and appetitus are therefore determined in their drive primarily 
from the viewpoint" (95). 
The problem of the individuation of the monad is that of its 
finitude or restrictedness, and the latter must be interpreted as 
restrictedness to a "viewpoint." The second feature Heidegger educes 
in his analysis of the monad's finitude is the so far inexplicit 
possibility of the monad's also "grasping itself" (95), in its 
"reaching out and grasping." By virtue of "this dimensional self-
openness," the monad "can perceive itself concomitantly; it can 
apperceive" (95). Thus Leibniz's "apperception" is interpreted here as 
a function of the finitude or restrictedness of the monad. According 
to Heidegger it is apperception--the "reflexive" character implicit in 
drive--that establishes the uniqueness of the viewpoint of the 
individual monad, for it is only in apperception that the viewpoint 
becomes possible as a viewpoint; in other words, viewpoint itself means 
an apperception of the monad's "situation," thereby constituting the 
monad's unifying relation to its own possible multiplicity. Viewpoint 
is inherently "reflexive" in this sense. 
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Thus the third feature of the restrictedness characterizing the 
aonad in its essence as drive is the way that in drive it "unifies the 
universe represented in advance, only according to the possibility of 
the perspective" (96). 
Each monad is thus in itself a mundus concentratus (Letter to de 
Volder, June 20, 1703, G. II, 252). Every drive concentrates in 
itself, in its driving, the world in each case after its own 
fashion. ( 96) 
Each monad is the "world," but through a "perspectival refraction," so 
that each monad is reflected in each; all monads together "are oriented 
in advance toward a pre-disposed harmony, the harmonia praestabilita of 
the totality of beings [des Alls des Seienden]" (96/119). The totality 
of beings, the whole of the world, is apprehended, by virtue of its 
viewpoint, by each monad; but at the same time the monad in its fini-
tude cannot comprehend the world '!§. such a totality. Instead, the 
aonad's apprehension of the world has the character of a finite event: 
"Each monad is, according to its particular level of awareness, a 
world-history making the world present" (97). Thus there is a multi-
plicity, a fundamental dissemination inherent in the concept of the 
monad as drive (of course, for Leibniz, the divine monad has a priv-
ileged perspective, not being finite; it is noteworthy that Heidegger 
is not concerned with this "absolute" monad, and is concerned solely to 
explore the consequences of the individuation of the finite monad). 
Thus a fourth feature of the monad in relation to its finitude 
emerges: "the monad is a living mirror of the universe" (97). Heideg-
ger quotes the Letter to de Volder of June 20, 1703: 
It is necessary that entelechies <monads> differ from one another 
or not be completely similar to each other; in fact, they are the 
principles of diversity, for each differently expresses the 
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universe from its own way of seeing (representing, Vor-stellung). 
And precisely this is their peculiar task, that they should be so 
many living mirrors or so many concentrated worlds. (G. II, 
251/52) (97) 
Heidegger finds here each of the features already discovered in the 
analysis of the monad's finitude. Of the last, mirroring, he says that 
it "is not a fixed copying, but drives as such to ever new predelin-
eated possibilities of itself" (98). Thus re-presentation itself sig-
nifies, not a fixed copying, but precisely the perspectival mirroring 
from the restriction of viewpoint that follows from the self-surpassing 
character of drive. Representation is "creative" in the sense that it 
articulates a possible viewpoint upon the whole, while it is only from 
such a viewpoint that the whole (world) is apprehended. 
There is a final aspect of finite drive to be mentioned, namely 
the negative consequence of particularity that 
In every finite drive occurring in a particular perspective, 
there is always and necessarily something resistant which opposes 
the drive .... Insofar as the monad is always the whole from a 
viewpoint, it is finite insofar as it is ordered to the universe. 
That is, the monad relates to resistance, something which it is 
not but could well be. This passivity, in the sense of what the 
drive does not drive, belongs to the finitude of drive. (98) 
This fundamental passivity is what Leibniz means by "prime matter." 
In a conclusion to this subsection and to Section 5, Heidegger 
reminds us that "it was necessary to interpret the monadology in order 
to expose the genuinely metaphysical foundation of Leibniz's logic" 
(99). 
At the same time our result needs a still deeper basis: the 
problem of ens qua essentia and as existentia, of being as 
something possible which is as such a possible actuality [das 
Problem des ens als essentia und existentia, als ein Mogliches, 
das als solches ein mogliches Wirkliches ist]. (100/123) 
The discussion of this problem is omitted in the lecture course; 
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Heidegger refers back to the lectures on the subject from the summer 
semester of the previous year (Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie). 
For our purposes, what is important in this remark is its clue con-
cerning the relation of the twofold structure of metaphysics to the 
traditional problem of Being as essence and as existence: Ontology 
concerns possibility, and metontology "possible actuality," and these 
concerns are the locus of Heidegger's repetition of the traditional 
metaphysical problems of essence and existence. In this text, the 
repetition is undertaken in the light of the Leibnizian metaphysics, 
for it is with Leibniz that "the distinction between essentia and 
existentia is again fluid" (64).4 
Heidegger has now finished his commentary on Leibniz, since the 
final section (17) of this Part constitutes a review and overview of 
the problem of the relation of logic to ontology. Before proceeding, 
then, to our study of the Second Major Part, let us summarize what 
our reading of the First Part has brought to light regarding the 
Destruktion and Heidegger's involvement with Leibniz's metaphysics. 
The First Part of MFL is motivated by the geschichtliche 
Erinnerung (and, of course, is alredy guided by the envisioned project 
to be worked out in the augenblickliche Besinnung of Part Two), and 
takes the form of a Destruktion, "a critical dismantling [Abbau] of the 
traditional concepts ... to the sources [Quellen] out of which they 
were drawn" (BP 23m/31). The regression (Rilckgang, BP 31) to the 
sources has the very concrete sense of a tracing of Leibniz's logical 
concepts to their origin in Scholastic metaphysics. The regression is 
motivated here by an ambiguity or undecidability in the Leibnizian text 
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with regard to whether logic or metaphysics takes precedence in the 
construe tion of Leibniz's thought. The ambiguity is resolved by going 
outside Leibniz's work proper to the historical sources of Leibniz's 
logic. Here Heidegger merely hints at sources beyond these sources--at 
the ubiquity of the metaphysical theme of presence, for example in the 
cognitive ideal of the scientia Del (MFL 45). Thus the regression does 
not really end with these particular sources; it could be carried 
through to the source of the fundamental metaphysical topoi. 
Heidegger actually aims at such a complete regression to the 
transcendence of Dasein, but he does not continue toward it by means of 
the "historical" regression to earlier metaphysical sources. Rather, 
he focuses upon another ambiguity in Leibniz's logical enterprise, 
namely the question of the primacy of one principle of knowledge over 
another. This ambiguity cannot be resolved in logical terms. In a 
sense, it cannot be resolved at all, since the basic principles are 
"equiprimordial" (56). It is in order to comprehend the ground of this 
equiprimordiality that Heidegger turns to the metaphysical dimension, 
which for Leibniz is conceptualized as monadic "drive." Thus, once 
again, the ambiguity (aporia) is resolved by stepping "outside" the 
problematic field of logic to find its ground or basis in metaphysical 
sources. In this second case, the metaphysical basis is discovered in 
Leibniz's own work. Nonetheless, Heidegger is implicitly undertaking a 
regression to a source that lies "beyond" Leibniz's own formulations of 
the nature of drive: The regression aims at the transcendence of 
Dasein as the ground of "thought," and this regression can be completed 
Q!!.!x in a repetition. Thus the "regression to the origin" is actually 
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completed only with the repetition that Heidegger undertakes in the 
analysis of transcendence in the Second Major Part of MFL. The paradox 
here is that the "origin" of Leibniz's work only becomes "manifest" 
throught the repetition of Leibniz's work.5 
Besides the central, metaphysical concept of drive, the major 
"topoi" of metaphysics are at least intimated in Heidegger's discus-
sion of Leibniz. Heidegger's repetition of fundamental metaphysical 
concepts is not intended to transpose thought to a place "outside" 
metaphysics, but is rather meant to be effective solely as a repetition 
and transformation of what is essential in metaphysics. The "overcom-
ing" of metaphysics rests upon a transformation "of" metaphysics it-
self, from its soruces, and is in this sense continuous with "meta-
physics." 
We learn from Heidegger's examination of Leibniz that ~ossibility 
is the central concept of ontology; indeed, the twofold structure of 
metaphysics is constituted by the relationship between "possibility" 
and "possible actuality." Heidegger shows how Leibniz transforms the 
Scholastic concept of possibility or power into that of vis activa or 
"drive." In turn, Heidegger elicits from the monadological concept of 
drive the interpretation of essence or possibility as event, the "hap-
pening" of transcendence. 
This event is itself "thinking," the grounding event whereby 
world comes to pass. Heidegger's transposition of the problems of 
fundamental ontology onto the problematics of ground and the meta-
physics of truth is modelled upon the results of his Destruktion of the 
Leibnizian theory of thinking, i.e., of judgment. The Second Major 
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part of MFL constitutes a "retrieval" of transcendence on the basis of 
the new focus upon the problem of ground. Heidegger presents this new 
perspective on transcendence as a clarification of the sense of his 
original project: to think the event of "world," to think transcendence 
as the grounding event, the site of the upsurgance of world. Thus the 
Destruktion of Leibniz yields, as I have already suggested, the central 
issue concealed in the tradition, that of the "principle of ground" 
(which must always be understood in relation to the problem of the 
"instituting" of world). 
The "metaphysics of truth" signifies the complete revision of 
fundamental ontology via the problematic of ground. In fact, The 
Meta2hysical Foundations of Logic is a transitional text, the 
transitional text, between the early ("transcendence") and the middle 
("truth") periods, for it is here that the motivations underlying this 
change are most clearly expressed and formulated. The "overturning" 
(Umschlag) of ontology into the metontology regulates the change from 
the early to the middle period, and it is by tracing the development of 
the metontology that we achieve the most concrete characterization 
possible of the so-called "turn" in Heidegger's thought. 
With the transition from drive to the problem of individuation, 
the Leibnizian "metontology" proceeds through a certain sequence of 
issues. Heidegger's presentation here shows how his own metontology 
can exhibit such a wide range of significations as we shall find in ,10 
and the Appendix: The metontology encompasses the problems of individ-
uation, finitude, "reflexivity," multiplicity and dissemination, and 
the upsurgance of world in the midst of das Seiende im Ganzen. 
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At the same time, the metontology will provide the key to the 
blossoming of the "metaphysics of truth" in the middle period. How 
this is so we shall see on examination of On the Essence of Truth. 
Meanwhile Heidegger himself completes the First Major Part with a 
reflection on logic as the metaphysics of truth. 
17. Theory of judgment and the conception of Being. Logic and 
ontology 
In this section, Heidegger surveys once again the field of 
inquiry and organizes it around the issues that are to be of central 
concern in the Second Major Part of MFL. Starting with the current 
situation, that epistemology has become logic, he reviews very sue-
cinctly the intentional theory of judgment, according to which "the 
intentional relation of making statements is itself a relating rela-
tionship" (101). The determining judgment is articulated relationally, 
and the whole of the judgment, in the sense of the act of judging, is 
itself an intentional relationship of Dasein to the present thing which 
is bifurcated (into "subject" and "predicate") through the judgment. 
Since the structures of intentionality and bifurcation are "structures 
of judging Dasein," the true question concerning judgment and truth is 
What is Dasein and how is it that it can make statements and must 
make them in the manner of a bifurcated intentionality? Wherein 
is the intrinsic possibility of judgment grounded as the charac-
terized mode of Dasein's activity? We need then to illuminate 
the Being-constitution of Dasein, first in this one definite as-
pect, then ultimately with regard to an ontology, a metaphysics 
of Dasein. (lOlm/125) 
Thus the metaphysics of Dasein concerns the possibility of thought as 
such, the locus of the determination of beings effected in the bifur-
eating judgment. This characteristic "mode of Dasein's activity" is 
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the ground of the possibility of such determination of beings. Ontolo-
gy, as the metaphysics of Dasein, is about "thinking" as that funda-
mental activity or event whereby beings are determined in their Being. 
The relation of judgment to truth can be examined only thorugh 
the clarification of "the way truth is related to judging Dasein and to 
Dasein as such" (102). What is really at stake in "logic" is the 
question of "the intrinsic possibility of truth .... If, however, 
clarifying the essence of truth can only be carried out as a meta-
physics, as an ontology, then logic must be conceived as the meta-
~h~sics of truth" (102). But to turn ontology into the metaphysics of 
truth is the task of the whole of MFL. 
Heidegger now reviews the First Major Part. The central theme in 
relation to the problem of "being true" is that of identity. But 
identity governs not only logical truths but "existential" truths as 
well, i.e., the multiplicity constituting the content of a given 
existing being can be brought together into "a possible coherent whole" 
only if "the being itself is constituted by an original unity" (102). 
That unity is monadological. 
Thus the monadic structure of beings is the metaphysical founda-
tion for the theory of judgment and for the identity theory of 
truth. Our dismantling of Leibniz's doctrine of jdugment down to 
basic metaphysical problems is hereby accomplished. (102-3) 
Heidegger adds that 
Our orientation to Leibniz's logic and its connection with meta-
physics has the task of making a horizon of possible problems in 
this field visible in the first place, so as to remove some of 
the strangeness from the purely systematic discussions that are 
to follow. (103) 
Heidegger proceeds to a long digression wherein he takes up the 
argument with "those who believe the primacy of logic over metaphysics 
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can be conclusively proved" (103). Actually, Heidegger "demonstrates," 
through the entanglement in the concepts of logic that results through 
this argument, that there is no exit from logic through argument--he 
makes, in effect, a sort of "leap": 
So the primacy of the rules of thought is thus, for all 
that, not to be dismissed, however one might twist and turn. In 
fact, this argument cannot be evaded. But it is especially 
impossible to evade the question whether the conditions necessary 
for the operations of thinking are foreordained prior to the 
essence of thinking and of that wherein thinking as an activity 
of Dasein is grounded, or whether, conversely, the essence of 
Dasein and thinking first makes possible the operational condi-
tions of thinking and the way in which they must necessarily be 
employed. Thinking and rule usage may be inevitable for the 
operation of all thinking, and thus also for establishing meta-
physics as well, but it does not follow from this that the 
foundation consists in the use of rules. On the contrary, it 
merely follows that rule usage is itself in need of justifica-
tion. And it further follows that this apparently plausible 
argument is not in any position to establish a foundation at all. 
The argument from the inevitability of using rules can make its 
appeal solely on this fact, the fact of its inevitability, but it 
is not even in a position to make this fact, in its intrinsic 
possibility, into a problem, much less solve it. (105) 
The point is that 
Insofar as the intrinsic possibility of something that provides a 
foundation must be prior in order to the actual operation and the 
conditions of thinking, the explication of the intrinsic possi-
bility of thinking, as such, is the presupposition of "logic" as 
a science of the rules of thinking. (105) 
What is necessary is to show to logic that it "lives and feeds on 
something" which it cannot itself produce "but which it even believes 
it must deny" (106). This "demonstration" takes place in a reflexive 
moment in which one grasps the character of the activity engaged in 
(the act of grounding) while arguing concerning the primacy of logic or 
metaphysics; thus the necessity of something like a "leap" through the 
very inevitability of the entanglement with logic in an argument with 
it. 
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Finally, Heidegger insists that "laying the foundation does not 
mean shoving another fundament under a finished discipline" (106). 
Here Heidegger explicitly denies that the foundational inquiry will 
have the effect of grounding the scientific disciplines in their given 
or traditional form. What, then, does the foundational inquiry accomp-
lish? Its true object is philosophy, and furthermore its aim is the 
trans-formation of philosophy itself: 
Laying the foundation implies always a new draft of the blue-
prints. Every foundation for philosophy must transform phil-
osophy itself, but transformation is only possible in seizing 
and maintaining what is essential. (106) 
Thus in the First Major Part of MFL Heidegger focuses upon 
Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and then upon the metaphysics under-
lying it, as an appropriate place (geeignete Stelle), or site, for the 
geschichtliche Erinnerung (22). Through this historical recollec-tion, 
he accomplishes a regression from logic to its foundations in metaphys-
ics, undertaken both on a historical and ontological basis. Heidegger 
shows how Leibniz gathers up into his philosophy and transforms, in his 
own way, the traditional metaphysical concepts of ~ssentia and existen-
tia. In particular, essence as "possibility" takes on the ontological 
character of the drive that "anticipates primordially," while exis-
tence, as "possible actuality," is understood from the individuation of 
drive (cf. note 4, above). 
In this way, the twofold structure of metaphysics becomes that of 
a relation between the organizing, unifying event in its essence--the 
latter conceived in terms of a kind of "potency"--and the individuation 
of the event, the latter conceived as taking place in relation to a 
possible multiplicity or "totality of beings" (95-96). Heidegger's own 
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concept of metaphysics is presented, then, as a "repetition" of this 
concept of the twofold structure of metaphysics, elicited from the 
"recollection" of Leibniz's ontology and the meta-ontology consequent 
upon ontology. Heidegger shortly presents, in !10, the retrieval of 
the project of Being and Time in terms of Dasein's ontological neu-
trality and the meta-ontological concreteness belonging to existing 
oasein. Hence in Chapter 3 we shall proceed to an examination of the 




1. Topology is an anti-"metaphysical" concept, in that it suggests a 
model of an interrelationship among elements sustained, not by a single 
dominating element, but by the character of the "space'' inhabited by 
the individual elements. The determining region or dimension of phil-
osophy is transcendence. In The Essence of Reasons, after recapitula-
ting something of his earlier "discussion" (Erorterul_!g) of Leibniz and 
of the principle of sufficient reason, he says that 
To analyze the problem means to gain access to and mark out the 
re~lm [Bezirk] within which we should treat the question ~oncern­
ing the essence of reasons. This realm is shown to be the realm 
of trans~endence. (ER 8/9, 10/11) 
Although "topology" properly belongs to a later period, we none-
theless find the beginnings of topological method in Heidegger's treat-
ment of Leibniz. His discussion there is topological not only because 
it takes Leibniz as an appropriate "place" (Stelle) for the dismantling 
of philosophy, but because its method is a search for the "dimension" 
constitutive of the realm of inquiry, and thus moves away from the 
traditional, meta-physical opposition of the "one" determining the 
"many." One might add that his discussion also suggests an analysis of 
metaphysics on the basis of topoi rather than system and structure. A 
"topology'' attempts to locate the site of metaphysics for the sake of a 
transformation of the site; and, along with this, of all of the topoi 
of metaphysics. 
2. Heidegger is a1m1ng at a notion of transcendence as that "event" 
which gathers a manifold into a unity, but a unity which is not itself 
"present" in the gathered manifold or "multiplicity." The problematic 
is that of the relation of the antic order to the ontological, of the 
phenomenal to the phenomenon, of representational thinking to its 
ground. Heidegger seeks a way of thinking the event which will not 
reduce it to a member of the field of elements, whether antic, phenom-
enal, or logical, but which at the same time will avoid turning it into 
a meta-physical ''super" or transcending element. The ground is not 
ang_!_her being, or any "type" of being whatsoever. Thus transcendence 
is "nothing"; it is the event of the coming into being of a "uni-sonous 
unity," and is, as such an event, itself the unification which comes 
into being. It escapes every representation of unity. Thus the diffi-
cult~ of characterizing the "event" as such is one of the motivating 
factors leading to the language and thinking of ~reignis, the event 
that cannot be represented, not even as an "event." 
3. Heim translates vor-stellend as "pre-hensive," in order to suggest 
the relationship of ~erceptio in Leibniz to the prehensive activity of 
the actual occasion in Whitehead's cosmology (and also, presumably, to 
suggest a common relationship in the notion of "event" between Heideg-
ger's and Whitehead's philosophies). The term "prehension" in White-
head does not by itself, however, include the notion of subjective aim 
and the "unifying unity'' that grasps in advance. Prehension signifies 
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only the moment of relatedness to the multiplicity, not the whole of 
the complex process of concrescence. But it is this feature of the 
anticipatory unifying of a possible multiplicity that Heidegger wishes 
to emphasize. Vorstellen is the mode of apprehension of a possible 
multiplicity, and the apprehension which makes the multiplicity as such 
"possible." Furthermore, the emphasis which the word ~or::.ili!)end 
intends to place upon the "representational" character of drive should 
be recognized and preserved in the translation. I have not retained 
the hyphen, however, only because the hyphen is meant to emphasize the 
character of grasping in advance ("vor") that takes place with repre-
sentation, and this factor is lost in translation. 
4. Heidegger expresses the close intertwining of "ontology" and 
"metontology" very succinctly in discussing the Leibnizian concept of 
being as identity (ER 31/30): 
What makes an Elns an El~ is "identity." Identity is, properly 
understood, the simply unity which unites primordially and, in 
uniting, at the same time individuates. The sort of unification 
that anticipates primordially ["possibility"] and individuates 
simply ["possible actuality"], constitues the essence of being 
[Seiende] as such. 
It would be difficult to understand the structure of this passage and 
its import if we did not have MFL at hand. 
5. Thus it is impossible to conceive of the or1g1n as simply indepen-
dent of this work of the repetition of the tradition. It cannot be 
taken to be simply "present," "present to itself." This is particu-
larly true since repetition lies at the heart of transcendence itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
Neutrality and Concretenesss of Dasein in ,10: "The 
problem of transcendence and the problem of Being and Time" 
Section 10 divides rather naturally into three subsections: The 
first (pp. 136-141) comprises an introductory paragraph, a paragraph 
"a)" containing "a general description" of the problem of Being and 
~and a paragraph "b)" containing "the guiding principles" thereof, 
and subdivided into twelve numbered paragraphs. The entirety of the 
first subsection is concerned with the meaning of the "preparatory 
analysis" of Dasein. 
The second subsection (pp. 141-148) asks why the preparatory 
analysis of Dasein, "with regard to revealing the possibility of the 
understanding-of-Being [is] an exposition of the temporaliu of Dasein" 
(141). It attempts to justify "connecting the problem of Being with 
time" (148). 
The third subsection (pp. 148-154) explains what is involved in 
working out the problem of Being as the central problem of philosophy, 
and what is meant by the required radicalization and universalization 
of the problem of Being. 
Heidegger's introductory paragraph explains why the "problem of 
Being and Time" can be inserted, here, into this text on transcendence 
and the relation of transcendence to the problem of ground. Being and 
~ must be interpreted from the standpoint of the problem of tran-
scendence because "Seinsverstandnis forms the basic problem of 
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metaphysics as such" (136). Metaphysics, as the metaphysics of Dasein, 
bas as its central problem the event of the coming into being of Seins-
verstandnis. "What does Being mean? This is quite simply the funda-
mental question of philosophy?" (136) But the basic problem of "meta-
physics as such," the "metaphysics of metaphysics," is that of the 
possibility of the philosophical event, i.e., the coming to pass of the 
understanding of Being. The problem of the happening of Seinsverstand-
nis encompasses that of "Being": To raise the Being-question in its 
most radical form means to question the possibility of the event of 
transcendence, "wherein" Being is understood. Because philosophy 
arises only within the dimension of transcendence, fundamental ontology 
asks after the possibility of the question of Beingl, rather than 
undertaking to establish a decisive answer to the "question of Being." 
For the question of Being is always "answered," with the existence of 
every Dasein, but the task of fundamental ontology is to answer to the 
problem of the possibility, in general, of such "answers." The prob-
lematic relationship of the inquiry into the possibility of Seinsver-
standnis to the concretization of that possibility in any given under-
standing of Being is addressed in the present section. In the first 
subsection in particular, the theme is that of the interrelation 
between "possible" Dasein and the "possible actuality" of concretely 
existing Dasein. The problem of the relation between the first and the 
second parts of metaphysics is taken up under the headings of the 
neutrality and concreteness of Dasein. 
Thus the purpose of fundamental ontology, according to paragraph 
a), is this: "The understanding-of-Being is to be brought to light by 
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way of Dasein's mode of Being, which is primarily existence" (136). 
What is to be demonstrated, through the analysis of the constitution of 
oasein's being, is "the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-
Being" (136, emphasis mine). Heidegger notes that in Being and Time 
"the metaphysics of Dasein itself is not yet the central focus" (136), 
so that the metaphysical significance of fundamental ontology is not 
evident in Being and Time, and perhaps could not become clear from a 
reading of Being and Time alone. In short, Heidegger is "retrieving" 
Being and Time itself for his metaphysical project, interpreting it in 
the light of his analysis of the twofold structure of the metaphysics 
of Dasein. In this way, Heidegger completes the self-interpretation of 
his early project, and therefore completes his early project, since it 
is "complete" ("teleion") only when gathered up into such a complete 
view. The present inquiry into the significance of Heidegger's early 
project is based upon that perspective upon its completion provided by 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. 
Although we shall be concerned in the present chapter only with 
the first "subsection" of UO, it should be noted here that UO 
represents, not only the revisionary retrieval of the first Division of 
Being and Time which is the subject-matter of the first subsection, but 
also a recapitulation of the theme of the temporal analysis of Dasein 
(second subsection), and therefore of the second Division of ~eil,!g_and 
Time, and a synopsis of the treatment of the "radicalization" and 
"universalization" of the problem of Being that constitutes the final 
aim of Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In short, Heidegger "inserts" 
the whole of his previous work into the Second Major Part of The 
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~taphysical Foundations of Logic, so that it is now to be understood 
as embedded in the inquiry undertaken there into the problem of ground 
as the "basic problem of metaphysics." 
Paragraph b), with its twelve subparagraphs, presents "the 
guiding principles" for the treatment of the problem of the under-
standing of Being in Being and Time. Actually it is a somewhat 
revisionary treatment of the twofold of existence and thrownness, on 
the model of the problematic of the two parts of metaphysics. 
The numbered paragraphs end with these remarks: 
These guiding principles should indicate briefly the sort 
of intent behind the analysis of Dasein and the requirements for 
carrying out the analysis. The basic intent of the analysis is 
to show the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-Being, 
which means at the same time the possibility of transcendence. 
(141) 
This "retrieval" of Being and Time in terms of the question of the 
intrinsic possibility of transcendence is in accord with the inter-
pretation of the project of Being and Time given in other texts of the 
period, including, in particular, Kant and the Problem of Metaphy~ics, 
which is concerned with the "intrinsic possibility of the grounding of 
metaphysics." Heidegger's interpretation of fundamental ontology is 
not a violent wrenching away of the problematic of ontology from its 
original intent--presumably, to "answer the question of Being"--but 
constitutes a genuine clarification of the aims already implicit, but 
not fully and explicitly formulated, in the project of Being and Time. 
Being and Time is above all concerned with the ~ossibility of the 
question of Being that occurs with the existence of Dasein. 
Before examining the numbered paragraphs in detail, let us take 
an overview of Heidegger's highly concentrated presentation, in these 
99 
passages, of the "metaphysics of Dasein." The first five paragraphs 
address the ontological themes of possibility, essence, and origin.2 
ontology requires the "metaphysical isolation" of Dasein. Heidegger 
speaks in this context of the "neutrality" of Dasein. Neutrality 
signifies Dasein's existence considered solely from the standpoint of 
its "essence"; thus neutrality usurps the concepts of generality and 
universality which, in the tradition, would serve as the locus of a 
philosophical inquiry into essence. Insofar as the analysis of Dasein 
in BT presents an "eidos" of Dasein, it is presented not as a universal 
which would define the form of man, without reference to the existence 
of any particular human being, but rather as offering to existing 
Dasein an image of the "potency of the origin" which, in any given 
case, can be the potency only of an existing Dasein. The analysis of 
neutral Dasein is that of lli! existing Dasein, so that it can open up 
the potency of the origin to every possible existing "instance" of 
Dasein. Thus the presentation of the eidos, which is not a universal, 
but represents, Heidegger says, an "extreme construction" (189m/243)--
is meant to "enable" existing Dasein toward the fulfillment of its 
authentic possibility of being. 
The next five paragraphs take up the motif of the radical 
individuation of the metaphysical being, i.e. the metontological theme 
as we have already seen it introduced in reference to the Leibnizian 
problem of monadological individuation. We have already discussed 
these passages from the First Major Part; 
What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular monad? 
How is this individuation itself constituted? (94) ... In this 
viewpoint the whole universe is in each case held in view, as it 
were, in a definite perspective of beings and of the possible .. 
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[the view] is refracted in each case according to the monad's 
possibility for unifying itself in its multiplicity. (95) ... 
Inasmuch as it unifies--and that is its essence--the monad 
individuates itself. In every monad the whole universe is 
potentially present. (96) 
The themes treated here in 110 are, in particular, those of the 
multiplicity and dissemination proper to the concretely existing (indi-
viduated) Dasein. It is noteworthy that, for Heidegger, dissemination 
cannot be understood apart from the unifying, organizational event that 
transcendence signifies; indeed, Heidegger finds it necessary to speak 
of "transcendental dissemination" with reference to the total structure 
of concretely existing Dasein. 
The tenth numbered paragraph concerns furthermore the grounding 
of dissemination in freedom. But the problem of freedom is bound up 
with that of truth (cf. pp. 191 ff.). Thus the problematic of the 
metontology culminates. once again, in the metaphysics of truth. 
The last two numbered paragraphs interpret the ontological 
project--Heidegger's own fundamental ontology--as itself an "extreme 
example" of metontological concretization; that is to say, they show 
(if we can put it this way) that ontology itself is already submitted 
to the reflection on finitude articulated in the metontology. It is 
the finitude of the ontological project itself that demands the the 
"overturning" of ontology, and so motivates the "turn" in Heidegger's 
work. 
Heidegger's retrieval, in these paragraphs, of the "problem" of 
Being and Time offers a new perspective upon the thrust of his exis-
tential analysis and inquiry into the transcendence of Dasein, For he 
makes it clear that the "aim" of the existential analysis, however 
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motivated by a concept of the universality of the existentialia it may 
be, is something like the "concretization" of possible Dasein. But if 
the relationship between fundamental ontology and the "actuality" of 
the factically existing Dasein is not the traditional metaphysical 
relationship of eidos and fact illustrative of the form, if it cannot 
be articulated in terms of the traditional distinction between essence 
and existence, how can this relationship be expressed? 
In his revision of metaphysical concepts, Heidegger brings the 
concept of essence, as we have already indicated, into the vicinity of 
the ideas of potency or possibility and of origin. These ideas belong 
to the analysis of the metaphysics of Dasein as concerned with the 
"event" of transcendence, the coming-to-pass of Seinsverstandnis. 
Essence, Wesen, comes to be understood verbally; it is the "activity" 
of the origin (transcendence) in surpassing itself toward a possible 
understanding of Being. Thus it is necessary to analyze transcendence 
as such and thereby to lay out those fundamental structures of exis-
tence which make an understanding of Being "possible." The analysis of 
such fundamental structures does not yield information about the char-
acter of the specific project of any factically existing human being, 
but rather discloses the ground and possibility of such a project. The 
analysis is "neutral" with respect to factically existing Dase in; it 
concerns only the phenomenon of Care or self-concern in general: 
1. The term "man" was not used for that being which is the 
theme of the analysis. Instead, the neutral term Dasein was 
chosen. By this we designate the being for which its own proper 
mode of being in a definite sense is not indifferent. (136D) 
The self-concern of Dasein, the concern of finitude for itself (cf. 
remarks on para. 5, below), is the point of origin of the analysis and 
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the point from which de-pends the whole of the discussion of the neu-
trality of Dasein. Derrida says in "Geschlecht," concerning this 
passage, that 
It is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropological, 
ethical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that 
neutralization, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself, 
bare relation, to the Being of its being .... Neutrality . 
is first of all the neutralization of everything not bearing the 
naked trait of this relation to itself, of this interest for its 
own Being. (G, 69) 
But Heidegger will say that neutralization is not the "voidness of an 
abstraction," nor the "indifference" of an empty void, an ontic 
nothing, or the nobody and everybody (para. 2)--in other words, not the 
result of a reduction or subtraction at all. Indeed, we soon will see 
(paras. 6-10) that it is a matter of getting "everything" in. The 
"relation to itself" is not the barren one of an auto-affection or 
presence to itself, but of that which, as self-concern, has always 
already prepared the way for and indeed articulated itself in the 
upsurgance of a "world."3 There is no "bare self" for the self to be 
related to: "As constituting the selfhood of Dasein, the for-the-sake-
of has . . universal scope" (MFL 191); "the totality of the 
commitment [Bindung] residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world" 
( 192/247). 
Because neutrality means possibility, 
2. The peculiar neutrality of the term "Dase in" is 
essential, because the interpretation of this being must be 
carried out prior to every factical (faktische) concretion. (136) 
What is at stake, in fact, is the way in which Dasein "occurs," 
as transcendence, in the midst of beings. The analysis of neutral 
Dasein exhibits the possibility of such occurrence. In this sense, 
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neutral Dasein is not itself a "being"--"neutral Dasein is never what 
exists [das Existierende]" (137/172). Dasein in its essence is "not 
this, not that"; it is no-thing. The neutrality of Dasein is its 
"power" to occur, its dunamis: 
3. Neutrality is not the voidness of an abstraction, but 
precisely the potency of the origin, which bears in itself the 
intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity. 
Dasein is "nothing," but its nothingness is not that of the voidness of 
an abstraction, i.e., of the generality of a concept, but that of a 
potency which can be realized through its own nihilating power, the 
"nichtet" of das Nichts. Thus the concept of neutrality looks forward 
to the analysis of the "nothing" in What is Metaphysics?; it also looks 
back to the treatment of the nothingness of Dasein, revealed in Angst, 
in UO of Being and Time. Neutrality is Dasein's "not" being any 
being, and at the same time its power of opening up a space within 
which being as a whole can be understood as "in" being. This nihil-
ating, irruptive power is what is meant by the "potency of the origin." 
Dasein is "not yet" (137) any thing; this open futurity, however, is 
what lets Dasein arise in its concrete, factical humanity, letting it 
be as ~being, so that it can belong to a specific sexuality and 
determinate generation. 
This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two 
sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty 
void, the weak negativity of an indifferent antic nothing. In 
its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and every-
body, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence. 
(136-37) 
But it is neutrality which allows Dasein to harbor "the intrinsic 
possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus 
into sexuality" (137). Sexlessness is not "the indifference of an 
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empty void"--as is the "universality" of genus--nor is it "the weak 
negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing," the limit of an abstrac-
tion from "what is," and thus less than any thing. Nor is Dasein in 
its neutrality the indifferent das Man. As the potency [Machtigkeit] 
of the essence, neutrality is not the opposite of concreteness; being 
"neither" of the two sexes is not non-sexual being, but signifies 
rather that which makes it possible for Dasein to have (in its self-
dispersal) a determinate sexuality. Thus 
4. Neutral Dasein is never what exists; Dasein exists in 
each case only in its factical concretion. But neutral Dasein is 
indeed the primal source of intrinsic possibility that springs up 
in every existence and makes it intrinsically possible. The 
analysis always speaks only in Dasein about the Dasein of those 
existing [Existierenden], but it does not speak to the Dasein of 
the Existent [Existenzen]; this would be nonsense, since one can 
only speak to those who exist [Existierenden]. (137m/172) 
Although neutral Dasein is "neither of the two sexes," this does not 
mean that Dasein is, in its factical concretion, without sexuality; on 
the contrary, the "sexlessness" of neutral Dasein is the condition of 
the possibility of sexual determination. 
What would it mean for neutral Dasein to be in its essence 
"sexual"? The issue is that of the "potency of the origin." "Origin" 
here means, as always, origin of Seinsverstandnis, and, equivalently, 
of "thought" and of "world." In what is the power of origination 
founded? If neutral Dasein were sexual, and therefore of a determinate 
sexuality, then "thought" would necessarily differentiate itself along 
sexual lines. But it is, as possibility, neutral with respect to 
Geschlecht--to sexuality, nation, race, and generation. This is not 
the only metaphysical implication of the neutrality of Dasein: That 
the locus of origin is Dasein means that theories which ground the 
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origin of human "culture" (more properly, world) in psychoanalytic 
concepts fail to reach to the essential dimension of the foundation of 
human "creativity." The ~ossibility of origination cannot, on Heideg-
ger's analysis, lie in any of the conditions of human embodiment; its 
potency means that it arises "before" such determination. 
What is at stake in an ontological reflection upon the nature of 
the origin is the preservation of the ontological, i.e., "neutral," 
character of the origin, as opposed to a determination of the character 
of origin on the basis of an ontic model. For Heidegger, psychoanalyti-
cal and other ontic explanations of the origin of history and "culture" 
restrict the possibilities of historical disclosure to those which can 
be formulated in the language of the psychology of desire (for exam-
ple). This type of explanation constitutes an inversion, since psycho-
analysis is only one of the historical possibilities of the understand-
ing of human being (and thus, one would have to add, of Being). No 
historical event could surpass the explicatory conditions established 
for it by psychoanalysis, if psychoanalytic explanations were substi-
tituted for the neutrality of an ontological grounding. 
To preserve the radically ontological character of the origin 
means that the origin cannot be understood through terms appropriate 
solely to any "regional ontology," that is to say, through terms 
derived from any specific region of human comportment in relation to 
beings. The problem of origin cannot be formulated, then, in terms of 
the evolution of the species, nor in terms of physical causality, nor 
in terms of the "bicameral mind," nor, in particular can ontology 
submit to the natural tendency--since Dasein is always "human being"--
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to identify the locus of origin with respect to "thought" (creativity, 
"culture," world) with its "natural" basis in sexuality or the body. 
Ontology must preserve, and indeed present a vision of, possibil 
ity "as such," in relation to the possibilities of historical disclo-
sure; it is concerned solely with the "potency of the origin." Thus 
ontology must affirm the neutrality of Dasein with respect to any 
identification that would limit the possibilities of Seinsverstandnis. 
Therefore "the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior 
to every factical concretion" (136). Dasein is "neither of the two 
sexes" (136); it is sexless. Not only is it "not" sexual and "not" a 
body, its analysis is "prior to all prophesying and heralding world-
views" (137) because world-views are subsequent to historical dis-
closure, and are wholly dependent upon such prior disclosure. The 
interpretation of Dasein is not even "wisdom, something available only 
in the structure of metaphysics" (137), i.e., in a concrete historical 
disclosure of the meaning of Being. Only within such a metaphysical 
order can human beings achieve "wisdom," knowledge of the truth of 
beings, since the latter requires a prior disclosure of Being. 
All of this is to emphasize that, to preserve the "potency of the 
origin," ontological analysis can only be concerned with Dasein in its 
neutrality. To treat Dasein as "neutral" has the specific function of 
thinking the "origin as such" and of illuminating it as the ground of 
Qossibilit2. In order to think the origin in genuinely radical fashion 
(to think possibility as such), ontology must achieve the separation of 
neutral Dasein from all beings. Dasein is not even "I," even if Dasein 
is in each case mine: 
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5. Nor is this neutral Dasein the egocentric individual, 
the antic isolated individual. The egoity of the individual does 
not become the center of the entire problematic. Yet Dasein's 
essential content, in its Existence [Existenz] to belong to 
itself, must be taken up along with the approach. The approach 
that begins with neutrality does imply a peculiar isolation of 
the human being, but not in the factical existentiell sense, as 
if the one philosophizing were the center of the world. Rather, 
it is the metaphysical isolation of the human being. 
The origin of the origin, one might say, lies in Care, and indeed in 
self-concern, as Derrida has pointed out in commenting on this passage 
and Heidegger's earlier remark that neutral Dasein designates "the 
being for which its own proper mode of being in a definite sense is not 
indifferent" (136)4. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
speaks of the self-concern of finitude, the concern of finitude with 
itself: 
the finitude of human reason is finitization [Verendlichung], 
i.e., "concern" [Sorge] about the ability to be finite .... the 
laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question 
of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude itself 
can first become a problem. (KPM 224-25) 
The origin of interpretation of Being as such lies in this "reflexive," 
self-questioning character of finitude. 
Let us turn briefly to Heidegger's elaboration (in MFL !11) of 
these remarks in paragraph 5 concerning the metaphysical isolation of 
Dasein. In section 11, entitled "Freedom and World," Heidegger calls 
Dasein's self-concern its egoicity (Egoitat): 
If we say "Dase in is in each case essentially mine," and if 
our task is to define this characteristic of Dasein ontological-
ly, this does not mean we should investigate the essence of my 
self, as this factical individual, or of some other given indi-
vidual. The object of inquiry is not the individual essence of 
my self, but it is the essence of mineness and selfhood as such. 
Likewise, if "I" is the object of the ontological interpretation, 
then this is not the individual I-ness, of my self, but I-ness in 
its metaphysical neutrality; we call this neutral 1-ness "egoici-
ty." But here too there is a danger of a misunderstanding. One 
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could say, Must not thou-ness, too, become likewise a topic and 
must not thou-ness be taken together with I-ness as equiprimordi-
al? This is certainly a possible problem. But I-ness, as the 
phenomenon correlative to thou-ness, is still not metaphysical 
egoicity. Here it becomes clear that the term "I" always pushes 
in the direction of the isolation of my self in the sense of a 
corresponding severance from the thou. Contrariwise, I-ness does 
not mean the factical ego distinguished from the thou; egoicity 
means, rather, the I-ness also at the basis of the thou, which 
prevents an understanding of the thou factically as an alter ego. 
But why is thou not simply a second ego? Because being an ego, 
in contradistinction to being a thou, does not at all pertain to 
the essence of Dasein, i.e., because a thou is what it is, only 
qua its self. and likewise for the "I." Therefore I usually use 
the expression "selfhood" [Selbstheit] for metaphysical I-ness, 
for egoicity. For the "self" can be said equally of the I and 
the thou: "I-myself," "you-yourself," but not "thou-I." 
Pure selfhood, understood as the metaphysical neutrality of 
Dasein, expresses, at the same time, the metaphysical isolation 
of Dasein in ontology. (188) 
We will not pause, here, to examine Heidegger's important contrast of 
the "I" of the factical ego and the "thou": The "thou" is always a 
self in the most fundamental, metaphysical sense (I-ness), but the "I," 
at least as mere ego, is not. What is important in this passage for 
the present discussion is the placing of the self "prior" to the 
distinction of I and thou--just as it is prior to, and thus "neither" 
of, the sexes in their division. What is at stake is that "not-yet" 
sexuality which, indeed, gives rise to the possibility of sexuality. 
And in this sense, it is, as Derrida says, in some sense "sexual"5--
just as it is, because it gives rise to "I" and "thou," to the division 
and relation between the two, in some sense "egoic." 
We have seen that the task of ontology is to accomplish the 
separation of Dasein from every ontical model that might compromise its 
neutrality. It must guarantee that Dasein is "neutral" with respect to 
any interpretive model derived from a specific Geschlecht; possibility 
as such cannot carry any "Schlag," any imprint, in advance. To ground 
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Dasein ontically would mean to confine "possibility" to the conceptions 
available in the already articulated domain of a specific region of 
beings, or to those available to a historical "generation," or even to 
those dependent upon Dasein's concrete sexuality. The purpose of 
ontology is to present Dasein with an "extreme construction" (189m/243) 
of its being, one which will, in its neutrality, ensure that 
possibility remains possibility. 
But through this purification, achieved by means of the analysis 
of neutral Dasein, the concept arises of an ontological ground, an 
essence, which is wholly distinct from the existing "particulars" for 
which it serves as the model. Thus Heidegger seems, at least at this 
stage of his work, to recapitulate, in his conception of the twofold 
structure of metaphysics, the traditional role of the chorismos 
separating essence from existence, even if now in the revised language 
of the distinction between neutral and concrete Dasein. The first five 
paragraphs of ,10 confirm the metaphysical isolation of Dasein, and 
thus establish the radical separation of neutral from concrete Dasein--
a separation which is established precisely in order, in the end, to be 
undone. 
Indeed, the five paragraphs 6-10 bring this separability of neu-
tral and concrete Dasein into question. These paragraphs show that the 
"potency of the origin" proper to neutral Dasein is always the potency 
of a concrete event of origination, i.e., always bears a relationship, 
as a "potency," to a determinate multiplicity. Just as for Leibniz 
drive is always the self-surpassing unification of a specific manifold, 
in the drive of the individuated monad, so in Heidegger's !10 of MFL 
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origination always occurs with the temporalization of a concretely 
existing Dasein. There "is" no neutral Dasein anywhere. Possibility, 
potency. is always the possibility of a specific determination of 
Being. 
Thus we can say that something like an Umschlag occurs between 
paragraphs 5 and 6--at least on the limited model of the "overturning" 
that Heidegger finds at work in Leibniz's ontology. In Chapter II we 
found that the metaphysics of drive leads immediately to the metaphys-
ics of the individuated monad. The corresponding relation here in flO 
can be formulated in this way: The radical separation of the origin is 
first articulated on the basis of the demand placed upon ontology that 
the "origin" be thought independently of every ontic means of interpre-
tation--that is to say, it must be thought in its neutrality. Thus the 
chorismos is established. But the closer exam- !nation of the neutral 
"origin" shows that, as potency of the origin, its very essence is to 
give rise to determinate originations. This recognition does not ren-
der ontology unnecessary, since it is not possible without it; indeed, 
the function of ontology is to articulate the thinkability of (con-
crete) origination in general. It is not possible to analyze the ap-
perceptive character of the individual monad, for example, unless one 
first grasps the significance of the "monad" and its relation to drive. 
This intertwining of neutrality and concreteness will become 
clearer upon examination of the details of the ontological analysis of 
Dasein. At present let us note only that temporalization--the crux of 
the ontological analysis--is always the "historizing" of factical 
Dasein. The neutrality of the ontological analysis means that Seins-
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verstandnis always has a temporal horizon, and thus that the temporale 
analysis is true for Dasein in general. But at the heart of the 
analysis of temporality lies the disclosure of the finitude of time. 
Temporalization means the repetition of a definite "past" in view of a 
possible "future" and in relation to a receptive "present." Since the 
potency of the origin lies in temporalization itself, there is no 
temporalization except in relation to a determinate "there" of Being. 
Thus in paragraph 6 we find that, because of the intimacy of the 
relationship between the neutrality of Dasein and its individuation, 
in its metaphysically neutral concept, Dasein's essence already 
contains a primordial bestrewal [Streuung], which is in a quite 
definite respect a dissemination [Zerstreuung] (138/173) .... 
multiplicity belongs to Being itself. (138) 
We have already seen, in the context of the Leibnizian 
"metontology," the connection between the radical individuation of 
Dasein and the concept of "multiplicity." Heidegger introduces 
multiplicity here in relation to the more precise metaphysical concept 
of Streuung--which signifies the dispersal intrinsic to Dasein's 
~utral (ontological) being. To think possibility means to ask how a 
possible actuality is indeed possible, i.e., how a multiplicity can 
become determinate in relation to a certain "apperception" of being as 
a whole. 
Thus, to return to the beginning of paragraph 6: 
the metaphysical neutrality of the human being, 
as Dasein, is not an empty abstraction from the 
nor; it is rather the authentic concreteness of 
not-yet of factical dispersion [Zerstreutheit]. 
inmost isolated 
ontic, a neither-
the origin, the 
(137/173) 
Temporalization ("not-yet, 11 futurity) occurs only in relation to a 
factical dispersal. The potency of the origin, therefore, is that of 
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the potential of that dispersal and the multiplicity that belongs to it 
for being gathered into something like a unity. "Potency" makes no 
sense apart from a relation to such a potential multiplicity. 
It is impossible here not to think of other metaphysical (and 
mythical) models of the origination and organization of the world. 
Heidegger himself mentions the mythical theme--elaborated, in one 
version, by Plato's Aristophanes in the Simposium--of the "large primal 
being becoming ontically split into many individuals" (138). This is 
the image of an on tic origination of mulitiplicity (or "multipli-
cation") from a prior unity, and thus of the subsequent reference of 
all beings back to that prior unity. Unity, in other words, lies, for 
the myth, in the unity of an ontically primordial source. Freud's 
concept of Eros in Beyond the Pleasure Principle contains echoes of 
such an appeal to a primordial unity and the concept of a "return" to 
it; indeed, this return constitutes for Freud the fundamental meaning 
of the compulsion to repeat, "beyond the pleasure principle." It is 
the theme of this metapsychological repetition that introduces into 
human life a movement toward higher types of unity, and which opposes 
the dissolution of organic life into its inorganic origin. Thus 
Freud's metapsychology remains grounded in an antic concept of repeti-
tion. 
A comparison with the cosmology of Whitehead would be particu-
larly instructive here, perhaps, since an analogy certainly obtains 
between the cosmological conception of the prehensive gathering of the 
many given data into the concrescence (concretization) of a novel 
actual occasion, and the Heideggerian metontological concept of the 
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multiplicity achieving unity through the individuation of concretely 
existing Dasein. However, it is necessary to recognize in Whitehead's 
concept of prehension the working of a decidedly ontic model, in that 
the actual occasion, although selective with respect to the subjective 
forms under which data will be prehended, and in that sense "creative," 
is creative only in relationship to an already established, determinate 
multiplicity of past actual occasions. This model differs from the 
ontologically grounded concept of the individuated event, in that the 
event of transcendence is primordially constitutive of the 
"multiplication" it contains. Thus 
here we are dealing with something else [than a negative concept, 
in the concepts of Zerstreutheit and Zwiespaltig], with a 
description of the multiplication [Mannigfaltigung] (not 
"multiplicity" (Mannigfaltigkeit]) which is present in every 
factically individuated Dasein as such. [What is at issue is] 
the clarification of the intrinsic possibility of multiplication 
(137-38/173) 
This is why Heidegger speaks of "transcendental dissemination" (para. 
7): The manifold can be conceived as such only on the basis of its 
potential "unity," i.e. the interrelatedness or "harmony" of elements 
belonging to the same manifold. The elements being unified are not 
simply "given" prior to the act of unification, but arise as a 
"multiplication," a field of interrelated elements, only with the 
originating (potential) act of unification. In the case of the 
monadology, Heidegger says that "drive develops the manifold 
[Mannigfaltig] in itself" (94/116). 
Inasmuch as drive primordially unifies, it must already 
anticipate every possible multiplicity, must be able to deal with 
every multiplicity in its possibility. That is, drive must have 
already surpassed and overcome multiplicity. Drive must there-
fore bear multiplicity in itself and allow it to be born in the 
driving. This is its ''world" character. It is important to see 
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the essential source of multiplicity in drive as such. (91/114) 
It is important to see the essential source of dispersal in transcen-
dence as such.6 
Thus we see that, while it is metaphysically necessary to empha-
size the ontological gap that separates neutral from concrete Dasein--
and thus the "metaphysical isolation of the human being" (137)--this 
work of separation, precisely because it converges upon the "potency of 
the origin," concerns that which "bears in itself the intrinsic possi 
bility of every concrete factical humanity" (137--para. 3). In other 
words, it is in virtue of its metaphysical isolation that 
6. As such, Dasein harbors the intrinsic possibility for 
being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into 
sexuality. (137) 
"Concretely" speaking, then, origination is possible only in relation 
to the "dispersion" (Zerstreutheit) of Dasein into embodiment and its 
splitting into the "disunity" (Zwiespiiltig) of the sexes. There can be 
no "multiplication"--this, of course, must be understood to mean world 
--apart from that "embodiment [which] presents an organizing factor" 
( 138). 
Since Heidegger is presenting here, in effect, a rewriting of the 
first Division of Being and Time, these passages can only be understood 
in the light of certain structural correspondences with, as well as 
differences from, the fundamental-ontological approach of Being and 
~· The first five paragraphs thematize the fundamental-ontological 
problem, that of Dasein's "existence"; the second five thematize the 
issue of "thrownness." The progression to the "authentic" existence of 
Dasein takes place now within the context of a more fundamental empha-
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sis upon thrownness as the "original" situation of Dasein. That is to 
say, we have in the remaining numbered paragraphs a "metontological" 
context for the development of fundamental ontology. To the 
ontological themes of neutrality, isolation, transcendence, and 
temporalization correspond the "metontological" themes of con-
creteness, multiplication, bestrewal, and spatiality. 
In ,10, sexuality and embodiment occupy the place belonging in 
Being and Time to the analysis of the ready-to-hand (Zuhandene). In 
his "preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world" (BT U2), Heidegger says 
that 
Dasein 1 s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has 
always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up 
[zersplittert] into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity 
[Mannigfaltigkeit] of these is indicated by the following exam-
ples: having to do with something, producing something, attend-
ing to something and looking after it, making use of something, 
[etc.]. (BT 83/56) 
Thus we find in MFL !10 an alternative presentation of the fundamental 
mode of Dasein's Being-in: not the multiplicity of concern with the 
ready-to-hand, but the modes of dispersion belonging to embodiment and 
sexuality. This particular "retrieval" of the problem of Being and 
Time shows that there is nothing sacrosanct about the route to ontology 
undertaken through the analysis of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit. 
Heidegger's treatment of these themes in !10 represents an exploration 
of another potential route to the explication of Being-in-the-world 
(embodiment as "organizing factor") and transcendence. Heidegger's 
treatment of dissemination or Dasein's dispersal into embodiment and 
sexuality represents an alternative formulation of the "ground-
condition" of human Dasein. Thus in this alternative treatment Being-
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in-the-world is inherently and radically a function of "embodiment" and 
"sexuality." 
But then doesn't this mean that the origin itself, contrary to 
the sense of the doctrine of neutrality, participates in some way in 
the "flesh"? But it is from this ground-condition that human Dasein 
gathers itself if it is to "function" as origin, if its being as the 
"potency of the origin" is to be fulfilled. The dispersed condition is 
the condition of potency, but remains mere!~ "potential" if Dasein 
remains immersed in the initial "entanglement" and "captivation" (para. 
8) in its environment. Dasein's "being-a-self is in every case only in 
its process of realization" (139, para. 11). 
It is difficult to avoid a seemingly Gnostic language implying a 
fall into the flesh and subsequent restoration of the self to itself--
as if to a condition of perfect presence to self, to the self's pris-
tine condition of self-presence--when speaking of Dasein's dispersal in 
contrast to its "process of realization." Heidegger's text is more 
subtle than this, however. "Realization" is not restoration to self-
presence, but the "return" to just that state of freedom which first 
lets Dasein become entangled in its environment, identifying itself 
with its own embodiment and its "desire." Thus, in Being and Time, 
anticipatory resoluteness brings Dasein back into the authenticity of 
its Situation, the flight from which constitutes inauthenticity. In 
110 "dissemination ... ultimately has its ground in the freedom of 
Dasein as such" (139, para. 10). Thus when Dasein is restored to 
itself, it does not take flight into the "heavens," nor return to a 
Pristine condition of self-presence: It recognizes itself in its 
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freedom as the site of the potential disclosure of the manifold as a 
whole. Dasein is thus "responsible" for the possible disclosure of 
this whole of being. Thus 
7. The transcendental dissemination proper to the 
metaphysical essence of neutral Dasein, as the binding [bindende] 
possibility of each factical existentielle dispersion and 
division, is based on a primordial feature of Dasein, that of 
thrownness. (138/174) 
And thrownness, therefore, is nothing other than the necessary condi-
tion for Dasein's disclosure of a particular "world" (multiplication). 
Neutral Dasein, as potency of the origin, signifies the potential locus 
of disclosure of a concrete manifold, determined uniquely for each 
"factical existential dispersion and division." 
"Binding possibility" refers back to the theme of being-guilty in 
Being and Time and that "being-a-basis" which constitutes Dasein's 
selfhood: 
The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can 
never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it 
must take over Being-a-basis .... In being a basis--that is, in 
existing as thrown--Dasein constantly lags behind its possibil-
ities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it 
and as this basis. Thus "Being-a-basis" means ~ to have 
power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This "not" 
belongs to the existential meaning of "thrownness" .... what 
one has in view here is ... a "not" which is constitutive for 
the Being of Dasein--its thrownness. The character of this "not" 
as a "not" may be defined existentially: in its being its Self, 
Dasein is, as a Self, the entity that has been thrown. It has 
been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, 
so as to be as this basis. (BT 330/284-85; ~58) 
The "nullity'' of Dasein's being-a-basis defines the existential meaning 
of thrownness. In taking over its being-a-basis, in the "nullity" of 
that thrownness which it can never master, and the impossibility of 
mastering which determines its being-a-basis, Dasein understands itself 
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in terms of its possibilities (BT 331). Indeed Dase in "always stands 
in one possibility or another; it constantly is not other possibili-
ties" (331). Dasein "as projection ... is itself essentially null" 
(331), since it does not "give itself" its own possibilities originally 
(nor is the Self ever transparently present to itself, since, as null, 
it grasps neither a "reason" for its thrownness in relation to this 
particular whole of being, nor does it determine the possibilities open 
to it as a Self; the latter it can only choose or fail to choose). In 
the nullity of its being, which includes the "nullity" of a possible 
projection, Dasein is free 
for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is in the 
choice of ONE possibility--that is, in tolerating one's not 
having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. 
(331) 
The "binding possibility," then, is that possibility which represents 
Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, the projection that is "thrown" 
along with the being of Dasein. The nullity of Dasein's being as 
thrown projection (binding possibility) is definitive of Care (331) and 
means that "Dase in as such is guilty" ( 331). 
The themes of freedom and guilt or "responsibility" are taken up 
again in MFL 111: 
In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives 
itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]. Freedom makes Dasein 
the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself, 
or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment. The 
totality of the commitment residing in the for-the-sake-of is the 
world. (MFL 192/247) 
Freedom binds Dasein, not to the type of "Self" which would exist 
beyond or outside its potential world, but to the whole of beings 
"into" which Dasein is (initially) dispersed and divided: 
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In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with 
others and precisely its being among beings of a different 
character. 
In the express self-choice, there is essentially the 
complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but 
to where and how it already always is, qua Dasein, insofar as it 
already exists. (190) 
nasein's return to itself in choosing itself is nothing other than a 
return and commitment to that multiplicity into which, in its factical 
existence, Dasein is "dispersed." But does Dasein then remain 
dispersed even in its authentic state, i.e., when it "realizes" its 
freedom? What is the difference between dispersal and unity? 
Dissemination is transcendental because it "ultimately has its 
ground in the freedom of Dasein as such" (139). That is to say, 
transcendental dissemination--Streuung, bestrewal--is "for-the-sake-of" 
the potential disclosure of that multiplicity "into" which Dasein is 
dispersed. Such disclosure occurs on the basis of a projection, and it 
is in projection that the multiplicity becomes determinate, a manifold 
or "world." Dissemination is not the rending of a "large primal being" 
into ontical multiplicity, but the way in which an ontological being 
(neutral Dasein) finds itself in its being as thrown. Dasein's 
bestrewal is the condition for its potential disclosure of the manifold 
as such. 
Thus it is only on the basis of dissemination that Dasein can 
find itself "in" other beings: 
8. This thrown dissemination is to be understood 
metaphysically. It is the presupposition, for example, for 
Dasein to let itself in each case be factically governed by 
beings which it is not; Dasein, however, identifies with those 
beings on account of its dissemination. (138) 
The entanglement and captivation of Dasein in "nature," and thus the 
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origin of mythology, is based upon the dissemination of Dasein. 
Theories of the rise of "culture" sometimes are formulated in 
terms of a development of human thought in relation to more original, 
mythical forms of expression. For Levi-Strauss, for example, rational 
thought is an attenuated, and therefore derivative, form of thought 
exhibiting the structures but none of the vitality of myth. Alterna-
tively, a still popular view holds thought to have developed out of the 
mythical expression of early man through the development of philosoph-
ical and scientific rationality, these having conquered their origins 
as a result of the natural progression of mankind toward rationality. 
Heidegger's paragraph 8 is implicitly critical of all such models 
of origin which represent an ontic continuity between myth and 
"thought," whether of a structural or historical order. Myth is for 
Heidegger a function of the dissemination that is inherent in Dasein's 
neutral or ontological character. Myth arises as the result of 
Dasein's dispersal into nature, its entanglement and captivation in 
this other to itself, and thus its finding "itself" in that other. In 
this way, Dasein reads itself "out" of nature on the basis of its dis-
persal into nature. Thus "thought," Dasein, is prior to myth in the 
ontological order, even if not in the order of historical succession. 
The "not-yet of factical dispersion" can be "the authentic 
concreteness of the origin" (137) because, in dissemination, Dasein is 
bound to the possibility of a free projection and hence disclosure of 
the "multiplication" corresponding to Dasein's existence. 
Dissemination is of ontological, never of merely ontical, significance. 
Heidegger therefore would deny the possibility of interpreting 
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"psychological" phenomena--the Oedipal conflict for example--in merely 
psychological terms. Such conflicts of identity concern the conflict 
of freedom with itself; dissemination expressing itself in 
identification with beings is in conflict with dissemination as a 
function of freedom, i.e., as the (ontological) basis for the potential 
disclosure of an ontic manifold. The "psyche" is the locus of the 
conflict of freedom with itself. 
Indeed, Dasein emerges from its immersion in its own sexuality--
that is to say, from its involvement, characterized (say) psychologic-
ally in terms of libidinal conflict, in the identification of itself 
with its own sexual and bodily being--to discover its own hymanit~: 
9. The essentially thrown dissemination of Dasein, still 
understood as completely neutral, appears, among other ways, in 
Dasein 1 s being-with with Dasein. This being-with with X does not 
emerge on account of factically existing together: it is not 
explained solely on the basis of the supposedly more primordial 
species-being of sexually differentiated bodily creatures. 
Instead the species-like unification metaphysically presupposes 
the dissemination of Dasein as such, that is, being-with as such. 
(139) 
There is no sexually (or genetically) grounded explanation of 
humanity (being-with). The latter is, rather, the ground of the 
recognition of the "other" as belonging to the same species. It is, 
furthermore, presumably the ground of the relatedness to the other that 
is constitutive, for human beings, of the significance of sexuality. 
Thus sexuality and embodiment are "explanatory" only where Dasein's 
humanity is occluded or not yet factically developed: 
Rather, factical bodiliness and sexuality are in each case 
explanatory only--and even then within the bounds of the 
essential arbitrariness of all explanation--to the extent that a 
factical Dasein's being-with is pushed precisely into this 
particular factical direction, where other possibilities are 
faded out or remain closed. (139) 
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The emergence of Dasein's humanity is to be contrasted with its 
immersion in nature, along with the mythological forms of expression 
accompanying this immersion, and its immersion in the conditions of 
embodiment and sexual being, with those forms of explanation of "human 
nature" that arise from confusing this "ground-condition" with human 
being Rer se. Paragraphs 6-10 can be read as the "story" of Dasein's 
return to itself in the recovery of its original freedom, the freedom 
which itself is the ground of dissemination (and which, therefore, is 
the "same" as dissemination. Dasein's return to itself consists in a 
withdrawal, an askesis with respect to beings, but for the sake of the 
development of its freedom, i.e., its letting-be of beings.) The 
story is the same as that of Being and Time, with some variations, 
however, in the plot: sexuality and embodiment play the role, here, 
played earlier by extant and present being; and the story (which 
corresponds approximately to Division One of Being and Time) ends in a 
clearer articulation of the role of freedom than does Being and Time, 
with the latter's central focus upon the concept of Entschlossenheit7. 
Paragraphs 6-10 may be read as mimetic of the return of Dasein's dis-
semination to the freedom which is the ground of dissemination. Thus 
it can be understood as a recounting of the (possible) temporal, "ex-
periential" progression of Dasein from sexual/mythical modes of exper-
ience and explanation, to the discovery of Dasein's own humanity, and 
then to the recovery of its own freedom as such. But the story "ends" 
not in the flight of Dasein from the world "into" which it has been 
dispersed, but in the discovery of freedom as the ground of its origi-
nal dissemination: Freedom means the disclosure of the manifold as 
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such. Dasein remains "committed" "to where and how it already always 
is." Dasein's thrownness, manifesting itself in the transcendental 
dissemination of Dasein, is its being bound to the world potentially to 
be disclosed through Dasein's free projection of that world. 
Dasein's initial dispersal into embodiment and sexuality is not 
incidental, but is ontologically grounded and is the condition for the 
disclosure of the manifold as such. "Embodiment" is one way of thema-
tizing the finitude of Dasein. But Dasein can become entangled in the 
situation into which it is thrown, and thus interpret its own Being in 
terms of that situation, i.e., in terms derived from the conditions of 
embodiment and sexuality. Thus there can be a kind of Seinsverstandnis 
which is grounded in the bodily and sexual being of Dasein, just as 
there can be a kind of Seinsverstandnis which reflects Dasein's immer-
sion in the field of its concern with beings present at hand. The 
concept of the "neutrality" of Dasein accounts both for the inadequacy 
of any such interpretation, from an ontological standpoint, of the 
Being of Dasein, while also accounting for the "not-yet of factical 
dispersion" which allows Dasein to interpret itself in these terms. 
Dasein is "nearer" to itself in its being-with with Dasein--its 
humanity--although being-with still belongs to the mode of dissemina-
tion. We know from Being and Time that Dasein's being-with can deter-
iorate into such identification with the other that Dasein interprets 
itself on the basis of das Man; on the other hand, being-with is 
possible as a mode of comportment of authentic existence. However 
10. Being-with as a comportment of authentic existence is 
only possible in such a way that every existing-with can be and 
is authentically itself. (139) 
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But what does it mean for existing-with to be "itself" authentically? 
Does Dasein "exist" somewhere other than in being-with with others? 
This freedom of with-one-another, however, presupposes the possi-
bility of the self-determination of a being with the characteris-
tics of Dasein as such, and it is a problem how Dasein can exist 
as essentially free in the freedom of the factical ties of being-
wi th-one-another. (139) 
It is a problem because of the possible "identification" with the other 
being and its possibilities; nonetheless, it is not in a "higher" stage 
but only here, in the "factical ties of being-with-one-another," that 
Dasein can recover its freedom. It is here that the turn-around 
occurs, and Dasein discovers that 
Insofar as being-with is a basic metaphysical feature of 
dissemination, we can see that the latter ultimately has its 
ground in the freedom of Dasein as such. The basic metaphysical 
essence of metaphysically isolated Dasein is centered in freedom. 
(139) 
In freedom, i.e., in Dasein's authentic being-with, the Other first 
"becomes" himself for Dasein. 
We have seen that the first five numbered paragraphs of 110 
introduce, under the heading of the neutrality of Dasein, the ontolog-
ical theme of the "potency of the origin." Neutral Dasein is possible 
Dasein; ontology thinks Dasein in its possibility, addresses the origin 
of possibility as such. Corresponding to dynamis, possibility, there 
must be an energeia, actuality. More precisely in this context, "pos-
sibility'' makes sense only insofar as it can be correlated with a 
"possible actuality." Thus paragraphs 6-10 undertake a "metontologi-
cal" account of the "actualization" of Dasein in relation to a given 
manifold. The dissemination of Dasein is the precondition for the 
actual disclosure of a determinate "world." 
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Dasein's freedom is disclosive of the Being of beings. Dasein is 
constituted a s·elf only in that resolute openness which brings Dase in 
back to the Situation as such (cf. note 7, above), letting beings and 
the other Dasein "be so-and-so as" they already areB. Thus, although 
Dasein does not take flight from beings in being its Self, worldly 
beings are not disclosed except in relation to an understanding of the 
Being of beings, i.e., in world-projection. "As free, Dasein is world-
projection" (192). The "for-the-sake-of" constitutive of the selfhood 
of Dasein is that "towards which Dasein as transcending transcends" 
(191), i.e., the world. 
Thus one would expect Heidegger to follow through in the numbered 
paragraphs with a discussion of the specific project of Dasein, the 
projection of world, or the projection of the constituion of Being, 
whereby Dasein "completes" its actualization. Indeed he says 
11. This metaphysics of Dasein, first as an analysis, can 
be attained only in the free projection of the Being-constitution 
[Seinsverfassung] itself. Dasein always exists as itself, and 
being-a-self is in every case only in its process of realization 
[Vollzug (=energeia)], as is also existence [das Existieren]. 
(139/175-76) 
The actualization of Dasein is completed in the free projection of the 
constitution of Being. But isn't this ontology? What has ontology to 
do with the metontological concern with the actualization of concretely 
existing Dasein? 
As we have already seen, ontology presents an "extreme model" of 
the constitution of Dasein; it is in this way that it contributes to 
the "actualization" of concrete Dasein: 
For this reason, projection of the basic ontological constitution 
of Dasein must arise by constructing one of the most extreme 
possibilities of Dasein's authentic and total capability of 
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being. The projection is directed towards Dasein, as a whole, 
and towards the basic determinations of its wholeness, even 
though Dasein in each case is only as existent [das Existier-
endes]. To put it another way, attaining the metaphysical 
neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only possible on 
the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement [Einsatz] of 
the one who himself projects. (139-40/176) 
The project began with the announcement of the neutrality of "Dasein," 
"essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried 
out prior to every factical concretion" (136m/171-72; para. 2). Here 
the hermeneutic circle returns to its beginning, however, with the 
announcement that the ontological project itself has a metontological 
Q_rigination. As realizing an "extreme possibility," it is itself only 
one possibility; concerning the existential as such, it is itself 
possible only on the basis of an existentiell involvement. Neutral 
Dasein, never "existent" by itself, represents the projection of an 
extreme possibility by (concretely) existing Dasein: Ontology has a 
metontological (finite) basis. Heidegger's metaphysics of metaphysics 
is bound to the conditions common to all metaphysics (i.e., thrown 
projection). It is thus not really a "meta-" metaphysics, but an "ex-
treme possibility" belonging to metaphysics itself. It is a metaphys-
ical reflection upon metaphysics. As such, it is itself subject to the 
same finitude inherent in all metaphysical projects. But although 
subject to finitude, it is nonetheless the project disclosive of 
finitude as such: 
This involvement is necessary and essential for the meta-
physical project, for metaphysics as such. But it is, therefore, 
as an individual existentiell component, not authoritative and 
obligatory within the many concrete possibilities of each fact-
ical existence. For the metaphysical project itself reveals the 
essential finitude of Dasein's existence, which can only be 
understood existentielly in the inessentiality of the self that 
only becomes concrete--as can be proven metaphysically-through 
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and in the service of each possible totality, a whole which 
becomes manifest in a rather special way in metaphysical inquiry. 
Nevertheless, it is a problem in its own right: to what extent 
there is an existentiell guidance, an indirect guidance, in the 
metaphysical project and in the existentiell involvement of the 
person who philosophizes. (140) 
Heidegger thus places his own project within the context of 
metontology, that is to say within the context of the finite "individ-
uation" of a project which itself is in the service of a "possible 
total! ty." Each of the multiplicity of possible metaphysical projects 
is "in the service" of a "possible totality"--in the service of some 
"whole of being" (das Seiende im Ganzen). The relationship of a 
possible project to the totality to which it is responsive raises the 
question of "existentiell guidance" (the call of conscience) in each 
case. Through the ontological project, these "metontological" prob-
lems--the finitude of thrown projection, the possibility of existen-
tiell guidance, the "possible totality" which Dasein serves as the 
"there" of its disclosure--first become manifest. Fundamental ontology 
is the project "of" projects, i.e., it is the inquiry into the possi-
bility of projection as such. 
Most importantly, that Dasein as such exists only in relation to 
(in the service of) a "possible totality" becomes manifest only through 
the ontological inquiry. Thus ontology is that unique project which 
grounds the metontological diversity of possible projects; it is that 
inquiry into neutral Dasein which lets Dasein become manifest as "the 
authentic concreteness of the origin." The "origin" is always con-
crete, for existing Dasein is always the origin of the disclosure of a 
determinate whole of beings. Furthermore 
12. The ontological interpretation of Dasein's structures 
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r 
must be concrete with regard to the metaphysical isolation and 
neutrality of Dasein .... Real metaphysical generalization does 
not exclude concreteness, but is in one respect the most concrete 
. . . . ( 140) 
Wherein lies the concreteness of ontology? It lies in the 
concreteness in the analysis of the Dasein phenomena, which give 
direction and content to Dasein's metaphysical projection. (140) 
That is to say, the concreteness of fundamental ontology itself lies in 
showing how direction and content are given (in the call of conscience) 
to (other) possible projections on the part of (concretely existing) 
Dasein. Ontology is concrete in showing how the "possible actuality" 
of existing Dasein becomes, for Dasein, possible. The (metontological) 
ontological project grounds metontology. 
Thus it is a misunderstanding to think that Dasein is concretely 
committed, in general, to 
taking the concrete phenomena of [neutral] Dasein by themselves 
and [secondly, to] taking them as existentiell absolutes in their 
extreme, fundamental-ontological conceptualization. (140) 
More bluntly put, no concretely existing Dasein need find its "actuali 
ty" in the "philosophizing" undertaken in Being and Time; only that 
which grounds its "possibility" is to be found there. 
Indeed, Heidegger finally says that 
One may not ... lose sight of the fact that with such a 
fundamental-ontological clarification nothing has yet been 
decided, and what furthermore ought to be shown is that nothing 
is decidable in this manner. Yet there is also always the 
factical necessity of a "presupposition" of a factical situation. 
(140-41) 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is "foundational" with respect 
to the multiplicity of possible concretizations of existing Dasein. 
Ontology is foundational of metontological diversity. When Heidegger 
says that 
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the basic intent of the analysis is to show the intrinsic possi-
bility of Seinsverstandnis, which means at the same time the 
possibility of transcendence (141/177), 
we by now realize that showing this intrinsic possibility, in ontology, 
determines nothing with respect to the concrete possibilities available 
to existing Dasein. Showing the intrinsic possibility of transcendence 
lets possibility first become possibility for existing Dasein. 
As we shall see in the chapter to follow, answering the question 
of the meaning of Being, and thus fulfilling the project of fundamental 
ontology, means, not designating "Being" as x--giving a "true" defini-
tion of Being--and thereby placing future philsophy upon a "secure" 
basis, but showing how all Seinsverstandnis originates in temporaliza-
tion, and thereby in makin~ Seinsverstandnis in general possible. "By 
a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in 
general" (154). The role of fundamental ontology is to show how some-
thing like a multiplicity of "ontologies," i.e., of "interpretations of 
Being," are possible. The difficulty, however, lies not so much in 
the concept of a "multiplicity," but in the concept of ~eing, if we 
think that Heidegger means to grasp in his own ontological inquiry the 
"true" meaning of Being which the tradition has simply missed. To 
answer the question of Being means to attain to the source of possibil 
ity as such, and this means to explicate, in "Temporal science," the 
"origin of possibility" through the analysis of time. The "answer" to 
the question of Being is that time is the source of all possible "an-
swers" to the question of Being, i.e., time is the source of metaphys-
ics as such. The (mis)interpretation of Being as presence founds the 
tradition; it is an interpretation which is represented by no single 
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philosophy, but underlies all traditional philosophical understand-
ings of the meaning of Being. There is a multiplicity of such inter-
pretations; there is, in short, a metontological dispersal of onto-
logical projects already evident in the tradition. Although we need 
not postulate the full concept of the Seinsgeschichte at this period of 
Heidegger's work, it is evident by now that the metontology establishes 
the context for the developing problematic of the Seinsgeschichte. 
It is clear, then, that Heidegger is in no sense attempting to 
jettison traditional metaphysics. Rather he takes over and transforms 
the bipartite division of metaphysics on the basis of his differentia-
tion of neutral from concrete Dasein. This differentiation is, howev-
er, immediately questioned and undercut precisely through the reversal 
which is effected by the transition from neutral to concrete Dasein. 
The finitude of the ontological project--or, better, the finitude of 
time itself, disclosed in the fulfillment of the project--means that 
the neutrality of Dasein is unstable, i.e., that it cannot provide an 
autonomous grounding for the sequence of metaphysical disclosures. We 
shall see in Chapter IV how the completion of the ontological project 
in the "science of Being" demands the overturning of the first part of 
metaphysics and its displacement by the second ("metontology") as the 
basis for inquiry into the origin of disclosure as such. The transi-
tion between the two parts of "metaphysics" is no longer of a merely 
formal nature, but constitutes a genuine overturning of the ontological 
methodology in favor of a new approach to the "question of origin." 
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NOTES 
1. This is Heidegger's explicit formulation of the issue--for 
instance, in The Essence of Reasons (1929): 
We might point out here that the portion of the investi-
gations concerning "Being and time" published so far has as its 
task nothing more than a concrete, revealing sketch (Entwurf] of 
transcendence (cf. !112-83, esp. ,69). The sketch is-there in 
order to make the single prominent goal of these investigations 
possible, a goal that is clearly indicated in the heading of the 
whole first part: namely, attaining the "transcendental horizon 
of the question about Being. 11 All concrete interpretations, 
above all the interpretation of time, should be evaluated 
strictly as they aim at making the question of Being possible. 
The emphases are Heidegger's. 
2. These themes taken together constitute the locus of Heidegger's 
reinterpretation of the traditional concept of "essence," and are part 
of his attempt to transform the metaphysical twofold (essence and ex-
istence) as such. This process becomes explicit with the reading of 
Leibniz in the First Major Part of MFL; Being and Time is assimilated 
to this interpretation in '10; and the Appendix to tlO announces this 
reinterpretation of metaphysics as the basis of his future work. 
3. The concept of neutrality is introduced in The Essence of Reasons 
in the context of a discussion of the concept of world (Chapter II in 
ER). Here the "self" and "world" are defined in terms of each other: 
As a totality, world "is" no particular being but rather 
that by means of and in terms of which Dasein gives itself to 
understand [bedeuten] what beings it can behave toward and how it 
£!.n behave toward them. That Dasein gives "itself" to understand 
in terms of "its" world means, then, that in approaching being 
through the world, Dasein makes a self of itself, i.e., a being 
which is free to be. The Being of Dasein lies in its "potenti 
ality for being" [Seinkonnen]. Better: its Being is such that 
its potentiality fQ.r Being is an issue. Dasein exists "for the 
sake of its .... 11 If the world is that, in surpassing to 
which, selfhood first arises, it is also that for the sake of 
which Dasein exists. The world has the basic character of the 
"for the sake of ... 11 in the primordial sense that it ensures 
the inner possibility of every factical "for your sake," "for his 
sake," "for its sake" [deswegen], etc. But that for the sake of 
which Dasein exists is itself. World belongs to selfhood; it is 
essentially related to Dasein. (85/84) 
This "itself" for the sake of which Dasein exists is its surpassing 
beings toward world; at the same time, world is that which is dislosed 
in Dasein's freedom, its "being able" to comport itself toward beings 
and toward itself. 
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Thus the ontological concept of neutrality (cf. also p. 87) 
refers to that selfhood which is related to world "prior" to any rela-
tion to particular beings. Far from signifying a "bare relation to 
self," the concept of neutrality means that there is no "self" apart 
from that relation to world which consitutes it a self. Hence the 
ontological analysis necessarily precedes any possible philosophical 
q!.!£.!!.ssion of the egoity or sexuality of Dasein, since the latter 
cannot be understood as possible modes of Dasein's comportment except 
on the basis of ontology. The neutral analysis first makes the 
interpretation of Dasein's concrete being possible. 
4. Derrida says in "Geschlecht": 
At first the concept of neutrality seems quite general. It 
is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropolocial, eth-
ical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that neutrali-
zation, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself, bare re-
lation, to the Being of its being; that is, a minimal relation to 
itself as relation to Being, that the being which we are, as 
questioning, holds with itself and its own proper essence. 
("Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference," in 
Research in Phenomenology, vol. XIII. Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1983, p. 69) 
Our question (cf. note 3 above) is whether Neutralitat is "neutraliza-
tion," a reduction or mini11alization of Dasein to a bare relation to 
its "own proper essence." 
Derrida's reading coincides in several places with our own; but 
if I do not take up here or respond directly to his treatment of these 
paragraphs, it is because his own strategy of re-marking the text on 
the basis of what it excludes, and of questioning the presence in the 
text of the metaphysical concepts of propriety and essence, fails, it 
seems to 11e, to recognize the "processual" and transformative character 
of Heidegger's own inquiry. It is not that Derrida is "incorrect" in 
what he discerns still to be at work in Heidegger's text--it is only 
that his method of reading disrupts and thereby renders ineffective the 
movement of Heidegger's text, the "process" at work which needs to be 
respected and recognized on its own terms, if Heidegger's task is to be 
understood. Derrida's method produces a blindness to the task manifest 
in the texts. Thus it remains necessary to find a way fo reading Hei-
degger which is independent of Derrida's. 
5. Derrida, p. 72. 
6. The concept of "transcendental dissemination" is correlated with 
that of the synthesis of apprehension in Kant's t1_ritique of Pure 
Re<!:.!.Q!!--it signifies transcendental synthesis insofar as it is ori-
ented toward the apprehension of the manifold as such and in advance. 
Concerning the synopsis of the manifold in pure intuition, Heidegger 
says, for example, in KPM: 
Time as pure intuition is neither only what is intuited in the 
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pure act of intuition nor this act deprived of its "object." 
Time as pure intuition is in one the formative act of intuiting 
and what is intuited therein. Such is the complete concept of 
time. ( KPM 180) 
This is temporalization as "transcendental dissemination." 
7. In Being and Time, "resoluteness brings the Being of the 'there' 
into the existence of its Situation" (BT 347/300). "The Situation is 
the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness--the 'there' as which 
the existent entity is there" (346/300). Furthermore, when the call of 
conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it does not hold 
before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the 
Situation" (347/300). Prior to the temporal interpretation of the 
structure of Care, the analysis of Dasein culminates in the concept of 
anticipatory resoluteness, which is "the way in which Dasein's potenti-
ality-for-being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity" (352/305). In 
other words, in resoluteness Dasein's co••it•ent to the whole of its 
existentiell being-there--to the "whole of being" which is constitutive 
of its Situation--comes into its own. Thereby it comports itself 
"authentically." The authentic disclosure of the Situation is grounded 
in what Heidegger calls "freedom" in MFL 'UO. 
8. Freedom is never simply the freedom of a subject, but is essenti-
ally the letting-be of entities which Dasein encounters: "Ontically, 
'letting something be involved' signifies that within our factical con-
cern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so '!!. it is already and 
in order that it be such .... Letting an entity be involved, if we 
understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for 
['!uf] its readiness-to-hand within the environment" (BT 117/84-85). 
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Chapter IV 
The Science of Being and the Turn 
In the following pages I wish to show how Heidegger completes his 
ontological project and how the metontological overturning of ontology 
is implicit in the very fulfilling of this project. To this end our 
discussion will first take up the issues of the science of Being, the 
the objectification of Being, and what is meant by the explicit carry-
ing out of the ontological difference. We shall then examine closely 
Heidegger's horizonal analysis of the projection of the ecstasis of the 
present upon praesens, and show how his discussion of Temporality con-
tributes to the completion of the ontological project. It will then 
be possible to show how the result of ontological inquiry is such as to 
lead immediately to the problematic of finitude ("concreteness") in the 
formal sense already indicated in our previous discussions, as well as 
to require the more radical Umschlag that signifies the "turn" in 
Heidegger's thought. 
The first paragraph of the Appendix to MFL presents the total 
structure of the fundamental- ontological project in a three-stage 
formulation: 
By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of 
ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits 
the intrinsic possibility of the question of Being as the basic 
problem of metaphysics--the interpretation of Dasein as temporal-
ity [Zeitlichkeit); 2) the explication of the basic problems 
contained in the question of Being--the temporal [temporale) 
exposition of the problem of Being; 3) the development of the 
self-understanding of this problematic, its task and limits--the 
overturning [der Umschlag]. (154/196) 
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The definition of fundamental ontology is followed by a listing 
of the various "stages" of its development. Each stage contains a 
statement of the task at that level followed by a formula indicating 
how the task is fulfilled. Thus, the first task is to exhibit the 
ground of the question of Being, and this task is accomplished through 
the interpretation of Dasein as temporality. 
Heidegger's statement (1) seems to be ambiguous--does it mean 
that the grounding exhibits how the question of Being ~be the basic 
problem of metaphysics, i.e. how it is that metaphysics is constituted 
through Dasein 1 s asking the question of Being; or does it mean that the 
basic problem of metaphysics is to exhibit the ground of the intrinsic 
possibility of the question of Being? But the two readings come to the 
same thing, for the fundamental problem of metaphysics (as fundamental 
ontology) is to show how the Being-question can be the fundamental 
problem of metaphysics (ontology in general).1 Within the self-ref-
erential structure of fundamental ontology, what is questioned is the 
possibility of the question of Being itself (cf. MFL, pp. 214-15). 
Fundamental ontology grounds the question of Being in the temporality 
of Dasein--this is the task undertaken in the published portion of 
Being and Time.2 
There is thus an ambiguity, a twofold sense to the expression 
"the question of Being." Since the question of Being is the basic 
problem of metaphysics, metaphysics, in its every occurrence--and the 
tradition consists in the constant occurrence, the ongoing recurrence, 
of metaphysics--arises as an "answer" to the question of Being. The 
"question of Being" designates the nature of that event which takes 
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place in metaphysics. It is the event of transcendence, the "Being-
process," as Richardson calls it3, wherein an interpretation of the 
Being of beings comes to pass. 
Thus the "question of Being" is answered in every metaphysical 
enterprise, in the sense that philosophy, which is always fundamentally 
"metaphysical," emerges in the question of Being and as a response to 
it. Philosophy itself is the "answer" to the question of Being. 
But fundamental ontology, as an inquiry into the intrinsic possi-
bility of the Being-question, seeks to ground that question in a source 
giving rise to it as a "possibility." Such a possibility arises only 
in the movement of transcendence, so that fundamental ontology has as 
its subject-matter transcendence or Seinsverstandnis itself. The task 
of the existential analysis of Dasein is to show how Dasein is itself 
constituted by "the question of Being," in its essence, for the "exis-
tence" of Dasein, in which its essence lies, takes place as interpre-
tation of Being, and thus in every case as something like an "answer-
ing" of the question of Being. The "question of Being," for Heidegger, 
names the structure of the "act" in which transcendence is realized. 
Thus the analysis of Dasein must exhibit the horizon upon which the 
answer, the interpretation of Being, is projected. Dasein projects the 
meaning of Being upon time. Time itself, as the temporalization of 
temporality, makes the question of Being possible, and is itself the 
implicit horizon for any possible answer. Time grounds the possibility 
of the question of Being. 
But if philosophy is always, as understanding of Being, an answer 
to the question of Being, in what sense does fundamental ontology 
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answer this question, which it asks for the first time explicitly, and 
therefore in a more fundamental way than the tradition? Precisely 
because it asks the question explicitly in an attempt to overcome the 
"forgottenness" of Being, it can do so only by "going beyond Being" 
(~ekeina tes ousias), and thus showing how the interpretation of Being 
can only arise in something other than Being, beyond Being, namely, 
time. Its own way of asking the question, and of "answering" it--for 
it •ust exhibit the saae structure as any other metaphysical enter-
prise--has the effect, as we shall see more clearly below, of subordi-
nating Being to something else, so that the "primacy" of Being in the 
tradition is already threatened at this early stage. The fundamental-
ontological answer to the question of Being can be formulated this 
way: Being is time. We shall examine the paradox implicit in this 
answer below. 
The twofold sense of the question of Being manifests precisely 
that ambiguity or twofoldness which sustains the Heideggerian enter-
prise at its center. In this ambiguity we have a clue to the relation 
to be thematized more explicitly in the relation of fundamental ontol-
ogy to aetontology. We are atttempting to establish how this "twofold 
relation" forms the central issue of Heidegger's early thought. 
Fundamental ontology is not directly and immediately "about" 
Being but attempts to establish the possibility of the understa~qing of 
Being, of Seinsverstandnis as such. The illllediate subject-matter of 
research in fundamental ontology is not Being but Dasein. Heidegger 
summarizes, in the Basic Proble!..!....Q! Phenomenology, the outcome of the 
analysis of Dasein as follows: 
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In my treatise on Being and Time, I set forth what the existen-
tial analysis encompasses in its essential results. The outcome 
of the existential analytic, the exposition of the ontological 
constitution of Dasein in its ground, is this: the constitution 
of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporality (Zeitlichkeit]. (BP 
228) 
In this way the projects of Being and Time and of Basic Problems are 
brought into a common framework, inas•uch as Heidegger now proceeds to 
treat the project of Basic Problems as presupposing, and fulfilling, 
the existential analysis undertaken in Being and Time. The second 
"stage" in Heidegger's outline of fundamental ontology refers to the 
investigations undertaken in Basic Problems of Phenomenology--the 
so-called "science of ontology." 
Basic Problems undertakes, at least in outline, the invest!-
gations that were to have been the theme of the unpublished Part One, 
Divis.ion Three of Being and Time, under the title "Time and Being." It 
is these investigations that Heidegger refers to in the formulation of 
the second stage of fundamental ontology: "2) the explication of the 
basic problems contained in the question of Being--the temporal [tem-
Qorale] exposition of the problem of Being." The "basic problems" are 
the four basic problems of phenomenology, which together constitute 
"ontology." Ontology shows how each "problem"--the ontological dif-
ference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of 
Being and the unity of Being, and the truth-character of Being--has its 
root in Temporality (Temporalitat). "The fundamental subject of re-
search in ontology, as determination of the meaning of Being by way of 
time, is Temporality" (BP 17). In the lecture course Basic Problems, 
Heidegger gets as far as the temporale exposition of only one problem, 
that of the ontological difference. 
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Now Temporalitat 
means temporality [Zeitlichkeit] insofar as temporality itself 
is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the 
understanding of Being and of ontology as such. The term "Tem-
porali ty" [Temporalitat] is intended to indicate that temporality 
represents the horizon from which we understand Being. (228) 
Why does Heidegger seem to have two names for the "saae thing," prim-
ordial time? How does the second stage of fundamental ontology, in 
which the goal of fundamental ontology is achieved, differ from the 
existential analytic--what, in short, is ontology? 
The design of the completed portion of Part Two (BP), entitled 
"The Problem of the Ontological Difference," suggests the character of 
the relationship between fundaaental ontology and ontology, and there-
fore between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitat: 
19. Time and temporality 
20. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and Teaporality 
[Teaporali tat] 
21. Temporality [Temporalitat] and Being 
22. Being and beings. The ontological difference 
The chapter on ontological difference is organized according to 
the model of the Platonic dialectic, with its double route of "ascent" 
and "descent." In '!119 Heidegger elicits the concept of original time 
(~eitlichkeit) on the basis of an analysis of the Aristotelean text 
(Aristotle's "treatise on time" at Physics 4.10-14), and through a 
phenomenological analysis of ordinary time. By these means, the 
concept of primordial time is established in advance of further 
investigation into the relationship between temporality and ~ei~ 
verstandnis--just in the same way that Plato introduces the concept of 
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the Good in the Republic (VI.502-509) prior to exhibiting its role in 
the dialectic. 
Heidegger himself introduces a thematic identification of the 
problematic of time with that of the Good in Plato's Republic: " . 
. . we are moving within one of Plato's fundamental problems" (BP 
282-83); and he refers to "the Platonic order of inquiry" at BP 282. 
Heidegger's "ascent" or analysis exhibits the "condition of the pos-
sibility" of the understanding of Being (Zeitlichkeit), while the 
"descent" or synthesis displays the total structure of the relation-
ship between time as horizon (Teaporalitat) and Seinsverstandnis. In 
the Republic Socrates says concerning the double structure of inquiry: 
"Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the 
intelligible I mean that which the reason (logos) itself lays 
hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assu•ptions not 
as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses (hupotheseis), 
underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable 
it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the 
starting-point of all (pantos archein), and after attaining to 
that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to 
proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any 
object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to 
ideas and ending with ideas." Rep. VI.511 b-c.4 
Section 19 ends with the question: "How does temporality make 
Seinsverstandnis possible" (BP 274/388)? Section 20 undertakes the 
"ascent" by showing that "temporality is the condition of the possi-
bility of all understanding of Being; Being is understood and con-
ceptually comprehended by means of time" (274). Zeitlichkeit is the 
ultimate term in the sequence of projections constituting the structure 
of the understanding (BP 308, ~21). Here Heidegger repeats, in summary 
fashion, the analysis of the temporality of Dasein undertaken in Bei~ 
and Time. Thus, Being and Time itself represents the "ascent" to the 
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epekeina tes ousias, Zeitlichkeit as the horizon of the understanding 
of Being. 
Analysis on the Platonic model yields insight (noesis) into the 
final source of thought and being. Only synthesis, however, yields 
science (episteme), in that the latter exists only when the intercon-
nections among all ideas, and the relation of these to the Good, are 
brought into full view. Heidegger's "science of Being" exhibits in 
explicit fashion the interconnection between the understanding of the 
Being of beings and t11te. It is from the standpoint of this "synthe-
sis," this view of the whole, that Zeitlichkeit is called Temporal-
itat. "We call this entire problematic Temporalitiit" (228). Tempor-
alitat is Zeitlichkeit from the standpoint of synthesis, that is, from 
the standpoint of the possibility of giving an account (logos) of the 
whole. It is in the demonstration of the horizonal role of Temporality 
in the understanding of Being that Heidegger completes the project 
announced in Being and Time of "getting Dasein as a whole into our 
grasp" (cf BT 281). 
The identity of Temporalitat with Zeitlichkeit is clearly empha-
sized. Analysis yields Zeitlichkeit as the condition of the possibili-
ty of the understanding of Being. When the "synthetic" question, "how 
does temporality make such understanding of Being possible?" (274, 
italics added), is asked, then the question is how "time as temporality 
[is] the horizon for the explicit understanding of Being as such . . 
?" (274). For this question of the "descent," that is to say "in 
its role as condition of possibility of the understanding of Being, 
both pre-ontological and ontological, we shall call Zeitlichkeit 
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temporalitat" (274). 
Section 20 undertakes the ascent by showing how Being-in-the-world 
"is already, as such, understanding of Being" (292), and does so by 
exhibiting the interconnections between "Being-in-the-world, transcen-
dence, and temporality" (!20(e); 294). Being-in-the-world is possible 
for Dasein because Dasein oversteps beings toward world. "Because 
Dasein is constituted by Being-in-the-world, it is a being which in its 
Being is out beyond itself. The epekeina belongs to Dasein's own most 
peculiar structure of Being" (299). Thus, "Dasein is the transcendent 
being" (300). Transcendence "makes possible coaing back to beings, so 
that the antecedent understanding of Being is founded on transcendence" 
(300). But if Being-in-the-world (which aanifests the projective 
structure of "understanding of Being") is founded in transcendence, 
then it is necessary to ask "in what is Dasein's transcendence itself 
grounded?" (301). "The ecstatic character of time aakes possible 
Dasein's specific overstepping, transcendence, and thus also the world" 
(302). The "ascent" is completed in Zeitlichkeit, which is not only 
"ecstasis" but the horizonal unity of the ecstases: "The transcendence 
of Being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the ori-
ginal ecstatic-horizonal unity of Zeitlichkeit" (301). Thus, "Zeit-
lichkeit is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of 
Being" ( 301). 
The understanding's glimpse of "that upon which it projects" "as 
unveiled" (284), the end of the existential analyses undertaken in 
Being and Time, does not yet guarantee that the way in which "the 
understanding of the Being of beings" is "made possible by time" will 
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be "transparent" (294) to us. Hence the ascent, the existential 
analysis, only prepares for the task which will complete the inves-
tigation undertaken by fundamental ontology into the constitution of 
Dasein 1 s Being--namely, ontology, the "science of Being." Section 21 
undertakes the synthesis: 
The task now is to comprehend how, on the basis of the tempor-
ality that grounds Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Temporality 
makes possible the understanding of Being. (302) 
Here we have the program of the "descent" clearly formulated, namely to 
show, on the basis of the eliciting of temporality as the horizon of 
the understanding of Being, how that te•porality (now Temporality) 
makes the understanding of Being possible. 
We shall examine the movement of "synthesis" (!21) in greater 
detail below. The issue of the "science of Being" remains Seinsver-
standnis, the understanding of Being--for there is no "Being" by 
itself. "Being is given only if the understanding of Being, hence 
Dasein, exists" (19). It is for this reason that one can say that 
Heidegger's own name for the "synthesis" is die Kehre, the Turn from 
"Being and time" to "time and Being." For by showing how Temporality 
makes the understanding of Being possible, the predominating role of 
"Being" in its traditional interpretation as praesens is undercut, 
since "Being" is no longer the ultimate term of metaphysical inquiry. 
If Being "is there" only where there is understanding of Being, and 
understanding has its source in the temporalization of temporality, 
then the inexplicit interpretation of Being as praesens, sustaining 
both the everyday understanding of Being and that of the tradition, 
itself rests upon the "forgotten" primacy of time. Heidegger, it is 
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true, does not announce the significance of this turning. We can catch 
a glimpse of the difficulty of the issue, why Heidegger does not 
address it directly, if we use Gadamer's5 formula, that according to 
Heidegger "Being is tiae." This at first offensive formulation cap-
tures the entanglement of Heidegger's enterprise in the language of 
Being, i.e. in the language of metaphysics, and therefore the impos-
sibility of completing it in its own terms. The phrase suggests the 
infinite series of projections required, in spite of Heidegger's claim 
regarding the li•iting of the series in the projection upon time6, if 
we are to understand anything like "ti•e." If all understanding is 
understanding of Being, then how is time itself, upon which the 
understanding of Being is projected, to be understood? How is any 
discourse concerning time itself possible, except that which reverts to 
the language of Being (presence) and therefore already depends upon the 
temporal projection? The "turn" in Heidegger's thought, which at 
first, at least, we must distinguish for•ally fro• the turn as initi-
ally conceived (from "Being and time" to "time and Being") is the 
effect of Heidegger's grappling with the fundamental question of the 
language required to address the el!ekeina tes ousias, the "origin" of 
metaphysical understanding, i.e. of the understanding of Being. 
The analogy with the Platonic "route of inquiry" has made it 
clear that the "science of Being" for Heidegger corresponds to the 
Platonic episteme, the synthetic view of the whole. What has to be 
shown is how time makes the understanding of Being possible. This 
means, precisely, to exhibit the interconnection of temporality with 
the understanding of Being at every level, to exhibit the total 
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structure of Dasein's transcendence in its grounding in temporali-
zation. The interconnection or "synthesis" is demonstrated in 121 on 
the basis of an analysis of the Being of the handy. Being is shown 
here to be understood on the basis of a projection upon the ecstatic 
horizon of praesens. By thus making explicit what constitutes the 
"Being" of beings in the understanding of beings, the science of Being 
explicitly acco•plishes the differentiation of Being from beings 
(122). The ontological difference signifies the explicit carrying out 
of this interpretation of the aeaning of Being, otherwise implicit in 
all understanding of Being. The synthetic view of the whole, which 
presumably makes the Being of Dasein itself "transparent," accomplishes 
the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference at the same 
time that it establishes how the understanding of Being is grounded in 
temporality. For in the process of demonstrating that the projection 
of the meaning of the Being of the (handy) being is directed toward 
time as its horizon, the investigation shows that the "meaning" of 
Being is time (praesens)--indeed, the two theses are demonstrated in 
the same gesture. In short, "Being" takes its meaning from the manner 
in which it is projected, by everyday (pre-ontological) understanding, 
upon time. The "science of Being" shows in what this projection con-
sists: thereby the projection becomes "ontological," i.e. explicit with 
regard to the meaning of Being. "Being" does not lie beyond the sphere 
of transcendence, but names the interpretive moment determining all 
com-portment, all openness, toward beings. In "stepping beyond" beings 
to Being, beings are understood from praesens. Being belongs to the 
structure of transcendence, even for the "science of Being." To 
146 
demonstrate explicitly the manner in which Being is projected in the 
understanding of Being is the goal of the science of Being and aakes up 
its content. Thus, the science of Being is wholly comprised by the 
four "fundamental problems of phenomenology" and already makes up the 
subject-aatter of the chapter on ontological difference in Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. 
There is no indication here that Heidegger envisions a future 
"science of Being" which will inquire into the true "meaning of Being" 
--thereby putting philosophy on a secure grounding and turning it, at 
last, into a science, accurate beyond all interpretation. What is at 
stake in ontology is not a "science" in the modern sense (a field of 
inquiry continuing to expand in its research on the basis of methodo-
logical directives) but something like an episteae in the classical 
sense of the grasping of a synthetic interconnection of elements, a 
view of the whole founded in a grasp of the primal arche. The "whole" 
here is Seinsverstandnis, and it is Seinsverstandnis which is the true 
subject-matter of the science of Being. Being is the "object" of this 
science, not only because Being is necessarily the "object" of all 
philosophy, but because it is only by clarifying the way in which Being 
is projected by the understanding that the nature of the understanding 
itself can become clear. And this is, in the first instance at least, 
the aim of ontology: to apprehend the nature of the "event" that takes 
place with the existence of Dasein, to understand how, in transcen-
dence, philosophy as an interpretation of the Being of beings can 
arise; how, in the "happening" (Geschehen) that Dasein is, something 
like Seinsverstandnis can come to pass. 
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We have seen that the function of ontology is to complete the 
task of fundamental ontology by presenting the "synthesis" of the 
whole, in the Temporal exposition of the understanding of Being. In 
this way, the possibility of such understanding is thoroughly grounded 
in the teaporalization of temporality (assuming that the exposition is 
completed). Section 22 presents the resulting "view of the whole" in 
the form of an explication of the ontological difference. What is the 
ultimate goal of this attempt to grasp, in rigorous, "scientific" 
fashion the "wholeness" of Dase in. i.e. the full structure of tran-
scendence? What finally is achieved with the explicit carrying out of 
the ontological diff erence?7 
The question of ontology is how Seinsverstandnis is possible on 
the basis of teaporality. Seinsverstandnis, however, is nothing other 
than the carrying out of the ontological difference, implicitly or 
explicitly. The understanding of Being is ordinarily 
"pre-ontological," in that such understanding is usually merely 
implicit. The aim of !21 was to show what understanding of the Being 
of beings was indeed implicit in pre-ontological understanding--in 
everyday comportment toward beings--thereby making it explicit. The 
"meaning of Being" is, from the perspective of the problem of the 
ontological difference, precisely that implicit projection made 
explicit, namely the projection of Being as praesens. 
Section 22 recapitulates the result of the ontological inquiry, 
the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference, in order to 
show how ontology thereby achieves an "objectification" (Vergegen-
standigung) of Being, and thereby constituted itself a science. 
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In order to understand further the "scientific" character of this 
achievement, we must first recall that the understanding of Being takes 
two foras, pre-ontological and ontological. In the first, the under-
standing of Being remains implicit: 
Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other 
be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this 
projection Being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted 
and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively 
apprehended .... Being is projected upon something fro• which 
it becomes understandable, but in an unobjective way. It is un-
derstood as yet pre-conceptually, without a logos. (281) 
The objectification of Being means to make explicit what is already 
implicit in pre-ontological understanding. "The understanding of Being 
in general in the pre-conceptual sense is . . the condition of the 
possibility that Being should be objectified, thematized at all" (281). 
Furthermore, "A scientific investigation constitutes itself in the 
objectification of what has somehow already been unveiled" (320). This 
latter statement, representing Heidegger's formal definition of 
science, is his addition to the classical concept of episteme. Ontolo-
gy is a science precisely because it clarifies that understanding of 
Being already operative in the everyday comportment of Dasein. We must 
be careful, therefore, not to mistake ontology for a distinct "science" 
with a special "object," "Being," the investigation of which would 
leave behind the field of inquiry opened up by fundamental ontology. 
On the contrary, ontology is nothing other than the final moment of the 
inquiry, the radical clarification of the internal structure (the onto-
logical difference) of that field (transcendence).8 
Ontology is accomplished when the understanding can "somehQ!__see, 
~s unveiled, that upon which it projects" (284; note reference to 
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"seeing the sun" in the Platonic allegory of the cave), i.e., when it 
can see temporality as the horizon of the projection of Being. This is 
possible, however, only if this ontological difference is carried out 
explicitly, if Being is "objectified" and therefore fully distinguished 
from beings. Thus Heidegger distinguishes between the "distinction" 
(Unterschied) of Being and beings, and the explicitly carried out 
difference (Differenz): 
~-
The distinction [Unterschied] between Being and beings is there 
[ist da], latent in Dasein and its existence, even if not in 
explicit awareness. . . . Existence aeans, as it were, "to be in 
the performance of this distinction." ... The distinction 
between Being and beings exists pre-ontologically, without an 
explicit concept of Being, latent in Dasein's existence. As such 
it can become an explicitly understood difference [Differenz}. 
(319)9 
ontology comes into its own as a science when it is able to 
distinguish "the mode of knowing operative in ontology as science of 
Being, and this requires us to work out the methodological structure of 
ontological-transcendental differentiation" (20). In the end, the task 
is to establish the interconnection between Being and time; this aim is 
served by ontology when it thematizes Being by showing that time is 
"the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being" 
(274). The science of ontology consists in the explicit differentia-
tion of Being from beings, accomplished by showing how Being is depen-
dent upon time--that is to say, how the understanding of Being has its 
horizon in Temporalitat. Ontology makes explicit what interpretation 
of Being i.s already implicit in the understanding of beings, namely 
that Being is praesens. The demonstration that time is the horizon of 
the under-standing of Being has effected the carrying out of the onto-
logical difference, and has therefore established the science of 
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Being. 
What, then, is achieved when the ontological difference is 
carried out explicitly in the science of Being, and therefore the 
~~ of all understanding of Being is made manifest? This question 
is equivalent to that concerning the ultimate significance of ontology 
itself. 
Pre-ontological understanding is the basis for the positive 
sciences, which "constitute themselves in the objectification of beings 
where the objectification holds itself in the tendency of everyday 
direct apprehension" (321). In short, the positive sciences are 
founded in a projection based upon this pre-ontological awareness 
(321). More importantly for understanding what is at stake in ontol-
ogy, such a projection also underlies traditional ontology. But 
everyday understanding does not distinguish clearly between Being and 
beings, so that, in traditional ontology, "Being itself is even treated 
at first like a being and explained by means of determination of 
beings, as at the beginning of ancient philosophy .... and at bottom 
this interpretation has remained the usual one in philosophy right down 
to the present day" (318-19). 
In view of this reference to the tradition, what "difference" 
does the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference make? 
Does ontology add, to the series of possible philosophies, one more 
philosophy, even if the final one, founded at last in a scientific 
inquiry? Or is it not clearly the case that ontology makes explicit 
what is already implicit at the heart of all traditional philosophy 
(that Being is understood as praesens)? What, then, is the status of 
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ontology? Is ontology the "true philosophy" at last, or does it 
accomplish anything more than an exposition of the "forgottenness" of 
Being in the tradition--and hence initiate the Destruktion? 
Or is it not possible that both accomplishments are essentially 
equivalent in view of the fundamental "methodology" which is at work 
even, as Heidegger tells us, in this "scientific" text: 
Reference to the fact that the Greeks understood Being by way of 
the present, by means of praesens, is a confiraation not to be 
overestimated for our interpretation of the possibility of 
understanding Being by time; but it nevertheless does not 
establish it basically. Still, it is testimony that in our own 
interpretation of Being we are atte•pting nothing other than the 
repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to 
radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves. (315-16) 
The radicalization of philosophy, whereby the forgottenness of Being is 
overcome, takes place in the self-repetition of the problems of 
philosophy. Repetition makes explicit what is already at work--the 
interpretation of Being as praesens, the Temporal horizon of the 
understanding of Being--in the tradition. Ontology, the central moment 
in repetition, overcomes the forgottenness of Being by showing what 
"Being" truly is in the tradition. Ontology discloses the essence of 
philosophy, the carrying out of the ontological difference; since it 
shows how philosophy answers the ontological question (the question of 
the Being of beings), it constitutes, in the terms of MFL, the first 
half of metaphysics. Metaphysics is just the "essence" of philosophy; 
it is the event always implicitly at work in philosophy. The carrying 
out of the ontological difference (transcendence) is the explication of 
the structure of this event which determines philosophy as philosophy. 
The moment of ontology, which exhibits what is concealed in the 
tradition, i.e. it exhibits the concealed "essence" of philosophy, is 
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not by itself the goal of repetition. Ontology overcomes the forgot-
tenness of Being in "objectifying" Being, but this means that Tempor-
ality is shown to be the horizon of the interpretation of Being. At 
the very moment of overcoming the forgottenness of Being, the center of 
metaphysics is shifted from Being to time. It is now seen that "Time 
is the origin of possibility." As origin, time can give rise to possi-
bilities not envisioned in the tradition. The goal of repetition is 
renewal, is, indeed, the transformation of the traditionlO. If we keep 
in view the structure of Heidegger's project as a whole (the two sides 
of the metaphysics of Dasein) then we can see that ontology serves as 
the moment of turning in philosophy, that it constitutes itself as the 
passageway whereby the tradition itself can give rise to the renewal of 
philosophy. The overcoming of the forgottenness of Being is meant to 
result, not in a new textbook on the true meaning of Being, but in the 
potential transformation of philosophy qua philosophy. 
Heidegger's own work does not, by itself, attempt to determine 
the specific form of future philosophy--this remains true even for the 
later work--but has as its sole aim the "transformation of the site" of 
thinking, for the sake of a renewal of what, for the present, we can 
call the possibilities of thinking. This project is deeply radicalized 
after the "turn" in Heidegger's thought, but the aim of the project 
remains the same throughout Heidegger's work. 
"In fact, that 'place' is, in every philosophy, an occupied 
place, and it is in each case transformed" (MFL 157/200). It is the 
passage through the "place" of fundamental ontology that enables the 
transformation of philosophy, which never exhibits, concretely 
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speaking, the bare neutrality of ontology, but always takes place in 
relation to a specific "whole of being"--so that a metontology is 
required to complete the metaphysics of Dasein. Philosophy always 
"occurs" as a transformation of philosophy. 
Ontology returns the traditional interpretation of Being to its 
source. This source is time, "the origin of possibility itself" (BP 
325). But the return and gathering of philosophy into its source, 
temporalization, raises several further issues, particularly when we 
look more closely at the nature of time. 
"Time" answers the question of the •eaning of Being; we find a 
formulation of this answer at the end of 120 of Basic Problems: 
The transcendence of Being-in-the-world is founded in its 
specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizonal unity of 
te•porality. If transcendence makes possible the understanding 
of Being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatic-
horizonal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the 
condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being. 
(302) 
The task that now follows, Heidegger says at the beginning of 121, 
"is to comprehend how, on the basis of the temporalit~ that grounds 
Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Te•porality makes possible the 1l!!..= 
derstanding of Being" (302). This task, as we have already suggested, 
constitutes the "synthetic" inquiry following the "ascent" to tempor-
ality; it therefore constitutes the science of Being proper. In this 
section, Heidegger demonstrates how Temporality (temporality in the 
"descent") makes the understanding of Being possible in a specific 
sense, "namely, the understanding of Being in the sense of extantness 
in its broadest signification" (302). In the second part, (b), of this 
section, Heidegger will show how Kant's interpretation of Being as 
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"position" has the same source as the understanding of Being in its 
extantness. Thus his analysis of the horizon of this understanding of 
Being (praesens) relates back to the concept of Being which underlies 
the tradition. It therefore constitutes the climax of the Destruktion, 
since it exhibits the source of that understanding of Being which is 
operative in the tradition. It is precisely at this culainating point 
that a repetition becoaes possible. Indeed, Heidegger says here that 
in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting nothing 
other than the repetition of the probleas of ancient philosophy 
in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own 
selves. (316) 
To return to Heidegger's Temporal interpretatin of "handiness": 
The overriding issue is how "Being-in-the-world itself [is] possible as 
a whole" (301). The problem, then, is the interconnection of world and 
temporalization. Heidegger goes so far here as to identify Dasein's 
transcendence with "world-understanding" (302). Seinsverstandnis 
itself is always a "world-understanding." Heidegger introduces the 
concept of openness (one way of saying "world") here: "The being we 
call Dasein is as such open for .... Openness belongs to its being" 
(300). (See MFL 210: "Time is essentially a self-opening and ex-
panding into a world.") "There would be nothing like a horizon for us 
if there were not ecstatic openness for ... and a schematic determ-
!nation of that openness, say, in the sense of praesens" (308). The 
concept of the horizon is that of a limitation (schematic determina-
tion) placed upon openness, so that beings can have a "determinate" way 
of appearing within the open domain. The horizon should not, of 
course, be conceived as "out-side" the open region but rather as the 
"schema" of the region itself. Both horizon and schema are ways of 
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expressing the "limit" character intrinsic to openness, without which 
there would not be any determinate beings or relatedness among beings. 
The type of relatedness approp-riate to the ecstasis of the present is 
functionalit~ (Bewandtnis); functionality is the "way of Being" of the 
type of being that we encounter most "nearly," equipment (Zeug) en-
countered in its handiness. Praesens is the "horizonal schema of the 
ecstasis of enpresenting" (equipment is "made present" in enpresenting) 
because it is the way the Being of equipment is "sketched out" in 
advance for its being encountered within the open realm. The horizon 
determines the character of its "appearing." That praesens is a 
schematic determination of openness means that the "world" manifested 
in beings is fundamentally a world of functional relations. Praesens 
signifies that which makes functionality as such "possible" and thus 
lets the handy be encoutered I!§ handy. 
That openness and thus world as such is determined as a "whole" 
by the horizon of praesens means that it is not possible to separate 
self-projection, ecstasis, and horizon, as if there were first of all 
"something" (or someone) that projected across an open space toward an 
already-established horizon. Rather, the "something" is just 
temporalization (self-projection) which, in each ecstasis, "has a 
horizon that is determined by [the ecstasis] and that first of all 
completes that ecstasis' own structure" (306). Temporalization is, as 
Heidegger will soon say (MFL 209) "worlding" of world, so that self-
projection, ecstasis and horizon can only be conceived as belonging in 
a unity to this event as a whole. Self-projection is temporalization, 
the event as such; the event has a projective character, i.e., it 
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occurs in ecstases; and the event is determinate in character, i.e., it 
takes place in relation to a horizon or "scheaatic determination." 
Thus we should not reify any of the aspects of Heidegger's analysis of 
temporalization, the unity of which Heidegger expresses as follows: 
Temporality in general is ecstatic-horizonal self-projection 
simply as such, on the basis of which Dasein's transcendence is 
possible. (312) 
We now turn to the demonstration of how a specific understanding 
of Being is indeed made possible through Temporality. It is through 
such a demonstration that the ontological difference is carried out 
explicit!~, since it is here that the usually implicit dependence of 
our understanding of beings upon a temporal determination of Being is 
made explicit. 
On a day-to-day basis, beings for the most part are encountered 
as extant, as beings accessible to us in the sense that we know some-
thing about them but, perhaps, do not really know how to "manage" with 
them, in the way that a shoemaker, for example, understands how to 
"deal appropriately" with the equipment found in his shop. Although we 
usually encounter beings in the privative mode of unfamiliarity, i.e., 
as merely extant, "this privative mode of the uncoveredness of the 
extant can be comprehended ontologically only from the structure of 
primary familiarity" (304). But this primary familiarity lies in deal-
ing with beings appropriately--the capacity to do this is to "under-
stand" beings in their mode of Being as equipment. Heidegger has 
already shown, in '120 (not to mention U5-18 of BT), how "the 
understanding of equipment traces back to the understanding of 
functionality, sig-nificance, and world, and hence to the ecstatic-
horizonal constitution of Dasein" (305). He has also already shown (in 
157 
t20) how commerce with the handy "constitutes itself with respect to 
its temporality in a retentive-expectant enpresenting of the equip-
mental contexture as such" (304). The problem now is to exhibit how 
temporality is, indeed, con-stitutive (as ecstatic-horizonal) of the 
understanding of the handy as such; to show, in other words, how 
"handiness" is understood on the basis of the complete ecstatic-
horizonal structure of temporality, i.e. of Teaporality. 
Handiness is not by itself a merely "positive" phenomenon--as 
extantness seems to be--but the handiness of the handy is encountered 
just as much in the unavailabilit~ of a piece of equipment as in its 
indeed being "at hand." Thus handiness is not understood through 
"categories" like being (being-extant) and not-being, but through 
"variations of a single basic phenomenon, which we may characterize 
formally as eresence and abse~, and in general as pra~" (305). 
Heidegger defers further analysis of this double structure of praesens 
until later in the section (pp. 309 ff.). Here he is concerned to show 
how, if handiness has a "praesensial meaning, then this would signify 
that this mode of Being is understood Temporally" (305). Thus the 
question is what praesens does indeed mean with respect to "time and 
temporality in general" (305). 
Heidegger first distinguishes praesens from the "now." The now 
characterizes intratemporality, i.e., temporal relations among the 
handy and the extant, "whereas praesens is supposed to constitute the 
condition of possibility of understanding of handiness as such" (305). 
Now, the very description of the handy as intratemporal presupposes 
that we already understand handiness as such and, presumably, 
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understand it through something like praesens. 
Again, the saying of the "now" is the way that the enpresenting 
of something, and threfore the moment, the Augenblick, can express 
itself. But the Augenblick (for example) is one of the ways that time 
temporalizes itself, specifically in the enpresenting of the present. 
Therefore, it would seem, praesens is identical with the present in the 
sense of "the enpresenting of ... " [das Gegenwartigen von .] 
(306/434-5), i.e., with one of the ecstasis of temporality. But this 
is not correct: 
The name "praesens" itself already aeans that we do not aean by 
it an ecstatic phenoaenon as we do with present and future, at 
any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard 
to its ecstatic structure. (306) 
The focus is, rather, upon soaething else: the horizonal structure 
whereby the ecstasis completes itself. Thus praesens is distinguished 
from enpresenting as horizon (of projection) is distinguished from 
ecstasis (projection as an "act"). But we must be careful here. The 
"horizon" (and thus Teaporality) does not represent a pre-established 
framework already somehow "ready" for the projection of the ecstasis 
upon it. Heidegger emphasizes very sharply that the "connection 
between present and praesens" (306) is not accidental. The connection 
lies in the fact that the horizon belongs to the ecstasis and is 
determined by it: "Instead, each ecstasis as such has a horizon that 
is determined ~and that first of all completes the ecstasis' Q!m 
structure" (306, emphasis mine). Indeed, it is the ecstasis which is 
"the condition of possibility of a specific 'beyond-itself,' of 
transcendence, the projection upon presence" (306). That praesens as 
horizon lies "beyond the ecstasis as such" is "due to the character of 
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the ecstasis" (306, emphasis mine). Strictly speaking, then, Tempor-
ality is not the "horizon" of temporalization, but is simply tempor-
alization in its complete structure: "Temporality [Temporali tatl_is 
temporality [Zeitlichkeit] with regard to the unity of the horizonal 
schemata belonging to it, in our case the present with regard to 
praesens" ( 307 / 436) . 
The connection between enpresenting and that upon which it 
projects is this: The projection of enpresenting upon praesens ~ 
As the condition of the possibility of the "beyond itself," the 
ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic predesig-
nation of the where out there this "beyond itself" is. (306) 
There are two essential consequences of this interconnection between 
horizon and ecstasis, between praesens and the present. First: 
Because praesens arises with and in the projecting (the ecstasis) 
itself, and because "as removal to ... , the present is a being-open 
for what is encountered (Offen- sein ftir Begegnendes] which is thus 
understood antecedently upon praesens" (306-7m/436), then the Being of 
present beings is indeed understood "from the original horizonal schema 
of the ecstasis of temporality" (307). Thus "understanding" which 
itself is "being-open for what is encountered," is "schematized" in its 
(teaporalizing) ecstasis by praesens. What is encountered in the open 
already has its Being "sketched in," schematically pre-determined, as 
"soaething present": 
Everything that is encountered in the enpresenting [the ecstatic 
opening-out toward .] is understood as something present 
[Anwesendes]--that is, understood upon presence--on the basis of 
the horizon, praesens, already removed in the ecstasis. If 
handiness and unavailability signify something like presence and 
absence--praesens modified and modifiable thus and so--the Being 
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of the beings encountered within the world is projected 
praesensially, which means, fundamentally, Temporally. (307) 
This is what Heidegger has set out to prove. Of course, the 
"proof" here does not consist in establishing a relationship between 
already received philosophical notions, but rather in constructing the 
concepts of praesens, ecstasis, and Temporality by exhibiting their 
interrelationship on the basis of the inquiry into the horizonal 
character of time. In this way the "wholeness" of Dasein, with respect 
to the constitution of its Being, is brought into view, and the project 
of Being and Time, insaofar as it lies in an attempt to get "Dasein as 
a whole into our grasp," is completed--or is, rather, completed with 
respect to the one ecstasis of the present. Through the disclosure, in 
this way, of the Being of Dasein as a whole, Heidegger has shown how 
te•porality is the basic condition of transcendence as such: 
Temporality is itself the basic condition of the possibility of 
all understanding that is founded on transcendence and whose 
essential structure lies in projection. (307) 
But this leads us to the second conclusion to be drawn from the 
disclosure of the complete (i.e., ecstatic-horizonal) structure of 
transcendence. Temporality is "original self-projection simply as 
such" (307). That the coaplete structure of self-projection is 
articulated in the disclosure of its ecstatic-horizonal unity means 
that there can be no projection "beyond" the horizon, UJ!on which the 
schemata themselves would be further projected: 
Because the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality is intrin-
sically self-projection pure and simple, because as ecstatic it 
makes possible all projecting upon ... and represents, together 
with the horizon belonging to the ecstasis, the condition of pos-
sibility of an upon-which, an out-toward-which in general, it can 
no longer be asked upon what the schemata can on their part be 
projected, and so on in infinitum. The series, mentioned 
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earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other 
--understanding of beings, projectin upon Being, understanding of 
Being, projection upon time--has its end at the horizon of the 
ecstatic unity of temporality. (308) 
To establish this in a more primordial way, Heidegger says, "we would 
have to go into the problem of the finitude of time" (308). 
What does the finitude of time mean? At the horizon of the 
ecstatic unity of temporality not only each ecstasis but temporality 
itself "has its end" (308). "But," Heidegger adds, "this end is no-
thing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all 
projecting" (308). It is the unity of end and beginning that consti-
tutes the finitude of time. The concept of primordial time is, in 
fact, that of a unity in which end and beginning are somehow the 
"same." What is involved in this relationship, not of identity, but of 
sameness constituted, as we maintain, by repetition? 
By now we are quite familiar with the fact that the highest 
ontological concept is that of possibility, and that the theme of 
possibility is so intimately related to that of finitude that it is 
precisely at the point at which possibility as such comes fully into 
view that ontology gives way to the problematic of finitude, that is, 
to metontology. This is the "formal" transition from ontology to 
metontology. The investigation into the constitution of Dasein as a 
whole comes to an end with the discovery of Temporality, the origin of 
possibility: 
Fundamentally it must be noted that if we define temporal-
ity as the original constitution of Dasein and thus as the origin 
of the possibility of the understanding of Being, then Teaporal-
ity as origin is necessarily richer and more pregnant than any-
thing that may arise from it. This makes manifest a peculiar 
circumstance, which is relevant throughout the whole of phil-
osophy, namely, that within the ontological sphere the possible 
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is higher than everything actual. (308) 
The question, if we are to understand the Umschlag, is how possibility 
does give rise to concrete possibilities, "possible actuality": What 
is the connection between Temporality as origin and concretely exist-
ing, finite Dasein? 
The "finitude of time" is discussed aost extensively in '11165 and 
74 of Being and Tiae, and is discussed there in terms of repetition and 
QOSsibili~. The concretization of possibility occurs through the 
repetition of a concrete possibility. 
In order to exhibit properly the extent to which Being and Time 
is itself concerned with the "concretization of possibility" it would 
be necessary to undertake an extensive interpretation of the second 
Division of BT. This is not possible here; all that we shall attempt 
is to indicate certain issues in ,165 and 74 that show how the analysis 
of primordial time contains within itself the iapetus for an "over-
turning" into metontology, i.e., into the problematics of finitude. 
We recall that in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz, the primor-
dial unifying character of drive is "concretized" only in the 
restrictedness of the viewpoint, which in turn is constitutive for 
drive. 
From the standpoint of the problematic of Dasein 1 s existence, 
temporalization is significant only in relation to Dasein's concrete, 
factical existence. Thus, in 165 of BT we read that "anticipatory 
resoluteness ... is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive 
potentiality-for-Being" (372). But 
This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, 
come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can 
163 
put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting 
itself come towards itself--in other words, that it exists. This 
letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibil-
ity which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the 
future as coming towards. (372) 
Given then that the "l?!.imary phenomenon of primordial and authentic 
temporality is the future" (378), Heidegger proceeds to demonstrate the 
unity of temporality in its three ecstases. Here he is engaged in 
"opening up" the meaning of Care in its temporal structure. Antic!-
patory resoluteness, which "understands Dasein in its own essential 
Being-guilty" (373) takes over thrownness; but this lets futural Dasein 
"be its ... 'been' ['Gewesen']" (373/326). "Anticipation of one's 
uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to 
one's ownmost 'been'" (373). At the same time, "resolute being-
alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation ... is possible only 
by making such an entity present" (374). Heidegger summarizes his 
analysis of the temporality disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness as 
follows: 
Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself 
into the Situation by making present. The character of "having 
been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future 
which "has been" ... releases itself from the Present. This 
phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the 
process of having been; we designate it as "te11poraliu." Only 
in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is 
the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory 
resoluteness, as we have described it, 11ade possible for Dasein 
itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic 
care. (374) 
Heidegger is here effecting a transition between his earlier 
analysis of the way in which resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness, 
"brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of the Situation" 
(347). "[W]hen the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-
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for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, 
but calls us forth into the Situation" (347). This, says Heidegger 
later on in the text, is "the primordial truth of existence" (355). 
What is at stake in resoluteness, which brings Dasein into, and 
maintains it in, the Situation, is that it "be held open and free for 
the current factical possibility" (355). And it is here that the 
question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is factically answered 
by Dasein (357). In other words, it is in the sort of "openness" to 
beings and to Others that is constitutive of the Situation that Dasein 
finds its wholeness at this initial level of the analysis. In its 
wholeness, Dasein is disclosive of the "reality" of its Situation. But 
this is a way of being finite--for Dasein to hold resolutely to the 
truth of its Situation (in the midst of beings), and thereby to 
disclose the truth of the Situation. 
Heidegger's opening up of the temporal diaension of the Situation 
raises the issue of historicity, which must be understood as a 
historicity belonging specifically to situated Dasein. That is to say, 
the disclosure of the meaning of Dasein's Being as primordial temporal-
ity takes place on the basis of the analysis of the Situation and as an 
elaboration of it. Teaporalization itself does not "depart from." the 
Situation, does not take place in vacuo, but shares in its finitude: 
The authentic future is teaporalized primordially by that temp-
orality which aakes up the aeaning of anticipatory resoluteness; 
it thus reveals itself as finite. (378) 
Indeed, temporality actually "constitutes" the finitude of the Situa-
tion, since the nullity (being-guilty as being-the-basis of a nullity) 
which we understand in resoluteness, and which brings us into the 
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Situation, is itself founded in futurity: 
The primordial and authentic future is the "towards-oneself" (to 
oneself!), existing as the possibility of nullity, the possi-
bility which is not to be outstripped. The ecstatical character 
of the primordial future lies in the fact that the future closes 
one's potentiality-for-Being; that is to say, the future is 
closed to one, and as such •akes possible the resolute exis-
tentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic 
coming-towards-oneself is the •eaning of existing in one's 
ownmost nullity. (378-79) 
At the present level of the analysis, the "possibility of nullity" 
constitutes the meaning of the "primordial finitude of time." 
With the further development of the analysis of the "temporality 
of Being-in-the-world," it becomes possible to further "concretize" the 
significance of temporalization. Dasein's temporalization in its full 
concreteness is its "historizing" [Geschehen] (427/375). In his dis-
cussion of "The Basic Constitution of Historicality [Geschichtlich-
keit]" (174; 434/382), Heidegger expands, so to speak, his earlier 
analysis of the Situation on the basis of a richer analysis of tea-
poralization. It is here that the concept of "possibility" becomes 
most concrete: 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, 
discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, 
and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that reso-
luteness, as thrown, takes over. In one's coming back resolutely 
to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of 
the possibilities that have co•e down to one, but not necessarily 
as having thus come down .... The more authentically Dasein 
resolves--and this means that in anticipating death it under-
stands itself una11biguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive 
possibility--the •ore unequivocally does it choose and find the 
possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by 
accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental 
and 'provisional' possibility drive out. Only Being-free for 
death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into 
its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's exis-
tence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of 
possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one 
and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. 
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This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which 
lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself 
dof!!! to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has 
inherited and yet has chosen. (435/383-84) 
But, Heidegger says, "the resoluteness which comes back to itself 
and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of 
existence that has come down to us" (437). Possibility is concretized 
The indications that we have elicited from Being and Tiae 
concerning the nature of the concretization of possibility for Dasein--
and thus of the nature of the metontological transition at what are 
calling its "formal" level--are not meant to constitute a proof of the 
way that primordial temporality necessarily gives rise to a determinate 
possibility of repetition, and therefore contains within itself the 
concept of a "possible actuality" in this sense. In order to complete 
a proof, the horizons of the future and of the past would have to be 
investigated in the same manner in which Heidegger analyzes the horizon 
of the present in praesens. In other words, the full structure of time 
in its finitude would have to be exhibited. It would then, presumably, 
become clearer still that the finitude of time means that temporaliza-
tion always "occurs" in relation to the thrownness of Dasein, and thus 
in relation to the possibility of its taking over determinate possi-
b.ili ties made available to it through its very "situatedness." 
Whether we think of the situatedness of Dasein in terms of its 
Situation or its historizing, that Dasein is thrown means that it has 
available to its potentiality-for-Being only certain possibilities for 
disclosure, possibilities which belong, indeed, to its "time" .and 
"place." "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes 
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to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (436). The first 
and formal sense of the metontological Umschlag is this: Implicit in 
the ecstatic-horizonal character of temporalization itself lies the 
necessity that disclosure take place in a "historizing" ("historizing" 
is the metontological term for "teaporality"),11 i.e., in the taking 
over of a determinate possibility in relation to a determinate tra-
dition from out of a determinate situation (of which one's "generation" 
is an eleaent). The concept of the finitude of time, arrived at 
through the ontological analysis--in the terms of tlO of MFL, on the 
basis of the neutrality of Dasein--gives rise to the concept of 
Dasein's essential concreteness. This means that Heidegger's own 
project stands under the law of finitude, and cannot stand outside the 
tradition to establish its basis and measure in a genuinely neutral, 
i.e., ontologically independent, Dasein. Rather than abandoning the 
project, however, Heidegger undertakes a more decisive questioning of 
finitude as the "source" of Dasein (cf. KPM 244). "The laying of the 
foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of 
man in such a way that this finitude itself can first becoae a problem" 
(KPM 225). Regarding the finitude of the ontological project, Heideg-
ger says in KPM: 
In any case, there is reason to believe that the explica-
tion of the essence of finitude required for the establishment of 
metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never ab-
solute .... It remains, therefore, only to develop the problem-
atic of finitude as such. (KPM 245) 
This development can occur, however, only insofar as the "onto-
logical" project places itself into the tradition in such a way as to 
repeat, on the same ground as that which gives rise to the tradition, 
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the source of the possibility of "the laying of the foundation" of 
metaphysics. The role of ontology is taken over by a questioning which 
is intrinsically historical: "[T]he basic attitude of the questioning 
is in itself historical; it stands and maintains itself in happening, 
inquiring out of happening for the sake of happening" (IM 45). The 
finitude of fundamental questioning aeans that it places itself within 
happening [Geschehen] for the sake of a renewal of "philosophy" (as 
"happening") on the basis of a transformation occurring within the 
"event," happening, itself. This transformation takes place with the 
Verwindung, torsion, of metaphysics upon itself, and gains its signifi-
cance from die Kehre, the turning "of" the history of Being. 
The metontological problematic is that of the irruption of meta-
physics, i.e., of the understanding of Being, into the midst of being 
as a whole. The possibility of such an event is what Heidegger means 
by "history." Human existence, as finite, is "for" such happening: 
With the existence of man there occurs an irruption into 
being as a whole such that, by this event, being becomes mani-
fest in itself, i.e., manifest as in being .... However, this 
prerogative of not simply being one being among other beings, 
which latter are not manifest to one another, but, in the midst 
of beings, of being delivered up to them as such and of being 
answerable to oneself as in being, in short, this prerogative of 
existing, involves in itself the necessity of an understanding of 
Being. (KPM 235-36/205-6) 
Here "Being" means first of all the "beingness" of beings. The meton-
tological "turn" means that questioning turns to the problem of the 
possibility of this event, the irruption into the midst of beings of an 
understanding of Being, whereby beings become manifest as such and as a 
whole. 
The metontological overturning of the transcendental-horizonal 
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from of inquiry follows also from the second consequence of the fini-
tude of primordial time, namely that the ontological project undercuts 
its own possibility by destroying the feasibility of a "science of 
Being" in the very act of completing it. 
The aim of fundamental ontology is to "get Dasein as a whole into 
our grasp"; the aim of the inquiry into the question of the meaning of 
Being is to make the Being of the questioner transparent to itself. 
The aim of ontology is to "objectify" Being, that is, to aake explicit 
the understanding of Being already iaplicit in pre-ontological aware-
ness, and to do so on the basis of a Temporal analysis of the horizon 
of the understandability of Being. Through this analysis, which is 
finally to make Dasein transparent to itself, understanding is to be 
made to "soaehow see, as unveiled, that u2on which it projects" (BP 
284). But the "basic condition for the possibility of understanding 
the actual <!.! actual is to look into the sun, so that the eye of 
knowledge should become sunlike" (285). But that which gives "lumin~ 
brightness" is the horizon itself (284). Thus in looking upon the 
horizon itself, the understanding sees the "sun," the luminous source 
of understanding; and, in doing so, it understands the horizon, and 
therefore understands understanding itself. Seinsverstandnis becomes 
transparent to itself. 
But if all understanding is projection, the question remains, in 
spite of Heidegger's asseveration concerning the limited number of 
projections in the series of projections (308), in relation to what 
horizon the horizon itself is understood. Is the ecstatic-horizonal 
structure of Temporality understood in terms of that ecstatic-horizonal 
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structure? But in that case no "ground" is obtained for that 
understanding--since it is its own ground--and it becomes difficult to 
see in what sense the understanding is made "transparent." But if, on 
the other hand, the series of projections does not come to an end with 
Temporality, then the understanding is also in this case not made 
transparent to itself. Here the problem is the ancient one of the 
possibility of the "knowledge of knowledge," with its involvement in 
the issues of self-reference and of finitude. For if primordial time 
is finite, then this means that in the ontological project finitude 
"grasps" finitude. Can finitude, in principle, become transparent to 
finitude? Is not the very meaning of finitude that it cannot become 
transparent to itself, that it cannot "leap over its own shadow"? The 
question arises whether the ontological project, as a project of 
horizonal inquiry, does not undercut its own possibility through the 
results of the inquiry. The finitude of the project makes it impos-
sible that it should become transparent to itself--but that it should 
become transparent to itself is essential to the completion of the 
project: the objectif !cation of "Being" in the explicit carrying out of 
the ontological difference, whereby the possibility of ontology in 
general is exhibited. The project of gathering philosophy into its 
"end" cannot be carried through to its end; the foundation cannot be 
established and the Turn cannot be carried out in the (foundational) 
terms of traditional metaphysics. 
The failure of the transcendental-horizonal inquiry, implicit 
already in the concept of the f initude of time, leads to the second or 
radical sense of the metontological Umschlag. Here the "metontologi-
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cal," i.e. finite, character of the project is recognized and carried 
out in its consequences. 
David Krell, in his essay on metontology12, seems to suggest--if 
I read hi• correctly--that the failure of the ontological project and 
the recognition of the radical finitude of inquiry leads, in essence, 
to the abandoning of the project of "fundamental" inquiry as such. In 
other words, finitude is to be equated with failure, rooted so deeply 
in any human project that any such project is permeated through and 
through with error. Here there seems to be a kind of incipient nihil-
ism, as if thought had to be abandoned in the face of the finitude of 
all questioning inquiry. 
If this were the case, then it would not be possible to determine 
that human thought is finite, since this itself is the "positive" re-
sult of a determinate course of inquiry. If finitude is identical with 
error (in the sense of the untrue) then finitude is not true, either--
and there is no reason to speak of the failure of thought attendant 
upon finitude. 
Heidegger's response to the radical problematization of fin]tude 
is of a different order. Now the problem of the "origin of metaphys-
ics" takes on the character, not of a fundamental-ontological inquiry 
into the horizon of the meaning of Being, but of an inquiry into the 
possibility of the "irruption" of finite Dasein into the midst of being 
as a whole. Indeed, what we called, in Chapter One, the rigorously a-
theistic character of Heidegger's questioning becomes even more severe-
ly "anti-meta-physical" in that the problem becomes how anything like 
the question of Being, and thus "Being," can arise from the midst of 
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the "extant" whole of beings. The metontological inversion means that 
"transcendence" must be understood from the standpoint of the prob-
lematic of finitude (KPM, Part Four): that ontology returns to the 
"metaphysical antic" from which it takes its rise (MFL, Appendix); that 
the unconcealment of beings takes place only in relation to the 
concealment of beings as a whole (On the Essence of Truth). We shall 
proceed shortly to an exaaination of the last of these documents, which 
we shall take as the exemplary "metontological treatise." We now turn 
to the aetontological problematic of the happening of truth, the 




1. Fundamental ontology, in Being and Time, consists in questioning 
the questioning entity Dasein. The fundamental-ontological question is 
how the question of Being as such is possible--and this questioning is 
itself the radicalization of the question of Being. The ontological 
questioning of metaphysics constitutes a doubligg of the question of 
Being; this doubling is correlated with the double structure of meta-
physics, as ontology (the questioning of metaphysics, i.e., of the 
possibility of the question of Being in general) and metontology (the 
questioning of Being in any concrete "instance" of metaphysics). 
2. Being and Time must be read as "about" the question of the meaning 
of Being, so that its goal is not soaething like a "theory of Being" 
but is rather about the structure of all understanding of Being in 
general. The first half of Being and Time inquires into the consti-
tutive structure of Dasein as a whole (Care) and the second half 
addresses the temporal significance of that structure. There is very 
11 ttle about "Being" in Being and Time but auch about temporalization 
and world. The question of Being is, formally understood, nothing 
other than the "movement" of temporalization itself. 
3. Richardson, p. 36. 
4. The Republic, tr. by Paul Shorey, in the Loeb Classical Library. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970. pp. 113-115. 
5. In H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976, p. 216. 
6. See John Sallis, "End(s)", p. 21. 
7. The "achievement" of the explicit carrying out of the ontological 
difference is that philosophy is gathered into its "end" and the 
oblivion of Being is "overcome," as Sallis notes in the article 
referred to above. 
8. Heidegger notes, in a "digression" required in order to ward off a 
fatal misunderstanding" (BP 281), that what is accomplished in finding 
in temporality that upon which "Being itself, as Being, is projected" 
(282) is nothing other than ontology: 
The basic act of objectification ... has the function of 
expli~itly projecting what is antecedently given upon that on 
which it has already been projected in pre-scientific experience 
or understanding. If Being is to become objectified--if the 
understanding of Being is to be possible as a science in the 
sense of ontology--if there is to be philosophy at all, then that 
upon which the understanding of Being, qua understanding [my 
italics], has already pre-conceptually projected Being must 
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become unveiled in an explicit projection (281-82). 
9. One should add, even if only parenthetically, that Heidegger has 
already introduced here the theme of the "thinking of difference as 
difference"--so that Identity and Difference will have to be seen as 
something like a "repetition" of the present ontological investigation 
in Basic Problems of Phenomenolog~. 
10. There is an essential connection between repetition and transforma-
tion. The repetition of the "essence" of philosophy, in effecting a 
retrieval of the origin, introduces the possibility of a transformation 
of "metaphysics." But such transformation could only be the "effect" 
of the slow process of retrieval, and not a directly obtainable goal. 
11. Thus Heidegger calls the problem of temporality, in MFL ,10, a 
"metontological" proble•. 
12. See our response to Krell in the Introduction, above. 
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CHAPTER V 
"On the Essence of Truth" as a Metontological Treatise 
In the Appendix to The Meta~hysical Foundations of Logic Heideg-
ger sketches the "logic" of the metontological reversal: 
Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already 
there (im Da], fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency 
toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes 
possible only when Being is understood in its whole problematic. 
The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of 
origin [von wo sie ausgegangen war] can be clarified by reference 
to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being "man" 
understands Being; understanding-of-Being effects a distinction 
between Being and beings; Being is there only when Dasein 
understands Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is 
there in the understanding presupposes the factical existence of 
Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of 
nature. Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when 
posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can 
become understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings 
[Totalitat von Seiendem] is already there. 
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for 
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This 
new in-vestigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and 
is the result of its overturning (Umschlag], its 
1
t.tl'1:J/bcA_r{. I 
designate this set of questions metontology [Metontologi~J. (MFL 
157m/199) 
Ontology turns back into the "metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly 
always remains" (158) because, like every project of finite Dasein, 
even ontology itself is the project of a being. Ontology has an on-
tical foundation (BP 19), and the first task of ontology is the char-
acterization of this ontical foundation (BP 20); that is to say, the 
first task of ontology is the investigation of the ontical-ontological 
entity Dase in. 
The second task of ontology (BP 20) is completed with the Tem-
poral analysis of Dasein. As we have seen, however (Chapter IV), 
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"precisely the radicalization of fundamental ontology brings about the 
above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its very self" (MFL 
157). The horizonal analysis results in the discovery of the radical 
finitude of time, and thus of the essential situatedness of all ques-
tioning of Being, including that of the fundamental-ontological inquiry 
itself. As a result, a special problematic is needed which investi-
gates that situatedness as such: Because Dasein is ontical, this 
inquiry takes the form of an investigation of the "metaphysical ontic," 
the "possible totality of beings" from which ontological questioning 
takes its rise. 
The metontological inquiry is the result of the overturning of 
ontology that takes place with the disclosure of the finitude of time. 
But this "overturning" means that the problem concerning the question 
of Being becomes how it can arise in the midst of "being as a whole." 
This problem, in a certain sense, goes beyond even that of the "fini-
tude" of Dasein. For the problematic of finitude arises in view of a 
conception of transcendence itself as the "locus" of the disclosure of 
Being, so that finitude is conceived as a property, as it were, of Da-
sein considered by itself. But the metabole signifies, not a mere 
reiteration of the ontological problematic (as if ~~tqg_and Ti~ were 
to be written a second time, as the result of the return of the 
hermeneutic circle to its "point of origin"), but a radicalization of 
the problem of "origin," i.e. of the problem of the locus of disclosure 
of the Being of beings. The new "special problematic" is concerned 
with the unconcealment of beings in the midst of being as a whole, and 
the problem of finitude becomes that of the interrelation of 
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unconcealment to the ~9-~cealment of being as a whole. 
Thus the temporal analysis results in the 
Turn [Kehr.!!], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the 
metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the 
movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring 
ontology to its latent overturning [Umschlag]. Here the Turn [Kehre] 
is carried out, and it is turned over into the metontology. (MFL 
158m/201) 
In its concrete significance, the Turn means the metontological over-
turning of ecstatic-horizonal inquiry--i.e., of the inquiry into the 
horizonal "source" of the understanding of Being--into the questioning 
of how unconcealment can "occur" in the midst of being as a whole. 
The problem becomes how "with the existence of man there occurs 
an irruption into the totality of being such that, by this event, being 
becomes manifest in itself, i.e., manifest as being" (KPM 235m). This 
is the question of the origin of metaphysics, which is the "fundamental 
event which comes to pass with the irruption into being of the concrete 
existence of man" (251m). In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics the 
problem of the ground of the possibility of metaphysics is still con-
ceived in terms of the finitude of man: "Dasein must be constructed in 
its finitude and with regard to that which makes the comprehension of 
Being intrinsically possible" (241). Finitude, however, is already 
brought into connection with the oblivion of Being: "The finitude of 
Dasein--the comprehension of Being--lies in forgetfulness [yergessen-
heit]" (241). Thus 
An analytic of Dasein must, from the beginning, strive to 
uncover the Dasein in man according to that mode of Being which. 
by nature, maintains Dasein and its comprehension of Being, i.e., 
primordial finitude, in forgetfulness. (242) 
Heidegger is clear about the difficulty of a reflection on 
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finitude, since finitude must problematize itself in such a reflection: 
In any case, there is reason to believe that the expli-
cation of the essence of finitude required for the establishment 
of metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never 
absolute. It follows that this reflection on finitude, which is 
always to be renewed, cannot succeeed by exchanging and adjusting 
various points of view in order finally and in spite of every-
thing to give us an absolute knowledge of finitude, a knowledge 
which is surreptitiously posited as being "true in itself." It 
remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude 
as such . ( 245) 
But the development of the "problematic of finitude as such," as the 
problematic of the "dependence of Dasein on being as a whole" (244), 
can only be accomplished through the articulation of the nature of that 
"dependence." It is with this task that the essay "On the Essence of 
Truth" (ET) is concerned!. Let us turn, then, to an examination of 
this text. 
There are two foci to ET, one overt and one hidden. The first is 
that previously treated under the rubric of finitude; the second is 
that of history (Geschichte). Richardson, in his commentary, sees both 
issues2, but he does not see that human "finitude" no longer is the 
issue per se, but rather the concealment of being as a whole. Nor does 
he distinguish Heidegger's meditation here on historical occurrence 
from his earlier inquiry into the historicity of Dasein in Bei~_and 
Time. It is these developments in Heidegger's thought which must be 
emphasized, however, if we are to understand the concrete consequences 
of the metontological Umschlag. At the same time, we wish to try to 
grasp the "movement" of this text as a whole in order to understand it 
as the "metontological" treatise par excellence. 
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Section 1. The Usual Concept of Truth 
The analysis proceeds, as is Heidegger's wont, from the "given" 
situation of thought to the ground or conditions of the possibility of 
that initial state. Thus Heidegger offers neither a criticism of the 
concept of truth as correspondence nor a more refined version of that 
theory--in fact, Heidegger is not engaged in developing a "theory" of 
truth, but in opening up the conditions underlying the possibiity of 
such theories, which are based, in our tradition, on the experience of 
truth as homoiosis or adaeguatio. Heidegger accepts that experience as 
the "given" which initiates the movement of inquiry. Philosophy for 
Heidegger cannot escape beginning with that which is "proximal and for 
the most part"--the everydayness of Dasein, the received scholarly 
tradition concerning Leibniz, the traditional understanding of judgment 
in logic, or the common view of the nature of truth--but, as is 
appropriate to the finitude of the inquirer, must begin with what is 
"given" to it. In the end, distance is obtained from this necessary 
beginning through the explication of how it is possible for the initial 
situation to arise: for example, the everyday understanding of time is 
explicated through the structures of primordial temporality. In this 
way the her11eneutic circle is "completed." But the opening up of the 
hermeneutic circle constitutes the "clearing" whereby the meaning, 
implicit in the original situation, is first discovered. 
Heidegger's inquiry into the essence of truth shows how it is 
possible for the truth of essence to be hidden as an issue: it there-
fore shows, after having begun with the traditional question of the 
essence of truth, why it is indeed "necessary" to begin this way. Our 
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attention necessarily falls first of all upon beings and their inter-
relationships, including the relationship of statements to complexes of 
fact. The latter relationship is understood ontically as a problem of 
"correspondence" because the condition of the manifestness of beings is 
overlooked in such manifestness, and this precisely because "manifest-
ness" occurs for the sake of the disclosedness of beings. 
Section 2. The Inner Possibility of Accordance 
Thus Heidegger's first step is to call attention to the "open 
region" within which objects appear. The immediate question is how it 
is possible for two such dissimilar things as a statement and, say, a 
coin to "correspond." 
In order to bring out the character of the "initial situation" 
already coming into clearer focus at this stage of the analysis, I 
shall translate verstellen as "to represent" in the following crucual 
passage: 
Correspondence here cannot signify a thing-like approxi-
mation between dissimilar kinds of things. The essence of the 
correspondence is determined by the kind of relation that obtains 
between the statement and the thing .... the statement regard-
ing the coin relates "itself" to this thing in that it represents 
it [vor-stellt, places-it-before] and says of the represented 
thing how, according to the particular perspective that guides 
it, it is disposed. What is stated by the representational 
statement is said of the represented thing in just such manner ~ 
that thing, as presented, is. The "such-as" has to do with 
representing and what it represents .... to represent here 
means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed, 
what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness 
[Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing 
and show itself as something withstanding lein Standiges]. This 
appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes 
place within an open region, the openness of which is not first 
created by the representing but rather is only entered into and 
taken over as a domain of relatedness. (BW 123-24m) 
In this discussion of the "essence" of correspondence Heidegger 
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presupposes the whole of his analysis of the Kantian ontology in Kant 
and the Problem.of Metaphysics. The open region is a field of op-
posedness; the ontology appropriate to it is that which concerns the 
grounding of objectivity and of objective, representational presenta-
tion. But here Heidegger does not focus on the "internal" structure of 
that open region (its transcendental horizon), but seeks to ~lace the 
open region itself, as it were, upon its "ground" in the concealment of 
being as a whole. Although the term "metontology" is never again used 
by Heidegger after MFL, we see in the present text the operation of the 
metontological Umschlag discussed in MFL, namely the task of accounting 
for "ontology" on the basis of the problematic of das Seiende im 
The "ontology" with which we have begun, however, is the 
"natural" one appropriate to ;:_epresentational thinking. (We read in 
KPM: "An insight into the primordially representational character of 
thought is not less important for our interpretation than is an exact 
comprehension of the sensible character of the imagination" (KPM 154).) 
In the representing statement's subordinating "itself to the directive 
that it speak of beings such~ they are" (BW 124), it achieves the 
conformity to beings that we call "correctness," truth in the ordinary 
sense. Correctness is possible because of the openness of comportment 
(Verhalten); 
for only through the latter can what is opened up really become 
the standard for the representing correspondence. Open comport-
ment must let itself be assigned this standard. This means that 
it must take over a pregiven standard for all representing. 
( 124) 
Heidegger's term Verhaltnis, the "bearing which originally and always 
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comes to prevail as comportment (Verhalten]" (124), suggests the finite 
relatedness of Dasein to what-is as a whole. Verhalten means the 
revealing relatedness to beings characteristic of Dasein, the com-
portment which "stands open to beings. Every open relatedness is a 
comportment" (124). It is on the basis of open comportment that speech 
can conform to beings, because comportment enables speech to take its 
directive from beings, to take beings as its standard. But comportment 
can do this because it itself takes over the pregiven standard of ob-
jectivi~ for its representing. The question, then "arises of the 
ground of the inner possibility of the open comportment which pregives 
a standard" (125). 
Section 3. The Ground of the Possibility of Correctness 
The representative statement can be predirected to an accord with 
the object 
only if this preg1v1ng has already entered freely into an open 
region for something opened up which prevails there and which 
binds every representing. (125) 
But the "openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possi-
bility of correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is 
freedom" ( 125). 
Heidegger adds that "in this connection 'essence' is understood 
as the ground of the inner possibility of what is initially and gener-
ally admitted as known" (125). Here "essence" serves the role per-
formed, in The Metaphysical Foundations of_hQg_ic, by "transcendence," 
which is there the dimension sought through the regression. We find in 
ET the same movement of regression to the "ground of the inner possi-
bility of" the "given"; the different result of the regressus marks the 
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distinction between the approaches of ET and MFL. Of course, in MFL 
the regression arrives at transcendence, and thereby at freedom, as the 
ground of the possibility of 11 logic. 11 Here, however, the regression 
continues, as we shall see, "beyond" freedom to the "essence" of free-
dom itself. 
The regression to essence shows that truth as correspondence is 
possible only on the basis of freedom. Part of the meaning of "free-
dom" as an issue is that truth has an intrinsic relationship to man. 
Thus Heidegger raises the question here whether "to place the essence 
of truth in freedom--doesn't this mean to submit truth to human 
caprice?" (126). The rhetorical question merely marks the tO(!OS of 
the problem of this relationship. But it allows Heidegger to remind 
us of the traditional metaphysical conception of the division between 
truth as it is in itself, "the imperishable and eternal," and the 
essentially un-true character of the human realm, so that truth "can 
never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belong to 
man's essence" (126). This metaphysical motif is brought up in order 
to highlight the reversal in the concept of essence undertaken in the 
Heideggerian text--essence is not otherworldly, "metaphysical," but it 
concerns an origination which takes place in the midst of being as a 
whole, and in relation to the existence of man. The problem of this 
origination is the "metontological" problem. 
Section 4. The Essence of Freedom 
If we can allow that we do not know what freedom is, nor what man 
is, nor what the relation between freedom and man is, then we may be 
prepared for a "transformation of thinking" (127). What is at stake in 
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this transformation of thinking is suggested by the route taken in the 
present essay, in particular by the movement toward the turn from the 
question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth of 
essence. In ET, Heidegger seeks, through the regression to essence, to 
engage just that dimension of "possibility" which "enables" something 
like "truth" to arise. That is to say, the same pattern is repeated 
here in ET that characterizes Heidegger's work in general: A "destruc-
tion" is undertaken of the given position through a regression to the 
"ground of the possibility" of that position. Specifically, here the 
destruction consists in a regression to the ground of the possibility 
of the view of truth as correctness. The sought-for "essence" signi-
fies that which makes possible the traditional position; but to elicit 
the essence means to awaken, as it were, possibility itself. The 
"repetition" achieved at the crux of the inquiry opens up the dimension 
of possibility as such, so that the traditional view is no longer the 
sole necessary "offspring" of the source. This is what is meant by the 
turn from the essence of truth to the truth of essence: the turn from 
the "single vision" of correspondence to the possibility of a multipli-
city of "truths" arising from the source of possibility itself. The 
constant horizon of Heidegger's inquiry remains the "transformation of 
thinking" (127). 
With the reminder that the connection between truth and freedom 
involves us in the "question of the essence of man" (127), Heidegger 
proceeds to a deepening of the question of essence, i.e., of the 
essence of freedom. Freedom is significant only in relation to beings: 
"Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be" (127). What does 
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"letting be" mean? 
To let be--that is, to let beings be as the beings which they 
are--means to engage oneself with the open region and its 
openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that 
openness, as it were, along with itself. (127) 
Let us note the doubleness or ambiguity introduced here with the 
concept of "letting beings be." This "anti-metaphysical" concept 
signifies the way in which freedom (as the essence of truth) is 
oriented toward the "antic"; freedom is, one might say, for the sake of 
the disclosure of beings !!§. what the}! are; indeed, there "are" only 
beings. But precisely because freedom is determined "as freedom for 
what is opened up in an open region" (127), freedom is also engagement 
with the open region and its openness. This subtle duality replaces 
the metaphysical duality of the sensuous and the supersensuous. 
Engagement with beings is at the same time engagement with the open 
region, apart from which beings could not come to stand within it. 
Thus while on the one hand we could not conceive of "beings" apart from 
an engagement with the open region (so that positivist and empiricist 
traditions overlook the dimension which enables us to encounter 
beings), on the other hand there is no meta-physical supersensuous 
realm which lets beings be. The chorismos or metaphysical gap is no 
longer to be conceived as a "vertical" distance opened up between two 
subsistent orders, but is itself the open dimension which constitutes 
the possibility of the appearance of beings as such. 
The "truth itself" then is not meta-physical but is the open 
region which the Greeks designated as ta aletheia (127). Heidegger in 
the 1930 essay translates aletheia as '"unconcealment' rather than 
'truth'" (127), in order to think the ordinary conception of truth as 
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correctness "back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and dis-
closure of beings" (128). Thus Heidegger wishes at the period of this 
essay to preserve the distance between "primordial" truth and the 
"truth" of everyday conception by using different names for each. Per-
haps it is in part for this reason that he once again retracts the 
translation "truth" for aletheia in the late period: 
Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" 
sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings, demon-
strated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as 
the certainty of the knowledge of Being [meta-physical truth], 
aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be 
equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as 
opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth 
itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in the 
element of the opening. (BW 388-89 (The End of Philosophy and 
the Task of Thinking)) 
Likewise, Heidegger in On Time and Being no longer uses "time" to mean 
primordial time, and he restricts "Being" to its meaning as "Presence." 
The engagement with the open region lets beings be by withdrawing 
in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves 
with respect to what and how they are and in order that repre-
sentative correspondence might take its standard from them. As 
this letting-be it exposes itself to beings as such and trans-
poses all comportment into the open region. Letting-be, i.e., 
freedom, is intrinsically ex-posing, ek-sistent .... Ek-
sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the dis-
closedness of beings as such. (128) 
What is at stake in the concept of ek-sistence is the problem of the 
foundation of history (Geschichte). 
The historical issue here is not to be confused with the issue of 
the historicity of Dasein in Being and Time. It is here that Richard-
son founders in his commentary on ET, failing to see what amounts to 
its central issue. On the Essence of Truth is a metontological text, 
meaning that it is no longer concerned with the analytic of Dasein 
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(though this analytic is of course not "jettisoned"), but with the 
foundations of the historical being of humanity. "Historical" signi-
fies the relationship of the emergence of an interpretation of the 
Being of beings, something that takes place with ek-sistence, to a 
possible totality of beings. The problem of Geschichte is that of the 
"happening" of disclosure in the midst of being as a whole. Heideg-
ger1s early period is defined by his fundamental-ontological inquiry, 
whereas the present text addresses the metontological problematic of 
the historical "irruption" of the Da-sein in man for the sake of the 
disclosure of beings in their Being. 
Exposure to the disclosure of being as such (128) begins with the 
qy_estioning that asks what beings are. Ek-sistence means this exposure 
to unconcealment as such and not simply to beings; in questioning, the 
opening up of beings occurs, the unconcealment, as Heidegger says, of 
"beings as such as a whole" (129). In this formula we find the expres-
sion of a new restriction in the concept of metaphysics. Whereas Hei-
degger uses the term "metaphysics" in MFL to refer to the dual struc-
ture of 1) the fundamental questioning concerning the possibility of 
the event of transcendence (ontology) and 2) the concrete event made 
possible through ontology, he now uses "metaphysics" to refer to the 
dual structure of the concrete event itself. That is to say, "ontol-
ogy" now means the understanding of the beingness of beings, and is 
conceived as a moment in the structure of every metaphysics; "theology" 
is that second moment in metaphysics which takes into account the 
"grounding" of being as a whole in a highest being (cf. Identity and 
Difference, pp. 57-61). The twofold structure of metaphysics is 
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retained (as onto-theology), but is itself conceived as a "residue," 
one might say, of. the genuine twofold: the questioning of the 
I!Q.SSibility of anything like the historical irruption of "metaphysics" 
in the midst of being as a whole. This questioning of the possibility 
of metaphysical disclosure constitutes the burden of the texts of 
Heidegger's middle period. The context of the questioning and its 
"object," as it were, is the series of historical "irruptions" of 
metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte). Thus the twofold of "ontology" and 
"metontology" is preserved in the more radical questioning of the 
middle period. The "questioning" takes the place of ontology (and can 
be conceived as a radicalization of the latter), and what it questions 
is the possibility of the irruption of metaphysics into the whole of 
beings. To inquire into the possibility of the sequence of metaphysi-
cal transformations of the beingness of beings, each of which takes 
place in relation to being as a whole (here the "metontology" has 
become the Seinsgeschichte) is what Heidegger means in the Letter on 
Humanism when he says that "thinking is the thinking of Being" (BW 
196)3. Here he also calls Being the "quiet power of the possible" 
(196). 
On the Essence of Truth is an inquiry into the "conditions" which 
make the disclosure of "being as such and as a whole" possible. As 
such, it does not yet treat of the "sequence" of transformations of 
metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte), but of the conditions of any such 
disclosure, as an unconcealment occurring in relation to the conceal-
ment of being as a whole, "in general." On the Essence of Truth is 
about the "foundations" of history (Geschichte): 
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History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up 
into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this 
conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding 
beings as such. (ET 129) 
Thus the phrase "ek-sistent Da-sein" no longer refers to the 
"existing" individual 12.~. but rather to the historical event (ek-
sistence) of disclosure (Da-sein). Thus "truth" does not belong to 
man, and placing the essence of truth in freedom does not reduce truth 
to human proportions; rather 
freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man--so 
originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive 
relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all 
history. ( 129) 
It can hardly be strongly enough emphasized that at the heart of 
Heidegger's work is the question of man, in the sense that the question 
of Being (which is now the question of the possibility of unconcealment 
in general) can only be taken up as the question of the relationship of 
the possibility of disclosure to man, to the humanity "by" which such 
disclosure must occur. "Freedom" is the locus of the question of this 
relationship, a question which is at the same time the question of the 
foundation of history. For freedom signifies the possibility of the 
occurrence of such disclosure (of "being as such as a whole") among any 
"segment" of historical humanity. The problem of history is that of 
how, first of all for Western, "metaphysical" man, and then also for 
any possible humanity, something like an interpretation (being as such, 
beingness) of being (as a whole, i.e., world) can arise. 
The inquiry remains bound at every step to the problematic rela-
tionship of the event of disclosure to human being. 
That man ek-sists now means that for historical humanity the 
history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the 
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disclosure of being as a whole. The rare and the simple 
decisions of history arise from the way the original essence of 
truth essentially unfolds [west]. ( 129-30) 
If "truth" is not separable from man, placed over against him in a 
meta-physical realm, then neither is untruth simply the property of 
fallible man. "Rather, untruth must derive from the essence of truth" 
(130). But if the essence of truth is freedom, in what does the 
essence of untruth consist, and how are "truth" and "untruth" thereby 
related? If the two are interrelated in essence, then it turns out 
that we can speak of the essence and non-essence of truth. 
Section 5. The Essence of Truth 
The principal theme of this section is attunement (Gestimmtheit): 
"As engagement in the disclosure of being as a whole as such, freedom 
has already attuned all comportment to being as a whole" (131). What 
is at stake in the concept of attunement is the relation of man to 
being. 
The discussion of attunement completes the analysis of ek-
sistence as comportment. Comportment, Verhalten, has replaced y~r-
stehen as the central term signifying the manner of man's relatedness 
to beings. Referring back to Section 2: "Comportment stands open to 
beings. Every open relatedness is a comportment. Man's open stance 
varies depending on the kind of beings and the way of comportment" 
(124). Comportment takes its standard from beings, so that statements 
can stand in a relation of representative correspondence with them. 
Thus the inquiry into the essence of truth, in determining that the 
openness of comportment is grounded in freedom, and thus that the 
essence of truth is freedom, has taken the lead from man's "natural" 
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comportment toward beings. 
But attunement concerns, not the representative presentation of 
beings but precisely what is not openly presented along with such 
representation, namely being as a whole. "Every mode of historical 
man's comportment--whether accentuated or not, whether understood or 
not--is attuned and by this attunement is drawn up into being as a 
whole" (131). In this way the unconcealment of beings is "placed" in 
relation to the Other that is its ground, the concealment of being as a 
whole. We are witnessing. in On the Essence of Truth, the transfor-
mation of the twofold of metaphysics (ontology/metontology) into the 
twofold of unconcealment/concealment (aletheia). 
That which the theme of attuning addresses is the Other to the 
openness of beings, "forgotten" precisely through the openness of 
comportment to beings. Whereas in Being and Time Verstehen takes 
precedence in the analysis over Befindlichkeit, and thus existence over 
thrownness, in ET the analysis of attunement is more "fundamental" than 
the discussion of comportment. 
The concealing of being as a whole is the condition which allows 
for the disclosure of beings: 
Precisely because letting beings be always lets beings be in a 
particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses 
them, it conceals being as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically 
at the same time a concealing. (132) 
It is "being as a whole" (not "Being") itself which "brings everything 
into definite accord" (132). Thus it is not man, nor even man's ''mood" 
which attunes, but man in his comportment is brought into attunement 
along with the openedness of being as a whole. The attunement is more 
primary than comportment, in that it "prevails throughout and 
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anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes" in letting beings 
be (131). 
Section 6. Untruth as Concealing 
We can now begin to see why untruth is spoken of as the "non-
essence" of truth, rather than as the essence of untruth. What is at 
stake is not untruth as the "opposite" to truth, but the full structure 
of the essence of truth, i.e. of aletheia. 
The concealment of being as a whole, untruth proper, is older 
than every openedness of this or that being. It is also older 
than letting-be itself which in disclosing already holds con-
cealed and comports itself toward concealing. (132) 
The openedness of beings rests, as a possibility, upon the concealment 
of being as a whole, the essence of truth upon its non-essence. 
As we have seen, what is at issue in On the Essence of Truth is 
no longer "finitude" but "the concealing of what is concealed as a 
whole" (132): Heidegger calls this the mystery. To be sure, "mystery 
as such holds sway throughout man's Da-sein" (132-33): but it is 
clear in this very line that the inquiry into the essence of truth has 
moved into a region more fundamental than that of the being of "man." 
Even if Da-sein is "man's," the mystery holds sway throughout it and is 
more primordial than the ek-sistence of Dasein. Thus the level of 
analysis has moved beyond that of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
with its grounding of the question of Being in the finitude of man. 
"Finitude" now belongs to Being: 
[T]he Un~ of the primordial Unwe~ of truth, as untruth, points 
to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not 
merely of beings). (133) 
The "resolutely open bearing [das entschlossene Verhlltnis]" in 
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which all comportment is grounded is a bearing toward concealment which 
"conceals itself in the process." "Verhaltnis" signifies the totality 
of man's relatedness to being, i.e., attunement and comportment in 
their unity. But in taking his bearings toward beings, on the basis of 
his COll[!Ortaent toward beings, he tends to acquiesce "in this or that 
being and its particular openedness" (134). This is the way that the 
entschlossene Verhaltnis conceals itself: by residing "in what is 
readily available" (134), and thus "letting forgottenness of the 
mystery take precedence and disappearing in it" {134). At the same 
time, it is precisely because of this forgottenness of the mystery that 
man can carry on his daily affairs in his concern with the "everyday": 
Thus left, humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the 
latest needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of 
proposing and planning. From these man then takes his standards, 
forgetting being as a whole. (134) 
In this way Heidegger "derives" the possibility of taking beings 
as the standard (in "representation"). Representational thinking is at 
least schematically "overcome" in such a demonstration, since the 
latter undermines the authority of the sole legitimacy of the appeal to 
beings as a standard in representation and representational thinking. 
What remains undone, and what cannot be accomplished in Qn the~~se~ 
of Truth, is to show how other "standards" are possible than the 
objectifying standard derived from the open comportment toward beings 
as present4. 
Man's forgetting of being as a whole is not something he "does" 
but is based upon that "bearing by which Dasein not only ek-sists but 
also at the same time in-sists, i.e., holds fast to what is offered by 
beings, as if they were open in and of themselves. As ek-sisten!.i_ 
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Dasein is insistent" (135). It is Dasein's very ek-sistence which 
delivers him over to his in-sistence; Dasein's open comportment after 
all, his freedom, is for the sake of letting beings be. Dasein does 
not leave his own nature behind in taking beings as the standard, by 
falling into a concern with beings alone. It is precisely by virtue of 
his relatedness to being as a whole that he is led into a neglect of 
being as a whole. Man's openness toward beings is possible only on the 
basis of the mystery, or the concealing, not only of being as a whole, 
but the concealing of that very concealing. 
Thus "mystery" names the total structure of man's relatedness to 
being. It is not only forgotten in and with that very relatedness, but 
is the ground of the forgetting itself. Heidegger's analysis then, 
does not "change" anything in our relationship to being as a whole and 
beings, but opens up the character of that relatedness in order to let 
it remain in its own "essence" (non-essence). Thus the goal of inquiry 
is not to make explicit what was implicit, but rather to let the "im-
plicit" remain "implicit." No "science of Being" is possible. The 
concept of "mystery" has replaced that of "phenomenon." 
Section 7. Untruth as Errancy 
The insistent turning toward [Zuwendung] what is readily avail-
able and the ek-sistent turning away [Wegwendu~] from the 
mystery belong together. They are one and the same. Yet turn-
ing toward and away from is based on a turning to and fro proper 
to Dasein. Man's flight from the mystery toward what is readily 
available, onward from one current thing to the next, passing the 
mystery by--this is erring [irren]. (135/196) 
This turning to and fro is itself the "ground" of history, and itself 
belongs to a "finitude" more fundamental than the finitude of man. 
Dasein is "constituted" through this turning; man's being is impaled 
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upon the "cross" of a contradiction constitutive of his essence: 
The full essence of truth, including its most proper non-essence, 
keeps Dasein in need by this turning to and fro. Dasein is a 
turning into need [Wendung in die Not]. (137/198) 
Dasein is so radically bound to this "needh that there is no meta-
physical realm into which Dasein might flee from his relatedness to 
beings and to being as a whole. Even an inquiry into the essence of 
truth remains within that turning into need, from which arises the 
necessity (Notwendigkeit) of thought. The Turn itself signifies this 
''turning into need," whereby thought remains true to its own finitude: 
"Then resolute openness toward the mystery [Ent-schlossenheit zum 
Geheimnisj is under way into errancy as such" (137/198). The Turn 
means a turning into finitude--which can no longer be conceived as the 
"finitude" of man. And openness toward the mystery releases Dasein 
into errancy as such. Here we have a "clue" to the nature of the 
overcoming of metaphysics in Heidegger's difficult thought of the Turn 
as a turning into "oblivion as oblivion" and man's transformed rela-
tionship to Being as a "corresponding" to the withdrawal of Being 
itself. We shall restrict our remarks on the Turn to the context 
provided by "On the Essence of Truth." 
The essay "On the Essence of Truth" manifests the structure, and 
therefore the essential "content," of Heidegger's "regressive" inquiry. 
Thus the "regression to origin" is undertaken through Section 5, where-
in Heidegger locates the essence of truth in ek-sistent freedom. The 
structure of the twofold begins to come to the fore in Section 6, as 
the relationship between the unconcealment of beings and the concealing 
of being as a whole. This ~elation is now thematized as turning in 
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Section 7. The fundamental themes of Heidegger's work are here laid 
out in order and in their "methodological" interconnection: regression 
to origin, the twofold, the turning within the twofold. Regression to 
origin establishes the thought of that "unity" which, when thought 
through to the end, necessarily fulfills itself in an overturning 
(Umschlag) into that other to ontology (das Seiende im Ganzen) which 
"precedes" it. But this 11etabole is actually constitutive of the 
relationship between the moments of the twofold (see in this respect 
Heidegger's full development of the concept of metabole in his lecture 
on Aristotle's Physics B,15). 
The "turning to and fro" [Zu- und Weg-wenden] of Dasein is a 
turning "within" the twofold, i.e., within the full structure of the 
"mystery." The "regression to origin" situates Dasein within that 
original condition--thrownness in Being and Time, but here, more 
fundamentally, the mystery--from "out of which" the question of Being 
arises and "to which" it returns in a reflection on its own origins. 
Heidegger speaks in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic of the 
"recoil" of the question of ground "back into one ground (thrownness in 
itself)" (MFL 215). In Introduction to Metaphysics we read: 
But if we consider the question of Being in the sense of an 
inquiry into Being as such, it becomes clear to anyone who fol-
lows our thinking that Being as such is precisely hidden from 
metaphysics, and remains forgotten--and so radically that the 
forgetfulness of Being, which itself falls into forgetfulness, is 
the unknown but enduring impetus to metaphysical questioning. 
(18-19) 
To inquire into "Being as such" means first of all to inquire into that 
unknown impetus, namely the oblivion of Being~~ such--the matter of 
thought is the "mystery." 
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Section 8 will bring the whole of the previous discussion in ET 
into relation to the meaning of philosophy as such--a question that 
remains the constant issue of Heidegger's work. Section 9, the "Note" 
added in 1943, situates the essay itself within the question of the 
possibility of the Turn and brings into play the theme of "transfor-
mation." In this essay, then, the whole of the fundamental structure 
of Heidegger's work--the themes of origin, twofold, and turn, bounded 
by the fundamental "context" of "f initude" and by the essential "aim" 
of transformation--is brought into play. 
At the present juncture, we have found that Dasein "is" the 
turning to and fro within the twofold, i.e. , within the "structure" of 
the mystery. The Turn means first of all the turning to and fro within 
the mystery, and therefore the "movement" of all history; Heidegger's 
own thought, therefore, insofar as it thinks the Turn, is in a certain 
sense distinguishable from any other philosophy only in that it is 
itself the thought of this movement. Heidegger's enterprise does not 
attempt to take a position "beyond" the movement constitutive of 
philosophy, i.e., of Dasein. In thinking finitude, it attempts to 
enter into the movement proper to finitude and thus to disclose it. 
This disclosure, however, eventuates, not in an objectification of 
finitude, but in a more decisive "turn" into it. Heidegger's thought 
wishes to be "under way into errancy as such" (137). To see how this 
is so, let us return to a consideration of the theme of errancy in 
Section 7. 
"History" is founded in errancy. We have already encountered 
this foundation in the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein, the "fulfillment 
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and consummation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure 
of beings" ( 129). .The ek-sistence of man means "that for historical 
humanity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the 
disclosure of beings as a whole" (129-30). The happening of "truth"--
here the openedness of beings--takes place with ek-sistence (in ~eing 
and Time, "projection"). In ek-sistence, however, man takes his 
standards from beings, and is thereby turned away from the mystery. 
Man's ek-sistent insistence is not a mere "happenstance," but is 
fundamental to man's being; it is founded in a "flight from the 
mystery," and this is "erring" (135). "Errancy is the free space 
[Spielraum] for that turning in which in-sistent ek-sistence adroitly 
forgets and mistakes itself constantly anew" (136/196). But it is only 
because of errancy that any historical "openedness of beings"--for the 
sake of which insistent ek-sistence "adroitly" forgets itself--can 
occur and take its course. "The errancy in which any given segment of 
historical humanity must proceed for its course to be errant is 
essentially connected with the openness of Dasein" ( 136). "History" is 
the history of "error." 
Errancy, the heir to the "falling" of Being and Time, charac-
terizes Dasein's relationship to the mystery. It is not a "flaw" in an 
otherwise pristine type of being, because it belongs to the "turning to 
and fro," in relation to the mystery, which is fund11ment11lli character-
istic of Dasein's being. The falling movement, Wirbel or "turbulence" 
of Being and Time6 is now understood as the "turning to and fro proper 
to Dasein." This movement is constitutive of the structure of human 
"finitude," and is the foundation of the very possibility of history. 
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The turning to and fro could not be thought apart from the 
possibility of a glimpse of the constant "center"--the mystery--which 
lets us think this turning as such. This is the way that Heidegger 
puts it in Grundfragen der Philosophie (1937/38): 
Nur das Eine ist sofort deutlich: In diesem Weltalter der 
volligen Frraglosigkeit wird die Philosophie als das fragende 
Heraufrufen des Fra~rc!!&.~ten unausweichlich zum Befremdlich-
sten. Deshalb ist sie das Notwendigste. Das Notwendige hat 
seine machtigste Gestalt im &infachen. Das Einfache aber nennen 
wir jenes unscheinbar Schwerste, das, wenn es ist, jedermann 
sogleich und fortan als das Leichteste und Greiflichste erscheint 
und doch unantastbar das Schwerste bleibt. Das Einfache ist das 
Schwerste, well das Vielfache die Zerstreuung erlaubt und begtin-
stigt und alle Zerstreuung als Gegenspiel der Sammlung den 
Menschen auf seiner standig Flucht vor ihm selbst--will sagen vor 
seinem Bezug zum Seyn selbst--bestatigt und so entlastet und das 
Schwergewicht des Daseins aushangt. Das Vielfache ist das 
Leichte--auch dort, wo seine Besorgung scheinbar Mtihe macht. 
Denn: Immer ist der Forgang vom einen zum anderen Erleichterung, 
und gerade diesen Fortgang versagt das Einf ache und zwingt zur 
standigen und standig sich bereichernden Rtickkehr zu dem Selben. 
Nur wenn wir das Einfache wagen, kommen wir in den Spielraum des 
Notwendigen. Das Notwendigste der Philosophie--gesetzt, daa sie 
wieder das Befremdlichste werden muB--ist jene einfache Frage, 
durch die sie, die Fragende, zuerst zu sich selbst gebracht wird: 
die Frage nach der Wahrheit. (GrF 13) 
Approximately: 
Only one thing is immediately clear: In this age of utter 
questionlessness philosophy as the questioning evocation of the 
question-worthiest inevitably becomes something most strange. 
Accordingly it is the most necessary thing. The necessary has 
its most powerful shape in the Simple. But the Simple is what we 
call that unpretentious gravity which, when it is, appears to 
everyone at once and henceforth as the most facile and easiest to 
grasp, and yet incontestably remains the most serious. The 
Simple (Onefold) is the most burdensome, because the Manifold 
allows and encourages dispersal and all dispersal confirms, as 
the counterpart to gathering, man in his constant flight before 
himself--not to mention before his relation to Seyn itself--and 
thus relieves him of the burden of Dasein and sets it aside. The 
Manifold is the facile--precisely where concern makes travail 
appear. For: The advance from one to another is always allevi-
ation, and just this advance denies the Simple and compels to 
constancy, and to a constantly enriched return to the Same. Only 
if we dare the Simple, do we come into the region [Spielraum] of 
the necessary. The greatest necessity of philosophy--supposing 
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that it must again become something most strange--is that sim~le 
question, through which this, namely questioning, is first 
brought to itself: the question concerning truth. 
What is striking in this difficult passage is the intertwining of the 
Simple and the Manifold, in the sense that it is precisely the "allev-
iating" advance within the Manifold that compels this very advance to a 
"constantly enriched return to the Same." This return does not, there-
fore, represent an "escape" from the turbulence in the sense of an 
event which lifts Dasein out of or above history; it is rather a 
moment, as it were, in that very movement whereby that movement comes 
"home" to itself. It is as part of the "turning to and fro" con-
stitutive of Dasein that the "turn" to the Simple itself occurs. Thus 
whenever Heidegger says in ET that 
... as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to 
a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his ek-
sistence--the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself 
and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, he not let himself 
be led astray (136), 
he does not mean that Dasein simply "escapes" from errancy. It is 
precisely in experiencing errancy itself, "as such," that man "turns" 
into the mystery and thereby is no longer led astray. But because the 
mystery is not a phenomenon to be grasped in its transparency, but is 
rather concealment and even the concealment of concealment, to arrive 
at the "mystery," in the sense of "resolute openness toward the 
mystery," is to be "under way into errancy as such" (137). 
It is only here, with the turning into errancy as such, that "the 
question of the essence of truth gets asked more primordially"; it is 
only here that "the ground of the intertwining of the essence of truth 
with the truth of essence reveals itself" (137). What is at stake here 
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in the turning from the essence of truth to the truth of essence is a 
possible transformation of thinking, effected through the "glimpse" 
into the mystery; the glimpse into the mystery "changes" nothing except 
to liberate thinking into that mystery which, in errancy, always 
remains the concealed ground of thinking. The "essence of truth"--
truth as conformity to the repre-sentational presentation of beings, 
the interpretation of beings in terms of presence--has its ground in 
the mystery which, concealing itself, makes possible Dasein's taking 
the standard of its co•portment from beings themselves. The turn 
toward the mystery brings the disclosure that "freedom itself origi-
nates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in 
errancy" (137). In this way the authority, as it were, of beings in 
their disclosedness, and therefore Dasein 1 s propensity to take its 
standard from beings, is undercut. But this does not mean that Dasein 
now dwells in the meta-physical "truth," stable in itself and free from 
the transformations of history. Rather, Dasein opens itself in a new 
way to that very process of transformation itself (into the "truth of 
essence"). All of philosophy takes its rise from this very same 
"moment" of "glimpse into the mystery" (137) (cf. the essay "The Turn" 
with its discussion of "insight into that which is"). Heidegger says 
that 
The glimpse into the mystery out of errancy is a question--in the 
sense of that unique question of what being as such is as a 
whole. This questioning thinks the question of the Being of 
beings, a question that is essentially misleading and thus in its 
manifold meaning is still not mastered. The thinking of Being, 
from which such questioning primordially originates, has since 
Plato been understood as "philosophy" and later received the 
title "metaphysics." (137) 
Heidegger 1 s own attempt to think the mystery as such repeats the 
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question which constitutes philosophy as such. Therefore it is not 
necessary to assume that Heidegger's thought breaks free of the "fini-
tude" constitutive of human thought as such. Even in the "ontological" 
question man is "especially subjected to the rule of the mystery and 
the oppression of errancy" (136}. The "thinking of Being" that Hei 
degger's work undertakes has, in fact, precisely the task of showing 
how, within the "needful condition of being constrained by the one 
[mystery] and the other [errancy]" (137-37}, something like the 
question of Being can arise. 
The "thinking of Being" cannot go "beyond" the domain of this 
"needful condition"; it cannot escape the "turning to and fro," but 
rather represents a unique intensification of Dasein's relation to that 
turning which is "constitutive" of metaphysics. The thinking of Being 
means to think this turning as such (which itself "is" Da-sein). To 
think Being "by itself" means to radicalize the thought of the "rela-
tionship" within the twofold until that relationship (aletheia) can be 
thought "as such." Thus, with the metontological inversion, Heidegger 
addresses the possibility of there being anything like the question of 
Being, and thus "Being," arising in the midst of being as a whole. At 
the initial stage of the questioning--in this metontological re-
initiation of the question concerning the possibility of the question 
of Being--it cannot be assumed that there is any "other" to the whole 
of beings. In this sense, Heidegger remains radically anti-meta-phys-
ical. The metontological problem, definitive of the "middle period," 
is how "Being" can be thought from the condition of the "needful 
condition" of man. And because Heidegger's own thinking, like all 
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"thinking," is a "turning into need," it cannot escape this condition, 
but can only "turn" within it. 
Section 8. Philosophy and the Question of Truth 
A concern with the meaning of "philosophy" is always at work in 
Heidegger's thought. In one sense, the central concern of his work is 
the meaning of philosophy ("thinking"). Here he brings philosophy 
immediately into proximity with language: 
In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for ek-
sistence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words. 
These are not just the "expression" of an opinion but are always 
already the ably conserved articulation of the truth of being as 
a whole. ( 138) 
Heidegger contrasts philosophy with sophistry, which bases itself upon 
the unquestioned character of being as it is already opened up. Thus 
philosophy, which puts the "liberation that grounds history" into 
words, has sophistry as its "insistent" counterpart. But sophistry 
with its foundation in common sense does not reach to the "original 
truth of being as such as a whole" (138). 
Philosophy itself, however, has an essentially discordant 
structure, i.e., one which is "split in two": 
But because the full essence of truth contains the non-essence 
and above all holds sway as concealing, philosophy as a 
questioning into this truth is intrinsically discordant [in sich 
zwiespaltig]. Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement 
[Gelassenheit der Milde] that does not renounce the concealment 
of being as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the 
stern and resolute openness [Ent-schlossenheit der Strenge] that 
does not disrupt the concealing, but entreats its unbroken 
essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its 
own truth. (138/199) 
Here Heidegger harmonizes the discordancy of the twofold. Metaphysics 
fails to understand itself as thus "ambiguous," as sustaining an 
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inherent relationship to the concealment of being as a whole even while 
opening up the disclosure of beings as such. 
Heidegger concludes chapter 8 with the following paragraph: 
The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of 
truth beyond the confines of the ordinary definition provided in 
the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the 
question of the essence of truth must no be, at the same time and 
even first of all, the question concerning the truth of essence. 
But in the concept of "essence" philosophy thinks Being. In 
tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements 
back to the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be as its "ground," 
likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground 
in concealing and in errancy, we want to show that the essence of 
truth is not the empty "generality" of an "abstract" universality 
but rather that which, self-concealing, is unique in the 
unremitting history of the disclosure of the "meaning" of what we 
call Being--what we for a long time have been accustomed to 
considering only as being as a whole. (139) 
Here the question of Being is raised as a question in relatiQ!! to the 
way that metaphysics understands it, i.e., as the manner of Being of 
being as a whole; it is furthermore correlated with the turning from 
the essence of truth to the truth of essence. That is to say, the 
domain of the essence of truth, i.e., of the openedness of beings (the 
unconcealment of being as such as a whole) is that of metaphysics, the 
province of the traditional understanding of Being. To raise the 
Being-question anew is to raise the question of the truth of essence, 
Le., of the source of the possibility of "truth," of unconcealment as 
such. In "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger has arrived at the QOint 
of commencement for any such questioning: the relation between disclo-
sure and its "ground" in the concealment of being as a whole. 
The regression to the "ground" of historical disclosure, under-
taken in "On the Essence of Truth," can only arrive at the "condition" 
for the possibility of any such disclosure, namely the mystery and its 
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concealment in errancy. The issue concerns the relatedness of man to 
being as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen). The movement of regression 
can only grasp the basis for "any" given moment of history--the inquiry 
in ET is, as it were, restricted to the synchronous moment of disclo-
sure. As a regression to the ground of the essence of truth, it can 
locate the "origin" of disclosure in the concealment of being as a 
whole, and therefore understand historical disclosure ~such, but it 
cannot thereby provide the means to understand the relation among var-
ious possible moments of disclosure. The question of this relationship 
is what is meant by the problem of the "truth of essence": what is the 
"source" of the ~equ™ of historical disclosures? "On the Essence of 
Truth" establishes the starting-point for an inquiry into the Seinsge-
schichte, but does not provide the "means" for such an inquiry. In-
deed, it cannot do so, as Heidegger points out in the "Note" of 1943 
( 140) . 
How, then, is the source or origin of the sequence of 
transformations of metaphysics to be addressed? But this is precisely 
the {!roblem of Heidegger's "middle period," with this introduction to 
which we shall bring our own investigations to an end. Here we can do 
no more than to suggest what it means to question Being "by itself": 
To question Being means, not to "leave" being as a whole behind--
something that is impossible for finite Dasein--but to question ~elf­
co~~~alment ever more radically. To question Being means to articulate 
the "language" of the interrelationship of concealment and unconceal-
ment (aletheia, the twofold). Thinking the truth of Being means to 
think self-concealment "as such" and as the source of unconcealment. 
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Section 9: Note 
"Truth signifies sheltering that lightens as the basic 
characteristic of Being" (140). There is no longer any mention here of 
"being as a whole." Thus "the answer to the question of the essence of 
truth is the saying of a turning [die Sage einer Kehre] within the 
history of Being [Seinsgeschichte]" (140). The Turn itself is visible 
in the transformed language regarding concealment: 
Because sheltering that lightens belongs to it, Being appears 
primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal. The name of 
this lighting [Lichtung] is aletheia. (140) 
The "truth of essence" is the "source" of the essence of truth because 
"sheltering that lightens is--i .e., lets essentially unfold--accordance 
between knowledge and beings" (140). Although the questioning in ET 
seems to remain "on the path of metaphysics," "it accomplishes a change 
in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics" 
(141). 
What Heidegger seeks is something on the order of a transfor-
mation of thinking. Indeed, he says that the truth of Being is sought 
"as the ground of a transformed historical position" (141). 
The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a 
thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and 
concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its 
relatedness to Being. (141) 
The transformation occurs with die Sage einer Kehre, and is therefore a 
transformation which occurs "in" language, and which is at the same 
time a transformation "of" language.7 
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NOTES 
The lecture '.'On the Essence of Truth," thought out and delivered 
in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight 
into the thinking of the turning from "Being and Time" to "Time 
and Being." This turning is not a change of standpoint from 
Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first 
arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and 
Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the 
fundamental experience of the oblivions of Being. (BW 208) 
2. Cf. Richardson, pp. 211 ff. 
3. As he tells David Krell in the interview, "Work Sessions with 
Martin Heidegger," by David Farrell Krell, Phil~sopQ.uodcy, vol. XXVI, 
1982, p. 133. 
4. The concept of standard is, we might point out, a "topological" 
theme, and the problem of the "transformation of the site" of 
metaphysics is that of opening up the possibility of other "stand-
ards," topological measures, than that appropriate to objectifying, 
representational thinking. The question of such non-metaphysical 
"standards" is the issue of what Heidegger calls "poetizing thinking." 
5. This text is essential to an understanding of the structure of 
Heidegger's work. 
6. What Wirbel makes manifest in Being and Time is that thrownness "has 
the character of throwing and of movement" (BT 223/179). In "On the 
Essence of Truth" Heidegger finds that "movement" to have the character 
of "turning to and fro," which, as we are attempting to show, is 
constitutive of histo~. 
The theme of Wirbel seems to have its roots in Plato; 
specifically, perhaps, in the "Myth of the true Earth" with which the 
Phaedo concludes (lllc-112b). The "hollows" mentioned there suggest 
that something like finitude is at issue. 
7. The problem of "transformation" cannot be discussed without 
reference to language, nor can the explication of the "inquiry into 
origin" be completed without an explanation of the relation of that 
inquiry to the "problem" of language. It is the inquiry into language 
that enables Heidegger to "solve" the problem of origin without having 
to leave behind the finitude of Dasein. We cannot take up this 
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